Mortland v. Poweshiek Cnty.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1912
• Citation: 137 N.W. 1009,156 Iowa 720
• Parties: MORTLAND v. POWESHIEK COUNTY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

156 Iowa 720

137 N.W. 1009

MORTLAND

v.POWESHIEK COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 22, 1912.

Appeal from District Court, Poweshiek County; H. E. Wilcockson and John F. Talbott, Judges.

Action at law to recover damages from the county for failure of its officials to award a bridge contract to plaintiff; he being, as is alleged, the lowest bidder for the work. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.J. M. Goodson and J. W. Carr, both of Montezuma, for appellant.

U. M. Reed, of Brooklyn, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

According to the allegations of the petition, the board of supervisors of the defendant county, although not required by law so to do, undertook to let a contract for doing all the concrete bridge and culvert work for the county to the lowest bidder, and it is averred that plaintiff made the lowest bid therefor in response to advertisements made by the county officials, and that, notwithstanding his was the lowest bid, the board “willfully, wrongfully, unlawfully, and in contravention of their said advertisement, invitation, promise and agreement made, in all as aforesaid, refused to let the contract to this plaintiff, who was the lowest bidder in fact, and let the contract to another contractor at a higher rate and price than that offered by plaintiff, against his protest and demand, which said work was done by such other contractor during the year of 1910 to the amount of more than twenty-two thousand dollars, all to the damage and injury of plaintiff in the sum of more than $2,000, no part of which has been paid, and is justly due plaintiff. That such damages are the reasonable value of the profits to which plaintiff would have been entitled, and would have earned, under his bid aforesaid, had his bid been accepted and he been awarded the contract for said work.”

A demurrer to this petition was sustained, and thereafter plaintiff filed an amended and substituted petition which did no more than specifically aver the damages claimed by him, although reference is made to certain plans and specifications prepared by him, which it is said were made at defendant's instance and request as a basis for competitive bidding. The theory of the action was not changed, however, and plaintiff did not ask in this amendment to recover for service performed. Defendant moved to strike this amendment for the reason that it tendered no new issue and the motion was sustained. The appeal is from the rulings sustaining the demurrer and the motion. It is conceded that there is no requirement of law that such contracts as are here involved shall be let to the lowest bidder, and it is true, we think, that the advertisement upon which plaintiff relies did not state that the contract would be let to the lowest bidder; but it is averred that the board orally agreed to award the contract to the lowest bidder. The motives of the board in awarding the contract are not impugned and no fraud is alleged.

In view of this record, but two questions arise: First. There being no law requiring the letting of such contracts, is the county bound because of the failure of its board to let a contract to the lowest bidder for the work? Second. Assuming that the county is bound by the action of the board in submitting the matter to bids, is it liable in damages to the lowest bidder for not awarding him the contract?

[1] These questions may be answered as one, for the solution thereof involves, as we think, but a single inquiry, to wit: For whose benefit is a law or agreement to let a contract for county work to the lowest bidder? Reason and authority give but one answer to this quære, and that is that it is for the benefit of the taxpayer. In the absence of fraud, the unsuccessful bidder, although he be the lowest, has no remedy. The reason for this is twofold--first, because the arrangement is not for his benefit; and, second, because the board has a discretion in such matters, and this discretion will not ordinarily be reviewed by the courts.

[2] Again, the board in such instances is acting as a governmental agency, and under the allegations of the petition...