Morton Grove Park Dist. v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 29 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 1749,No. 77-1573,1749,77-1573 |
| Parties | , 24 Ill.Dec. 356 MORTON GROVE PARK DISTRICT, Petitioner, Edward J. Rosewell, Treasurer of Cook County, Appellee, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Trustee under Trust, etc., et al., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, for appellee; Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Mercer Cook and Michael F. Baccash, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel.
Defendant, the condemnee, appeals from an order denying it the income earned on a condemnation award deposited with the Treasurer of Cook County (Treasurer) by the condemnor, Morton Grove Park District (the Park District). The issues presented for review are (1) whether denying the condemnee the income earned by the Treasurer on the deposited condemnation award during the pendency of its appeal deprived it of just compensation for its property; and (2) whether the earnings of such a deposited award should have been paid to the condemnee under general trust principles.
The facts are not in dispute. It appears that on December 11, 1972, the Park District (not a party to this appeal) petitioned to condemn certain real estate belonging to defendant. A jury found the fair market value to be $1,000,000, and judgment was entered thereon. Subsequently, the amount of the judgment plus $15,478.06, the statutory interest on the award from the date of the judgment until the date of deposit, was deposited by the Park District with the Treasurer. The Park District, under court order, took possession of the real estate. This order also required a $200,000 surety bond to secure "the payment of such compensation as may be finally adjudged in this cause."
On appeal, this court in Morton Grove Pk. Dist. v. American Nat'l Bk. & Tr. Co. (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 426, 350 N.E.2d 149, affirmed both the judgment entered on the jury's award of $1,000,000 as just compensation for the property taken and the order transferring possession to the Park District, pursuant to section 13 of the Eminent Domain Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 47, par. 13.) Thereafter, defendant petitioned the trial court seeking, among other things, an order directing the Treasurer to pay it not only the $1,015,478.06 deposited but also the interest earned by the Treasurer on said sum from the date it was deposited until the date of payment to defendant.
The trial court directed the payment of the $1,015,478.06 to defendant but denied its request for payment of the interest earned by the Treasurer on the deposited award while the case was being appealed. Defendants appeal from that portion of the order denying it the earned interest, which the parties agree amounted to $92,357.08.
OPINIONThe contention of defendant that it is entitled to the amount earned by the Treasurer on the deposited award presents a question of first impression in this State. Defendant, however, suggests two supporting bases for its position the first of which is that the refusal of the interest earned was a denial of its right to just compensation for the taking of its property.
In the consideration of this argument, we initially note that the constitutionality of section 13 of the Eminent Domain Act, the authority for the trial court's grant of possession to the Park District, has been specifically upheld. (Dept. of Pub. Wks. & Bldgs. v. Butler Co. (1958), 13 Ill.2d 537, 546, 150 N.E.2d 124; Village of Prairie Du Rocher v. Schoening-Koenigsmark Milling Co. (1911), 251 Ill. 341, 96 N.E. 249.) We further note, and defendant agrees, that under Illinois law a condemnee may not accept a condemnation award and also maintain an appeal, as such acceptance renders moot any question as to the sufficiency of the award. (See County of Cook v. Malysa (1968), 39 Ill.2d 376, 235 N.E.2d 598; Dept. of Pub. Wks. & Bldgs. v. Forbeck (1970), 118 Ill.App.2d 231, 254 N.E.2d 182.) Therefore, as defendant points out, in order to exercise its right of appeal, it was required to leave the amount of the award and interest on deposit with the Treasurer for the full time necessary to complete the appeal process and that, during this time, the Park District had full possession of the property. Thus, not having the use of either the award or the property during the appeal, it maintains that the denial of the earnings generated during the appeal by the deposited award deprived it of its constitutional right to just compensation.
While the deposited sum included statutory interest on the judgment to the date of deposit, it is clear that defendant does not seek further interest on the judgment. It asks only for the payment of $92,357.08 the amount actually earned by the Treasurer on the sum deposited which, it argues, should be paid as just compensation for the period during the appeal that it was deprived of both the use of its property and the award.
We note, however, that when compensation is awarded under the Eminent Domain Act and deposited with the Treasurer in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of that Act, the statutory and constitutional requirements of just compensation are satisfied (Dept. of Pub. Wks. & Bldgs. v. Butler Co.) and that when such an award is paid or deposited, all rights are fixed as of the date the petition to condemn was filed, as such date is viewed as the time of taking (see Bd. of Junior College Dist. v. Carey (1969), 43 Ill.2d 82, 250 N.E.2d 644). In the instant case, by the determination of the jury and the judgment entered thereon, the market value of defendant's property was established as $1,000,000. When that amount was deposited with statutory interest on the judgment to the date of deposit, the requirements of just compensation were satisfied. (Dept. of Pub. Wks. & Bldgs. v. Butler Co.) Thus, when the judgment and the order of possession to the Park District were affirmed on appeal, there remained no question as to just compensation within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Act. We therefore reject defendant's argument that the income earned on the deposited monies should be considered as additional just compensation for the period during the first appeal that defendant did not have the use of its property or the award.
Defendant next contends that the interest earned should be paid to it because the Treasurer acted as its trustee while the award was on deposit. We disagree.
We view Locasio v. Rosewell (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 704, 8 Ill.Dec. 563, 365 N.E.2d 949, as being dispositive. There, the same contention was made and the court found that the county treasurer was not the trustee of condemnation funds deposited with him. Furthermore, the concept of a trust presupposes an obligation arising out of a confidence reposed in a person for the benefit of another to act in accordance with such confidence. (Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1934), 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250; 35 Ill. L. & Prac. Trusts § 2 (1958).) In the instant case, there was no such repose of confidence by defendant. The funds were deposited with the Treasurer by the Park District in accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act and, not only did defendant specifically disavow acceptance of the funds but it also contested the amount of the award and the constitutionality of the statutory procedure permitting the transfer of the property.
Additionally, as stated in S.A.S. Co. v. Kucharski (1972), 53 Ill.2d 139, 143, 290 N.E.2d 224, 227, "(t)he County Treasurer, while performing some functions similar to trustees, is a public official governed by the applicable legislative powers and restrictions placed upon him by the General Assembly." While the Eminent Domain Act provides for the deposit of the...
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