Morrow v. Dretke
| Decision Date | 14 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-10024.,03-10024. |
| Citation | 367 F.3d 309 |
| Parties | Ricky Eugene MORROW, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Doug DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Randy Schaffer (argued), The Schaffer Firm, Houston, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Tina J. Dettmer (argued), Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
This is an application for a certificate of appealability by Ricky Eugene Morrow, a Texas death row inmate, seeking to appeal the decision of the federal district court denying habeas relief and refusing a COA. Morrow raises three contentions. First, he argues that the district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing and presuming the findings of the State habeas court to be correct even though it held no hearing. Second, he asserts that the state habeas court committed constitutional error in rejecting his claim that the state suppressed FBI and Dallas police reports of interviews with prosecution witnesses. Third, he urges that the district court erred in rejecting his claim that his counsel was ineffective at the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. We grant the request for a COA on the Brady claims and ultimately affirm their denial on the merits. We deny a COA on the remaining claims.
Morrow was convicted of capital murder by a jury in Dallas County, Texas, in 1983 and sentenced to death. That conviction was reversed on appeal.1 He was tried again with the same result. This second conviction was affirmed on appeal.2 Morrow filed his state habeas petition on October 21, 1996, supplemented on January 26, 1999. Because the judge who presided at the trial had retired, the habeas case was assigned to a visiting judge who denied a request for an evidentiary hearing and recommended denial of relief upon the record as supplemented by affidavits and documents, a recommendation accepted by the Court of Criminal Appeals.3 Morrow's federal petition followed on September 13, 2000. The federal magistrate judge also denied an evidentiary hearing, and on April 9, 2002, filed her recommendations. The district court in turn adopted the sixty-five page report of the magistrate judge, denying relief and a COA.
Unless a COA is granted, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal.4 The standard is whether Morrow "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."5 This standard "includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."6
The COA determination "requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits" but not "full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims."7
As for the merits, under section 2254(d), an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.8
The Supreme Court has explained that a state court decision is "contrary" to established federal law if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases," or confronts facts that are "materially indistinguishable" from a relevant Supreme Court precedent, yet reaches an opposite result.9 Alternatively, a state court "unreasonably applies" clearly established federal law if it correctly identifies the governing precedent but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular case.10
A federal habeas court's inquiry into reasonableness should be objective rather than subjective, and a court "may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly."11 Rather, federal habeas relief is only merited where the state court decision is both incorrect and objectively unreasonable.12 However, "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law."13 In other words, habeas relief is inappropriate when a state court, at a minimum, reaches a "satisfactory conclusion."14 This court has also held that it is the state court's "ultimate decision" that is to be tested for reasonableness, "not every jot of its reasoning."15
Additionally, section 2254(e)(1) also requires federal courts to presume correct the factual findings of the state courts unless the petitioner "rebut [s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence."16
For reasons we will explain, we deny Morrow's request for a certificate of appealability on his claim that the district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing and in presuming the state court findings to be correct, as well as his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We grant the certificate for Morrow's claim that the State suppressed FBI reports and interviews with prosecution witnesses. However, we reject this claim on its merits and affirm the judgment of the district court insofar as it denied Morrow relief on this claim.
The federal district court described the robbery and murder as follows:
Trial testimony adduced the following facts regarding the events at issue. In the late morning of January 19, 1982, Morrow and [Linda Ferguson Morrow]17 proceeded to a laundromat so that Ferguson could do their laundry while Morrow went to a pawnshop to purchase a radio. He later returned for Ferguson and they in turn went back to the pawnshop ostensibly to purchase a television. They instead purchased two handguns — a smaller.25 pistol and a larger .38 revolver. After purchasing the weapons, they proceeded to a mall to purchase ammunition.
Ferguson and Morrow arrived at Metropolitan [Savings] at around 4:15 p.m. Morrow went inside the bank and "started screaming and cursing and hollering and directing profanities at everyone in the bank and demanding the money." Joena Bailey Shipley, Jean Cullum Blum, W.L. Miller, and Carol Fritchie were working at Metropolitan at the time of the robbery. Morrow exited the bank with a sack of money, including coins. As he exited, the sack ripped and his gun discharged. He stopped to retrieve the dropped money. Two bystanders, Louis Wong and Bo Holmes, witnessed a man leaving the scene with money falling from a ripped sack. No one disputes that the man they saw was petitioner Ricky Morrow.
John Norton, a Dallas police officer at the time of the robberies, interviewed witnesses at Metropolitan. After the Metropolitan robbery, Dallas police officer K.C. Edmonds interviewed Shipley, Blum, Miller, and Fritchie. Agent Nelson Borrero of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also interviewed Blum.
After leaving Metropolitan, Morrow and Ferguson arrived at First Texas [Savings] between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. As Morrow entered First Texas he approached Kathy Knoebber Crouse at her desk. When Mark Frazier, another bank employee, asked Morrow if he needed assistance, Morrow "started screaming and ranting and raving and cursing and hollering it was a robbery." He led Frazier at gunpoint to Tammy Roy's teller window and pointed one pistol at her and another pistol at Frazier. After getting a sack of money from Roy, Morrow shot and killed Frazier and exited the bank.
Jo Brown, Operations Supervisor at First Texas, witnessed the events at First Texas on January 19, 1982. Nancy Galloway, another employee of First Texas, also witnessed the events of that date. Jan Noble, a real estate agent with an office in the same building at First Texas, witnessed Morrow and Ferguson leave the scene in their vehicle.
After robbing First Texas, Morrow and Ferguson proceeded to the Park Cities Inn and rented Room 311. Richard A. Acree, a police officer then employed by the University Park Police Department, spotted their vehicle at the inn. He spoke with Sherry Baker, the clerk-receptionist for the inn, and ascertained that Morrow and Ferguson were in room 311. He called for assistance and several units arrived on the scene soon thereafter.
Numerous law enforcement officers from the FBI, Dallas Police Department, and University Park Police Department arrived at the inn, converged on Room 311, and demanded that Morrow and Ferguson surrender. FBI Agent Thomas Yunessa, armed with an assault rifle, and Dallas Police Officer P.T. Barnum, armed with a shotgun, crouched behind a toppled coke machine in the hall outside the room. Officers Edmonds, Luke Robertson, and Harold Rice, as well as Detectives Charles Hallam, John Landers, and Jack Baird of the Dallas Police Department, were also present at the inn. Ferguson voluntarily surrendered. Morrow then fired his .38 revolver. Law enforcement officers fired weapons and Morrow subsequently surrendered.
Special Agent Richard T. Garcia of the FBI interviewed Crouse after the robbery and shooting at First Texas. Special Agent H. Lamar Meyer interviewed Nancy Galloway and Jan Noble regarding the events at First Texas.
We must deny a COA for Morrow's first claim that the federal district court erred in applying a presumption of correctness to the state habeas findings because they rested on the papers filed and not on testimony at an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Manning v. Epps, Civil Action No.: 1:05CV256-WAP.
...that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold."); Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.2004) (habeas relief merited where state decision both incorrect and objectively unreasonable). Additionally, habeas relief doe......
-
Ward v. Dretke
...58. See, e.g., Garcia v. Dretke, 388 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir.2004); Jones v. Dretke, 375 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir.2004); Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.2004); Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir.2004); Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th 59. Ex parte Ward, Nos. ......
-
Bible v. Stephens
...but on whether its determination was 'unreasonable.'" Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); see also Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2004); Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 776 (5th Cir. 2002). To meet the AEDPA standard, "a state prisoner must show that the state co......
-
Smith v. Quarterman
...based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § A state court's decision is contrary to established law when it "reaches a legal conclusion in direct ......