Morrison v. State
| Decision Date | 09 March 1966 |
| Citation | 21 McCanless 374,217 Tenn. 374,400 S.W.2d 237 |
| Parties | , 217 Tenn. 374 Joe MORRISON et al. v. STATE of Tennessee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Jack E. Vaughn and John Washington, Johnson City, for plaintiff in error Morrison.
Preston H. Taylor, Kingsport, for plaintiffs in error Culbertson and Bradley.
Thomas E. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
We have herein a second petition to rehear on behalf of Morrison which is courteous, conscientious and forceful. This petition is to the effect that the defendant, Morrison, was prejudiced because in the examination of one of the arresting officers certain contents of a statement made to him by co-defendant, Culbertson, prejudiced the rights of Morrison to such an extent that the questions in reference to this statement amounted to a violation of Morrison's constitutional rights in having evidence given against him wherein the witness who gave same was not subject to cross-examination by counsel for Morrison.
There are two cases particularly cited and relied upon in support of this contention, to-wit, Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934; and Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923. In the Douglas case the confession of an accomplice was the only direct proof that Douglas fired the shotgun involved in the murder case and that Douglas had the requisite intent at the time he fired the weapon to commit murder. In other words the conviction in the Douglas case apparently was based upon the accomplice's confession with some slight corroboration.
In the Pointer case the chief prosecuting witness was not present for the trial, and a transcript of his testimony at the preliminary hearing where Pointer's rights of cross-examination were extremely limited was permitted in the evidence at the trial of the case. Thus, as in the Douglas case, in the Pointer case the State's case rested for the most part upon the testimony of a witness in such a manner as to deprive the defendant of a right to cross-examine.
We have carefully read these two cases and think that they are easily distinguished under the factual situation from how the trial in the original instance was conducted in the case against Morrison. Since the filing of the second petition to rehear herein, we have reexamined the record and read the testimony upon which it is contended that a new trial should be granted on the basis of the authority of the Douglas and Pointer cases. We find that in this examination these two co-defendants who were indicted along with Morrison did not take the witness stand, but that an officer, who had taken voluntary statements from them, when being cross-examined or examined by counsel, who referred to these statements, was asked if these two co-defendants did not make certain statements in their admissions to this officer of their participation in this crime. These questions where they had any reference whatsoever to Morrison were objected to, and the trial judge promptly sustained the objection to any statement made in this voluntary statement to the officer in reference to Morrison.
During this examination part of the time the jury was excused and most of the argument on the subject of the admission of these statements was done outside the presence of the jury. None of the contents of the statements got into the record. Bits of the statement did get into the record by this method of examination, but in each instance where there was the slightest reference to Morrison the court sustained the objection in this language:
'I sustain the objection as to that, as to what anyone else said, and I will only let you question him as to the defendant Culbertson, what he said, what he did, or what he said to him.'
In each instance when there was anything said with reference to Morrison, the court would sustain the objection and say: 'Disregard it, Gentlemen of the Jury.' And again the court said when anything crept into the examination with reference to Morrison, 'As to its pertaining to anyone else I am going to...
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Palmer v. State
...of the evidence pro and con. Hargrove v. State, 199 Tenn. 25, 28, 281 S.W.2d 692, 694; Morrison v. State, 217 Tenn. 374, 397 S.W.2d 826, 400 S.W.2d 237. While the defendant's wife and children were living in Michigan, he and the deceased, Ada Ruth Goins, lived together in a common-law relat......
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Ledford v. State
...(Tenn.Cr.App.1975); Tooley v. State, 1 Tenn.Cr. 652, 448 S.W.2d 683, 687 (1969). Or, more adroitly stated in Morrison v. State, 217 Tenn. 374, 390, 391, 400 S.W.2d 239 (1966): ". . . We must conclude that the jury made up of citizens of high intelligence, fair minded men and women, and juro......
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Hancock v. State
...by that testimony.' Hargrove v. State, 199 Tenn. 25, 28, 281 S.W.2d 692, 694; Morrison v. State, 217 Tenn. 374, 397 S.W.2d 826, 400 S.W.2d 237. The defendant relied upon the defense of alibi. Such a defense presents an issue of fact to be determined by the credibility of the witnesses and t......
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Hughes v. State
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