Morrissette v. Chicago, B. & QR Co.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. 60 C 1171.,60 C 1171.
• Citation: 193 F. Supp. 600
• Parties: Eugene J. MORRISSETTE, Felix Lee and Nathaniel Brown, Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

193 F. Supp. 600

Eugene J. MORRISSETTE, Felix Lee and Nathaniel Brown, Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.

No. 60 C 1171.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois, E. D.

May 3, 1961.

Arthur S. Gomberg, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Burton E. Ericson, of Bishop, Burdett, Falasz & Doherty, and T. G. Schuster, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

ROBSON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are former employees of defendant and have filed a two-count complaint for wrongful discharge. Count one is for damages, and count two is for reinstatement. Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction in this Court and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiffs do not allege that jurisdiction is based on diversity, but state that the "jurisdiction of this Court is founded upon interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C., Sections 151 et seq. * * *" The Act does not give District Courts jurisdiction over actions for wrongful discharge, whether the relief sought is damages or reinstatement (Broady v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 7 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 73; Starke v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 7 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 569; Buster v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 7 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 73). The Act provides an administrative remedy for settling such matters. A discharged employee has alternative remedies, one established by the Act and one at common law, if the state law permits such an action without a showing of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies (Walters v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co., 7 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 332).

Plaintiffs elected to pursue their administrative remedy and submitted their claims to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, Third Division, which denied them December 16, 1959. Plaintiffs allege that the Board failed to make an award because it became deadlocked, and no referee was appointed in accordance with the statute. The Act establishes a procedure to follow upon deadlock, but plaintiffs have not alleged that they availed themselves of it (45 U.S.C.A. § 153, subd. 1). The Board's awards (or "denials" of plaintiffs' claims) are not included in the pleadings, nor are the transcripts on which they are based, so it must be presumed they were validly determined.

In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 1959, 360 U.S. 601, at page 608, 79 S.Ct. 1351, 1355, 3 L.Ed.2d 1460, the Court said:

"Thus, the plain language of § 3 First (m), on its face, imports that Congress intended that the Board's disposition of a grievance should preclude a subsequent court action by the losing party. Furthermore, we have said of the Railway Labor Act that `the specification of one remedy normally excludes another.' Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 301 64 S.Ct. 95, 97, 88 L.Ed. 61. Thus, our duty to give effect to the congressional purpose compels us to hold that the instant common-law action is precluded unless the overall scheme established by the Railway Labor Act and the legislative history clearly indicate a congressional intention contrary to that which the plain meaning of the words imports. Our understanding of the statutory scheme and the legislative history, however, reinforces what the statutory language already makes clear, namely, that Congress barred the employee's subsequent resort to the common-law remedy after an adverse determination of his grievance by the Adjustment Board." (Emphasis ours.)

The Court further said in 360 U.S. at page 612, 79 S.Ct. at page 1357:

"Upon failure of a division to agree upon an award because of a deadlock or inability to secure a majority vote of the division members, the division must appoint a neutral referee to sit with the division as a member thereof and make an award, § 3 First (l). Awards are final and binding except insofar as they contain a money award * * *." (Emphasis ours.)

Continuing, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and said at pages 613-614, 79 S.Ct. at page 1358:

"The labor spokesman for the proposal made it crystal clear that an essential feature of the proposal was that Board awards on grievances submitted by or on behalf of employees were to be final and binding upon the affected

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