Mortensen v. Villegas
Decision Date | 01 February 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 08-19-00080-CV,08-19-00080-CV |
Citation | 630 S.W.3d 355 |
Parties | George L. MORTENSEN, Appellant, v. Daniel VILLEGAS and Elvia L. Ramirez, Appellees. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
APPELLANT: George L. Mortensen, 3668 Bishop Way, El Paso, TX 79903.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: Daniel Anchondo, Anchondo & Anchondo, 2509 Montana Ave., El Paso, TX 79903, Frank J. Guzman, Frank J. Guzman, P.C., 521 Texas Ave, El Paso, TX 79901.
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
This is the second pro se appeal by Appellant George L. Mortensen in which he contests the dismissal of claims asserted in an heirship proceeding pending in a statutory probate court. Following dismissal of prior claims based on lack of standing, Mortensen returned to the same cause and forum below to assert claims against Daniel Villegas and Elvia L. Ramirez (Appellees, collectively), as well as against other defendants who are not parties to this appeal.1 For a second time, the probate court dismissed Mortensen's claims for want of jurisdiction, and in doing so, granted relief sought by Appellees to include awards of attorney's fees. Mortensen raises six issues challenging the court's dismissal of his claims and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the fee awards. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
In 2010, Crystal Dianne Ortiz filed an application for the appointment of a dependent administration of the estate of her father, Jose Casares (Decedent), in Probate Court No. 1 of El Paso County. For several years, little activity transpired in the case until Ortiz retained new counsel. In 2015, Ortiz filed a motion to dismiss her application for dependent administration asserting that she and her brother, Steven Joseph Casares, were the only heirs and that an administration of an estate was not necessary. Ortiz included an application to determine heirship with her dismissal motion. On December 1, 2015, the court granted Ortiz's motion to dismiss the application for dependent administration but made no determination of the Decedent's heirs.
On May 6, 2016, Mortensen filed a pro se pleading characterizing himself as an interested person asserting an "authenticated claim" against the estate. Mortensen described that he owned real property located next door to a property owned by Decedent. Alleging that Decedent's property had been abandoned for several years, Mortensen claimed his neighboring property had been encroached upon and adversely affected by the circumstance. Mortensen sought recovery of $30,000 against Decedent's estate for diminishment of the value of his property, for the labor he had expended to pull weeds and pick-up trash from Decedent's property, and for time he spent researching and pursuing his claim.
On February 15, 2017, the probate court entered a judgment declaring that Ortiz and her brother, Steven Joseph Casares, were the heirs of Decedent and each shared a one-half interest in Decedent's real and personal property. Ortiz later filed a motion to declare Mortensen a vexatious litigant who filed an unsubstantiated and unfounded claim. Ortiz further asserted that Mortensen lacked standing to bring his suit. Thereafter, the court rendered an order denying Mortensen's claim based on his lack of standing and his failure of proof of appropriation over the subject property. The court also denied the motion to declare him a vexatious litigant. Although Mortensen appealed to this Court, we affirmed the probate court's judgment. See Matter of Estate of Casares , 556 S.W.3d 913, 915-16 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). Like the court below, we held that Mortensen lacked standing to challenge the heirship claims or to otherwise present a claim for damages in the heirship proceeding. Id.
Following the first appeal, Mortensen returned to the same heirship proceeding and filed an original petition in which he asserted new claims against Decedent's heirs, Ortiz and Casares; against Appellee Elvia L. Ramirez, a notary public employed by Ortiz's attorney; against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm), the notary surety of Ramirez; and against Appellee Daniel Villegas, a friend of Decedent's family. The petition describes that Ortiz resides in San Antonio, and Casares is believed to be homeless but he maintains a mailing address in Colorado Springs, Colorado. By his petition, Mortensen alleged the following as his causes of action: (1) that Ramirez improperly refused to give him access to her notary records; (2) that State Farm failed to pay a bond claim on behalf of Ramirez pertaining to her refusal; (3) that Ortiz committed slander by filing a police report that alleged that Mortensen had committed a burglary of the Decedent's home; (4) that Ortiz committed libel by filing the police report; and (5) that Ortiz, Casares, and Villegas, committed a "Nuisance Tort[ ]" against Mortensen who had expended time and expenses repairing Decedent's property.2
Relevant to this appeal, Ramirez and Villegas each filed a combined motion which sought protection from discovery and dismissal of all claims asserted. By their motions, Ramirez and Villegas asserted that Mortensen had brought frivolous, groundless claims in bad faith and for the purpose to cause unnecessary and needless costs of litigation. Relying on this Court's prior ruling, Appellees pointedly claimed that Mortensen did not qualify as an interested person of the heirship proceeding. Along with dismissal, Ramirez and Villegas sought attorney's fees of $5,000 and $10,000, respectively. Responding to Villegas's motion, Mortensen contended that "$10,000 in ‘reasonable attorney fees’ is not based on the realities in this case and is simply [ ] designed to intimidate the Plaintiff and attempt to prevent further discovery that would support Plaintiff's causes of action." In responding to Ramirez's motion, he argued against dismissal but included no specific response to the claim for attorney's fees.
At the hearing that followed, Ramirez and Villegas urged dismissal asserting the court had already determined that Mortensen lacked standing to assert claims in the proceeding and that ruling had been affirmed on appeal by this Court. Mortensen continued to urge that he had standing with the court and he opposed dismissal. As the hearing concluded, the trial court reiterated that it had already determined that Mortensen lacked standing in the estate, and he had improperly brought claims for which the court lacked jurisdiction. Before concluding, the court announced its willingness to allow the attorneys representing Ramirez and Villegas to submit bills for having "to defend this again." Subsequently, the trial court rendered the following written orders: (1) an order denying Mortensen's motion for alternative service on Ortiz; (2) an order granting Villegas's motion for a protective order; and (3) an order dismissing Mortensen's petition in its entirety which included orders awarding attorney's fees of $4,500 to Ramirez and $3,375 to Villegas. Invoices from both attorneys were attached to the court's order reflecting itemized charges for legal services which corresponded to the respective amounts of fee awarded.
This appeal followed.
In six issues, Mortensen challenges the probate court's order dismissing his original petition, the court's grant of protective orders and awards of attorney's fees to Villegas and Ramirez, and the denial of his motion for alternative service on Ortiz. Responding, Appellees assert a series of arguments. First, that the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims asserted by Mortensen urging that he lacked standing to litigate matters involving the estate. Second, Appellees further argue that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting protective order relief. Third, as to the awards of attorney's fees, Appellees contend that Mortensen waived error by failing to object in the probate court and by failing to adequately brief his challenge in this Court. Fourth, regarding a specific portion of the fees awarded to Villegas, Mortensen waived any complaint about Villegas's failure to segregate recoverable fees from those that were nonrecoverable. Fifth, if no waiver occurred, Appellees alternatively argue that this Court should imply findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of such fee awards.
1. Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez , 315 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. 2010). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, State v. Naylor , 466 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. 2015), and a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley , 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004). We always have jurisdiction to resolve questions of standing and jurisdiction. Naylor , 466 S.W.3d at 787. The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction and standing are rigid questions of law that are not negotiable and cannot be waived. See Naylor , 466 S.W.3d at 792 ; Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993). Both are essential to a court's power to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000).
A motion to dismiss based on the court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is the functional equivalent of a plea to the jurisdiction. Narvaez v. Powell , 564 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). A plaintiff has the burden of pleading facts which affirmatively show that the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 446. In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court must determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively...
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M.G. v. T.G.
...(mem. op.); Arnold v. Addison, No. 05-20-00001-CV, 2021 WL 5984875, at *16 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mortensen, 630 S.W.3d at 368. no evidence supports the trial court's award of $12,390.34[17] of the attorney's fees, we sustain M.G.'s fifth subissue. Conclusion ......