Mortland v. Little
| Decision Date | 27 June 1884 |
| Citation | 137 Mass. 339 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | David N. Mortland v. Bernard Little & trustee |
Suffolk. Trustee process. The Emigrant Savings Bank was summoned as trustee. In the Superior Court, the trustee was charged, and appealed to this court. The facts appear in the opinion.
Trustee charged.
J. W O' Brien, for the trustee.
J. B Richardson, (F. S. Nickerson with him,) for the plaintiff.
Judgment not having been entered, it was within the discretionary power of the Superior Court to order the case to be brought forward upon the docket, and to vacate the entry discharging the trustee, for the reasons set forth in the motion; namely, that the case was left off the docket for nonpayment of the clerk's fees, that the trustee was subsequently discharged as of a previous term, without notice to the plaintiff or his attorney of any motion for such discharge, and that they had no knowledge of the discharge until long afterwards. Lucy v. Dowling, 114 Mass. 92. Marshall v. Merritt, 103 Mass. 45. Capen v. Stoughton, 16 Gray 364. The cases of Mason v. Pearson, 118 Mass. 61, and Blanchard v. Ferdinand, 132 Mass. 389, are instances where there had been such a final disposition of a case that the court had no authority to revive it.
The trustee answered, that it had funds on deposit in the name of Bernard Little as trustee for Stephen Little. Whether, upon this answer, with the fact that the depositor, Bernard Little, was the defendant, the trustee could have been charged without citing in Stephen Little, is not material. See Randall v. Way, 111 Mass. 506. Subsequently, in answering an interrogatory, though not in answer to it, the trustee made the statement that it had been informed and believed that the fund belonged to Stephen Little. It thus appeared that there were funds in the hands of the trustee which belonged either to the defendant or to Stephen Little, and which were claimed by Stephen Little; and he had a right to appear, either voluntarily or upon notice, and defend his right. Gen. Sts. c. 142, § 15. Boylen v. Young, 6 Allen 582. The ownership of the fund, as between the defendant and a claimant, is not a fact by the assertion or denial of which the trustee can conclude either the plaintiff or the claimant. It involves inferences and conclusions from facts and of law. Nutter v. Framingham & Lowell Railroad, 131 Mass. 231. A trustee may know that the fund is claimed by one party or the other, but he cannot know as a fact, and has no authority to determine, the right of that claim; and his statement that the fund belongs to one party cannot amount, in legal effect, to more than that such party is a claimant of it. His statement that it belongs to a defendant cannot preclude a claimant from coming in, and his answer that it belongs to a third person rather than to the defendant, furnishes ground for the plaintiff to have such person summoned in to defend his right. There cannot be a doubt that Stephen Little was properly summoned in, and appeared, as the claimant disclosed in the answer and examination of the trustee.
Having come in, Stephen Little was a party to the suit, so far as his title to the fund was concerned, and the only other party, as concerned that title, was the plaintiff. The trustee had no further concern in the matter. It was a mere stakeholder, and the question whether it was to be charged or discharged depended upon the right to the fund as it should be determined by the result of the proceeding between the claimant and the plaintiff; and, if the claimant failed, on the trial, to establish his right, the trustee would be charged. It seems plainly to follow, that, if a claimant is cited in, and appears and disclaims all right, the judgment should be that he had no right, and, as a consequence, the trustee should be charged. It was, indeed, decided in Taylor v. Collins, 5 Gray 50 note, where a claimant appeared on notice, and was defaulted, the trustee's answer having disclosed all the facts of an assignment from the defendant to the claimant, which the court held to be...
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...an appropriate descriptive term in pleading in real actions, Prescott v. Hutchinson, 13 Mass. 439; and under trustee process, Mortland v. Little, 137 Mass. 339; and it is familiar in patent law, and perhaps in other connections. The character of a pleading, however, is commonly to be determ......
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