Morstad v. State
Decision Date | 15 June 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 930271,930271 |
Citation | 518 N.W.2d 191 |
Parties | Thomas J. MORSTAD, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Neil W. Fleming of Fleming, DuBois & Trenbeath, Cavalier, for petitioner and appellant.
Stephen J. Rice, State's Atty., Grafton, for respondent and appellee.
Convicted of sexually assaulting his nine-year-old daughter, Thomas J. Morstad has continued to insist on his innocence. Because he would not admit guilt, he could not "successfully complete" a sexual-offender treatment program, and his probation was revoked.
Morstad appeals from a trial court judgment denying his application for post-conviction relief. We reverse and remand. Revocation was improper because the conditions of Morstad's probation did not clearly require him to admit guilt. We do not decide whether an unambiguous requirement to admit guilt would violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
In March 1992, following a bench trial, Morstad was convicted of gross sexual imposition for sexually assaulting his nine-year-old daughter. At trial, Morstad testified he did not sexually assault his daughter. Following a sentencing hearing at which Morstad continued to maintain his innocence, the trial court deferred imposition of sentence and ordered Morstad be placed on four years of supervised probation. Morstad appealed. This Court affirmed the conviction. See State v. Morstad, 493 N.W.2d 645 (N.D.1992).
As a condition of his probation, Morstad was to "attend, participate in, cooperate with and successfully complete ... evaluation and treatment through the Sex Offenders Treatment Program at Northeast Human Services Center or other appropriate Human Services Center." Morstad completed a sex-offender evaluation at Northeast Human Service Center on January 18, 1993. Based on the evaluation, Dr. Myron J. Veenstra, a clinical psychologist with the center, concluded Morstad was not amenable to out-patient sex-offender's treatment at the center because Morstad would not admit sexually assaulting his daughter. Dr. Veenstra concluded Morstad was in "an extreme state of denial". Based on Dr. Veenstra's recommendation that rehabilitation would be best accomplished by placing Morstad in a closely controlled in-patient treatment program (prison), the State moved to revoke Morstad's probation.
The judge for the probation revocation hearing was not the judge who tried and sentenced Morstad. The court found Morstad had violated the treatment condition of his probation. The court revoked probation and sentenced Morstad to six years at the State Penitentiary, with two years suspended.
Morstad petitioned for post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, claiming his probation had been unlawfully revoked because the trial court wrongly concluded he had violated a term of his probation, and a requirement he admit guilt would violate the Fifth Amendment. The trial court denied Morstad's petition for post-conviction relief, and Morstad appeals. 1 This Court has jurisdiction under Art. VI, Sec. 6, N.D. Const., and N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-32.1-14.
In his August 17, 1993, notice of appeal, Morstad purports to appeal from the May 10, 1993, order revoking probation; the June 3, 1993, criminal judgment and commitment; and the August 6, 1993, order denying post-conviction relief. As to the order revoking probation, and the criminal judgment and commitment, Morstad's notice of appeal is untimely. In criminal cases, the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within ten days after the entry of judgment or order appealed from. Rule 4(b), N.D.R.App.P. Petitioning for post-conviction relief does not, as was suggested by counsel at oral argument, automatically stay the running of the time for bringing a direct appeal. A proceeding under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act "is not a substitute for and does not affect any remedy incident to the prosecution in the trial court or direct review of the judgment of conviction or sentence in an appellate court." N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-32.1-01(2). Compare N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-32.1-03(3) (). Morstad's appeal from the order denying post-conviction relief was timely under N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-32.1-14. Accordingly, the only appealable order properly before us is the order denying Morstad's application for post-conviction relief.
Morstad claims his probation was illegally revoked because the treatment condition of his probation is ambiguous as to whether he is required to admit guilt as part of sex-offender treatment.
Conditions of probation are to be strictly construed in favor of the offender. State v. Drader, 432 N.W.2d 553, 554 (N.D.1988); State v. Monson, 518 N.W.2d 171 (N.D.1994). " '[T]he benefit of the doubt as to a sentence which is not certain, definite, and free from ambiguity should be given to [the] accused, and serious uncertainty in the sentence must be resolved in favor of liberty.' " Drader, (quoting 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, Sec. 1585). If a condition of probation is capable of two constructions, this Court will construe the condition in favor of the offender. Drader.
In United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir.1987), the Ninth Circuit concluded:
(Citations omitted.)
The issue is whether Morstad received clear warning his failure to admit guilt as part of treatment would constitute a violation of probation.
The written treatment condition of Morstad's probation orders Morstad to "attend, participate in, cooperate with and successfully complete ... evaluation and treatment through the Sex Offenders Treatment Program at Northeast Human Services Center or other appropriate Human Services Center." An examination of the written order does not end the analysis. In addition to written probation conditions, an offender may rely on and be guided by explanations or instructions of the sentencing court. Simmons at 566-67; United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir.1982).
At the sentencing hearing, Morstad's trial counsel anticipated the difficulty Morstad would have completing a treatment program as part of his probation.
The court responded to Morstad's counsel's concerns by explaining:
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