Moseley v. Electronic Missile Facilities, Inc, 401
| Decision Date | 17 June 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 401,401 |
| Citation | 83 S.Ct. 1815,374 U.S. 167,10 L.Ed.2d 818 |
| Parties | H. W. MOSELEY, doing business as Moseley Plumbing and Heating Company, Petitioner, v. ELECTRONIC & MISSILE FACILITIES, INC., et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
George C. Grant, Macon, Ga., for petitioner.
Newell Edenfield, Atlanta, Ga., for respondents.
The primary issue in this case is whether a claim under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a—270d, as amended, based upon arbitration clauses in two subcontracts providing for arbitration of any dispute arising thereunder, is enforceable under the provisions of the United States Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 and 3. The institution of this suit was directed toward the recovery of compensation alleged to be due under two subcontracts between the petitioner, a plumbing and heating contractor, and the respondent Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., who was the prime contractor under a contract with the United States Corps of Engineers, Savannah District, covering certain Nike Hercules missile installations at Robins Air Force Base Defense Area and Turner Air Force Base Defense Area, both of which are located in the State of Georgia. The subcontracts provided for arbitration in New York, and, disputes having arisen thereunder, the respondent filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York seeking an order directing arbitration in accordance with the arbitration provisions. Petitioner then filed this suit in the Middle District of Georgia, where the work under the subcontracts was performed, seeking (1) recovery of the amounts alleged to be due under the subcontracts; (2) rescission of the subcontracts—on grounds of fraud—and recovery on a quantum meruit basis; (3) in the alternative, failing in both of these claims, recovery of the reasonable value of the labor and materials furnished; and (4) an injunction enjoining the respondent from proceeding with its arbitration efforts in New York. Neither party sought to compel specific performance of the arbitration agreement. The District Court, holding (1) that the Miller Act gave petitioner the right to sue in the District Court where the subcontracts were performed and (2) that the arbitration clause, if induced by fraud on the part of respondent, would be vitiated, made permanent its prior restraining order directed at the arbitration proceedings in New York. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner must arbitrate in New York under New York law. 306 F.2d 554. We granted certiorari. 371 U.S. 919, 83 S.Ct. 287, 9 L.Ed.2d 228. Petitioner attacks the subcontracts, as well as the arbitration agreement, as being fraudulent, and this issue, we conclude, must be first determined by the District Court. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
We need not elaborate at length on the involved factual situation since it is detailed in the opinions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court. As we have said, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, the district in which the subcontracts were performed, alleging breach of contract for refusal to pay and seeking recovery for work which had been performed and, alternatively, rescission of the subcontracts on grounds of fraud. The suit was brought under the provisions of the Miller Act, which provides in pertinent part:
'Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name of the United States for the use of the person suing, in the United States District Court for any district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in controversy * * *.' 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b).
It further provides that parties included within the Act 'shall have the right to sue * * * and to prosecute said action to final execution and judgment * * *.' Id., at § 270b(a). Respondent moved to dismiss the suit or stay the same so that the New York arbitration suit might proceed under the terms of both subcontracts, each of which provided that '(a)ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to' the subcontracts or their breach would be submitted to arbitration in New York City under New York law. In denying these motions the District Court held that the Arbitration Act did not apply here since any other holding would nullify the provisions of the Miller Act. It also concluded that the allegations of fraud, if sustained, would, under Georgia law, rescind the subcontracts, including the agreement for arbitration.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed on the theory that the Miller Act was not enacted for the benefit of plaintiffs in the selection of a forum, but rather for the convenience of the defendant, and that this is the type of dispute that is and should be subject to arbitration. As to the issue of fraud, it held that federal law controls in determining whether an allegation of fraud precludes arbitration of a dispute arising under the subcontracts and concluded that, in order to bar arbitration under federal law, the allegation of fraud must be specifically directed to the arbitration clause rather than to the entire contract. Thus,...
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