Morss v. Allen
| Decision Date | 13 May 1938 |
| Parties | MORSS v. ALLEN. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The place of wrong governs the right of action for death, and, if the statute of the place of wrong provides that the distribution shall be made to the next of kin, the law of that State determines who are the next of kin and not the law of the domicil of decedent.
2. Satisfaction of the judgment recovered by the administrator ad prosequendum shall be made only to the general administrator. A release executed by the parents of decedent could not operate to defeat the right of the decedent's brothers and sisters.
3. This court has the fundamental and inherent equitable power so to control its process as to prevent abuse and injustice.
Action by H. Russell Morss, Jr., administrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Frank L. Haller, deceased, against Thomas R. Allen for the wrongful death of the deceased in an automobile accident. On petition for order to satisfy judgment.
Order for satisfaction of judgment in accordance with opinion.
Argued April term, 1938, before PERSKIE, J., in chambers, pursuant to statute.
Joseph C. Paul, of Newark, for plaintiff. Howard Eastwood, of Burlington, for defendant.
How much, if any, of the moneys paid by defendant to the parents of a deceased son, in full release of defendant's liability for the wrongful death of the son suffered as the result of an automobile accident which occurred in our State, shall be applied or credited upon the application to satisfy the judgment subsequently recovered by the administrator ad prosequendum, under our Death Act, R.S.1937, 2:47-1 to 2:47-6, 2 Comp.St.1910, p. 1907, § 7, Comp.St.Supp. 1924, § 55 —10, for the benefit of all the next of kin (decedent's parents, two brothers, and two sisters), when, as here, the parents are residents of California and under the law of that State are the sole next of kin of the decedent?
The facts are stipulated. On June 22, 1935, Frank L. Haller was a passenger in a car which was struck by defendant's car on public highway No. 40 of our State. As a result of the injuries suffered from the accident Haller died. At the time of his death he was in the service of the United States Navy and was stationed at Lakehurst, N. J. But he was a resident of California, and so were his parents, his two brothers, and his two sisters, all surviving him. Under the laws of California the mother and father are the sole next of kin. On November 16, 1935, the mother and father, in consideration of $1750 paid to them by defendant, executed an instrument, in California, releasing defendant from all liability for the death of their son. On April 30, 1936, the surrogate of Ocean county appointed Russell H. Morss, Jr., as administrator ad prosequendum of the estate of the decedent. Thereafter, in May of 1936, he instituted suit in the Supreme Court of this State against the defendant, under our Death Act, for the benefit of all of the next of kin of the decedent; namely, his parents, two brothers, and two sisters.
At the trial of the cause the learned trial judge refused to permit the jury to consider the payment made to the parents either as a bar to plaintiff's cause of action or in mitigation of plaintiff's damages. The trial judge made clear to the jury that "defendant must seek credit for this payment in some other proceeding that may be associated with the judgment, "or collection or payment of the judgment in this proceeding if and after the rendition of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff at the trial." This was proper. The proof of payment was not offered by defendant, in the event he be held liable, to prove payment by another party to the plaintiff for the damages arising out of the same accident. Cf. Brand-stein v. Ironbound Transportation Co., 112 N.J.L. 585, 172 A. 580, 104 A.L.R. 926; Lombardo v. Creamer, 113 N.J.L. 117, 172 A. 584; Moss v. Cherdak, 114 N.J.L. 332, 176 A. 333. It was offered as a credit for moneys which he himself paid.
The jury returned a verdict of $2,700 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Judgment was entered in this court on January 31, 1938.
Thereafter defendant deposited with the clerk of the court the sum of $1,024.18 in payment of the satisfaction of the judgment and costs, i. e., the difference between the amount of the judgment and costs less the payment of $1,750 made to the parents, as aforesaid. Plaintiff refused to satisfy the judgment upon the proffered basis. Defendant invokes the aid of the court. Rev. Stat.1937, 2:27-313, 2:27-314, 3 Comp.St. 1910, p. 2961, § § 27, 29.
Plaintiff resists this application upon the alternate grounds (1) that the payment to the parents was voluntary, and, therefore, defendant is not...
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...the laws of that state rather than ours. See Giardini v. McAdoo, Err. & App. 1919, 93 N.J.L. 138, 140, 107 A. 437; Morss v. Allen, Sup., 1938, 120 N.J.L. 203, 205, 199 A. 414. It is equally clear that all of the pertinent issues relating to the cause of action resulting from the accident ma......
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