Morse v. Mallernee, Civil Action No. 9:13-CV-1354 (LEK/DEP)
| Decision Date | 17 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 9:13-CV-1354 (LEK/DEP) |
| Parties | JAY H. MORSE, Plaintiff, v. RONALD MALLERNEE and DOUGLAS SPRINGER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
FOR PLAINTIFF:
JAY H. MORSE, Pro Se
MICHAEL G. McCARTIN, ESQ.
MARK G. MITCHELL, ESQ.
HON. ROBERT G. BEHNKE
Broome County Attorney
Edwin L. Crawford County Office Bldg.
P.O. Box 1766
Binghamton, NY 13902
LEIA D. SCHMIDT, ESQ.
Assistant County Attorney
Pro se plaintiff Jay H. Morse, a New York State prison inmate, has commenced this action against Douglas Springer, a Broome County Deputy Sheriff, and Ronald Mallernee, a corrections officer employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. were violated when his necklace displaying a crucifix was forcibly removed from his neck and confiscated during the course of a transfer from local to state custody.
Currently pending before the court are defendants' separately filed motions seeking dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that both of the pending motions be denied.
Plaintiff is a New York State prison inmate currently being held in the custody of the DOCCS. See generally Dkt. No. 10. While he is now incarcerated at the Riverview Correctional Facility, at the times relevant to his claims in this action, plaintiff was being transferred from the Broome County Correctional Facility ("BCCF") to the Elmira Reception Center ("Elmira R.C."), a DOCCS facility. Id. at 2, 3.
On April 23, 2012, while plaintiff was being prepared for transfer from the BCCF to the Elmira R.C., defendant Springer told plaintiff he could not possess the one-and-one-half inch silver crucifix displayed on a twenty-four inch silver chain worn around his neck. Dkt. No. 10 at 3. After objecting and informing defendant Springer that DOOCS Directives #4202 and #4911 permitted him to wear the necklace, plaintiff and defendant Springer discussed the matter with an unidentified Broome County Sheriff's Sergeant, who confirmed that plaintiff was permitted to wear it. Id.Defendant Springer and another unidentified Broome County Deputy Sheriff then transported plaintiff to the Elmira R.C. Id.
Upon arriving at Elmira R.C., defendant Springer informed defendant Mallernee that plaintiff was wearing a necklace, and defendant Mallernee instructed defendant Springer to confiscate it. Dkt. No. 10 at 3. Notwithstanding plaintiff's objections, defendant Springer "forcibly yanked" the necklace with the crucifix from plaintiff's neck and threatened to "throw [it] out the window while returning to Binghamton." Id. at 3-4.
Plaintiff alleges that he "is a practicing Roman Catholic and [holds the crucifix confiscated by defendant Springer] while reciting his prayers twice a day" and that doing so allows him to feel "closer to God[.]"2 Dkt. No. 10 at 11.
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 31, 2013, with the filing of a complaint and an accompanying application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. Plaintiff's original complaint named eight individuals as defendants, including several DOCCS employees, the Broome County Clerk, and members of the Broome County Sheriff'sDepartment. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. On January 6, 2014, Senior District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn issued a decision and order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A, granting plaintiff's IFP application and dismissing plaintiff's complaint, with leave to amend, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. No. 6. Plaintiff availed himself of the opportunity to amend, filing an amended complaint on January 21, 2014. Dkt. No. 7. By decision and order dated July 8, 2014, Judge Kahn dismissed all of the claims asserted in plaintiff's amended complaint, with the exception of the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims asserted against defendants Springer and Mallernee. Dkt. No. 9. Judge Kahn also directed the clerk of the court to docket a copy of the original complaint, together with the amended complaint, as plaintiff's "second amended complaint," which is now the operative pleading. Id. at 4 n.7.
Following service of the summons and second amended complaint upon the defendants, both defendant Springer and defendant Mallernee filed the currently pending motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. Nos. 27, 36. Both defendants contend that dismissal is appropriate because they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit, and defendant Springer additionally seeks dismissal based on the absence of any allegations that plausibly suggest plaintiff'sright to free exercise of religion was substantially burdened. See generally Dkt. Nos. 27-1, 36-1. Plaintiff has responded to defendants' motions, and both defendants have since submitted replies in further support of their motions. Dkt. Nos. 30, 33, 39, 40. The motions, which are now fully briefed, have been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
A motion to dismiss a complaint, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, calls upon a court to gauge the facial sufficiency of that pleading using a standard which, though unexacting in its requirements, "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation" in order to withstand scrutiny. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. 677-78 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While modest in its requirements, that rule commands that a complaint contain more thanmere legal conclusions. See id. at 679 ().
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56); see also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003); Burke v. Gregory, 356 F. Supp. 2d 179, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Kahn, J.). The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). As the Second Circuit has observed, "[w]hile Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to 'nudge plaintiffs' claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (alterations omitted).
When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint against this backdrop, particular deference should be afforded to a pro se litigant, whose complaint merits a generous construction by the court when determining whether it states a cognizable cause of action. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 ("'[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citation omitted)); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) ; Kaminski v. Comm'r of Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 804 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (Hurd, J.) ().
Defendant Springer contends that plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise claim should be dismissed because the allegations in the second amended complaint fail to plausibly allege that plaintiff's right to the freeexercise of his religion was not substantially burdened by defendants' alleged conduct.3 Dkt. No. 36-1 at 5-7.
While inmates confined within prison facilities are by no means entitled to the full gamut of rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, including its First Amendment, the free exercise clause of that provision does afford them at least some measure of constitutional protection. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 816, 822 (1974). Whatever protections an inmate retains, however, are not without limits, and the task of defining the contours of the rights in a prison setting requires striking a delicate balance between the rights of prison inmates and the legitimate interests of prison officials tasked with maintaining prison security. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1987); Ford v. McGinnis...
To continue reading
Request your trial