Morse v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 2:08-cv-829-FtM-29DNF
| Decision Date | 15 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:08-cv-829-FtM-29DNF |
| Parties | FRANK MORSE, JR., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Frank Morse, Jr., (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Morse") who is represented by counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition," Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Petition challenges Petitioner's judgment of conviction for first degree felony murder, which was entered in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court, DeSoto County, Florida (case number 2003-CF-412), for which Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. Petition at 2.1 On November 2, 2005, Petitioner's sentence and conviction were affirmed, per curiam, on direct appeal. Id.
The Petition sub judice raises two grounds for relief:
Petition at 3. Petitioner submits a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Petition (Doc. #2, Memorandum). Respondent filed a Response to the Petition (Doc. #13, Response). Respondent submits that the Petition should be denied due to Petitioner's failure to satisfy his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), (e). Response at 1. Respondent filed exhibits (Exhs. 1-18) in support of the Response, including the four-volume record on direct appeal (Exh. 18). Petitioner filed a reply to the Response (Doc. #11, Reply). This matter is ripe for review.
Morse filed his timely2 Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331, n.9 (11th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal habeas court employs a "highly deferential standard" when reviewing State court judgments. McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002); Stewart v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Thus, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-39 (2003). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson, 527 F.3d at 1146; Wright v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Peoplesv. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1142 (2005).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). In cases where nothing in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence addresses the issue on point or the precedent is ambiguous and gives no clear answer to the question, it cannot be said that the state court's conclusion is contrary to, or constitutes an unreasonable application of, "clearly established Federal law." Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743, 747 (2008); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003).
A state court decision can be deemed "contrary to" the Supreme Court's clearly established precedents within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) only if: (1) the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law as set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that is "materially indistinguishable" from those in a decision of the Supreme Court and yet arrives at a different result. Brown, 544 U.S. at 141; Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 15-16. Further, it is not mandatory for a state court decision to cite, or even to be aware of, the relevant Supreme Court precedents, "so long as neither the reasoning nor theresult . . . contradicts them." Early v. Parker, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown, 544 U.S. at 134; Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 956 (2001); or, "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1520). The "unreasonable application" inquiry "requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous"; it must be "objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003) (citation omitted); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18. Depending upon the legal principle at issue, there can be a range of reasonable applications. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663-64 (2004). Thus, the state court's decision is not subject to federal review de novo; rather, § 2254(d)(1) relief is only available upon a showing that the state court decision meets the "objectively unreasonable" standard. Id. at 665-66.
A § 2254 petitioner can also obtain relief by showing that a state court decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Where the credibility of a witness is at issue, relief may only be granted if it was unreasonable, in light of the evidence presented, for the state court to credit the testimony of the witness in question. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006). Additionally, a factual finding by a state court is presumed to be correct and a petitioner must rebut this "presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 890-91. This statutory presumption of correctness, however, "applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed determinations of law and fact." Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001) (citation omitted). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact; therefore, the presumption does not apply and such claims are reviewed de novo. Rolling v. Crosby, 438 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Rolling v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2943 (2006).
Finally, if the state court fails or declines to rule on the merits of a particular claim raised before it, that claim falls outside of the scope of § 2254(d)(1)'s restrictions and the reviewing federal habeas court owes no deference to the state courtdecision when evaluating that claim. Davis v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed under the standards established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1183 (11th Cir. 2008). Post-AEDPA, the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), remains applicable to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in this case. Newland, 527 F.3d at 1184. In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether a convicted person is entitled to habeas relief on the grounds that his or her counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" "under prevailing professional norms," which requires a showing that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, which "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Bobby Van Hook,558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009); Cullen v. Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).
States may "impose whatever specific rules . . . to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented," but "the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices." Bobby Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 17 (internal quotations and citations omitted). It is petitioner who bears the heavy burden to "prove, by a...
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