Morton v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa

• Decision Date: 03 April 1934
• Docket Number: No. 42311.,42311.
• Citation: 254 N.W. 325,218 Iowa 846
• Parties: MORTON v. EQUITABLE LIFE INS. CO. OF IOWA.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

218 Iowa 846

254 N.W. 325

MORTON

v.EQUITABLE LIFE INS. CO. OF IOWA.

No. 42311.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 3, 1934.

Appeal from District Court, Mahaska County; J. G. Patterson, Judge.

An action upon a life insurance policy containing a provision that there should be no liability in the event of suicide of the insured within one year from the issuance of the policy. Defense was made on this ground. A verdict was returned for the defendant company. A new trial was granted upon motion of plaintiff. From such ruling, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Henry & Henry, of Des Moines, and Devitt, Eichhorn & Devitt, of Oskaloosa, for appellant.

McCoy & McCoy, of Oskaloosa, and H. F. Wagner, of Sigourney, for appellee.

ANDERSON, Justice.

This is an action upon a life insurance policy for $5,000, issued by the defendant-appellant upon the life of Frank H. Morton, on September 16, 1931. The insured died October 16, 1931. The plaintiff is the widow of the insured and the beneficiary named in the policy of insurance. The policy in the action contained the following provision:

“3. Suicide. If within one year from the date of issue the insured shall commit suicide, whether sane or insane, the liability of the Company shall be limited to the amount of premiums paid in cash on this policy.”

The first premium of $152.30 was paid. The appellant admitted its liability to the extent of the premium paid, but denied any other liability under the policy, alleging as its defense, that the insured, Frank H. Morton, committed suicide within one year from the date of the policy, and that under the provision of the policy quoted the liability of the company should be for the premium paid only.

There was a trial to a jury, and, after the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was overruled, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for a new trial, and exceptions and objections to the instructions given to the jury by the court, and exceptions and objections to the refusal of the court to give instructions requested by the plaintiff-appellee. The first five grounds of the motion for new trial presented the grounds that the verdict is contrary to law, contrary to the evidence, not supported by sufficient evidence, contrary to the weight of the evidence, and contrary to the instructions of the court. Grounds 6, 7, 8, and 10 of the motion allege that the court erred in overruling objections interposed by the plaintiff to evidence offered by the defendant, and in sustaining objections made by the defendant to evidence offered by the plaintiff, and in overruling motions made by the plaintiff to strike evidence offered by the defendant all “as more fully appears from the shorthand notes of the official shorthand reporter, which by reference are made a part hereof.” The ninth ground for a motion for new trial alleges that the court erred in permitting the introduction, over the objections of the plaintiff, of the certified copy of the death certificate, Exhibit I. Grounds 11 and 12 of the motion raise the objections and exceptions to instructions Nos. 8 and 1, as given by the court to the jury.

The plaintiff's complaint as to instruction No. 8 is to the effect that the court erred in admitting the alleged death certificate in evidence for the reason that it was not properly certified in accordance with the requirements of the statute; that the statements therein contained giving the cause of death as “suicide” and “suicide by hanging,” are merely conclusions of the coroner, and that it was improper to submit the same to the jury; and that the court should have instructed the jury that they must disregard the conclusions of the coroner as to the cause of death as stated in said alleged certificate; that the alleged certificate, if admissible at all, is only presumptive evidence of the facts therein stated, and that the conclusions of the coroner are not facts, and that under the instruction of the court the jury were permitted to consider the conclusions contained in said alleged certificate as facts; and that the court should have advised the jury the difference between the “conclusions” and the “facts” as stated in said certificate.

Instruction No. 8 is as follows:

“The defendant company has introduced in evidence the death certificate of Frank H. Morton. As to this you are instructed that our law provides that where a death occurs and there is no physician in attendance, the coroner of the county is authorized to sign the death certificate; and our law further provides that a certified copy of the death certificate may be introduced in evidence as presumptive evidence of the facts therein stated, but this presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted and overcome by the other evidence in the case or by facts and circumstances shown on the trial. It is for you to say as to whether or not said presumption has been overcome.”

Appellee's complaint as to instruction No. 1, as given by the court, is to the effect that the court did not properly state the issues to the jury in such instruction. That the court in said instruction submitted to the jury in detail the defense relied upon by the defendant under the provision of the policy relieving the company from liability, if the insured should commit suicide within one year from the date of the issuance of the policy, but did not refer to or call the jury's attention to the provision of the policy relied upon by the plaintiff, to wit, that the company agreed to pay the beneficiary $5,000 upon the surrender of the policy and the receipt of due proof of the death of Frank H. Morton; that the court covered the provision of the policy upon which the defendant was relying to defeat recovery, but did not state to the jury the provision of the policy upon which the plaintiff was relying for recovery.

The motion for a new trial was sustained by the court generally and without any comment or indication as to which ground or grounds of the motion it based its ruling. From such ruling, the defendant-appellant prosecutes this appeal.

[1] It is the settled law of this state that the Appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the trial court in granting a new trial. It must appear clearly that there has been an abuse of the discretion lodged in the trial court before this court will interfere with a ruling granting a new trial. The fact that the trial court has had the witnesses before it, heard their testimony, had opportunity to observe the effect of the evidence and the general conduct of the trial, places the trial court in a much better position to pass upon the question as to the right of a new trial than this court can be by presentation of the issues upon appeal. Resultantly, we have been very reluctant to interfere with the action of trial courts in granting motions for new trials. Brooks v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 115 Iowa, 588, 88 N. W. 1089;Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa, 391, 128 N. W. 338;Royer v. King's Crown Plaster Company, 147 Iowa, 277, 126 N. W. 168;Post v. City of Dubuque, 158 Iowa, 224, 139 N. W. 471;Woodbury Co. v. Dougherty & Bryant Co., 161 Iowa, 571, 143 N. W. 416;Thomas v. Illinois Central R. Co., 169 Iowa, 337, 151 N. W. 387;Rupp v. Kohn, 210 Iowa, 969, 232 N. W. 174.

[2] The court can set aside a verdict on its own motion. Thomas v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra.

[3] While no one ruling may in itself constitute error sufficient to set aside a verdict, yet when taking the whole record and considering all the rulings and exceptions together, in connection with the knowledge and observation of the trial court as to the course and conduct of the trial, the trial court may conclude, and properly so, that there has not been a fair trial, and that the losing party is entitled to another hearing. Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa, 391, 128 N. W. 338.

[4] Appellant's first contention is that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant. We are unable to see any merit in this contention. On the record as it stood at the time defendant's motion to direct a verdict was made, there was a conflict in the evidence on the defense interposed by the defendant, that is, as to whether the insured had committed suicide. On the face of the record at that time, with the legal presumption existing against the act of suicide, the court would not have been warranted in directing a verdict for the defendant.

Defendant's next contention is that the court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's motion for a new trial for the reason that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the insured committed suicide; and that the defendant was entitled to an affirmative holding by the court to this effect. And for the further reason that, in sustaining plaintiff's motion for a new trial on any of the grounds stated in the motion, was error. The defendant contending that only four of the grounds for a new trial were specific enough to demand the attention of the court.

We have heretofore indicated the grounds of the motion. The defendant-appellant only argues four of them. Many of the grounds not argued go to the rulings of the trial court in the admission and exclusion of testimony. We have read the transcript, which has been certified to us, carefully, and we are constrained to say that there are many errors and inconsistencies in the rulings of the trial court upon the admission or exclusion of testimony. It would extend this opinion to unnecessary length if we should attempt to point out and discuss the many rulings of the trial court of which the plaintiff had just cause to complain, and if the trial court had based its ruling upon errors committed in ruling upon the admission or exclusion of testimony, in our judgment, it should not be disturbed.

One of the grounds for new trial was that the court erred in permitting the introduction of the death certificate, Exhibit I.

Section 2319 of the Code makes it the...