Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc.
Decision Date | 04 March 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-1015.,01-1015. |
Citation | 537 U.S. 418 |
Parties | MOSELEY ET AL., DBA VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET v. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC., ET AL. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
An army colonel sent a copy of an advertisement for petitioners' retail store, "Victor's Secret," to respondents, affiliated corporations that own the VICTORIA'S SECRET trademarks, because he saw it as an attempt to use a reputable trademark to promote unwholesome, tawdry merchandise. Respondents asked petitioners to discontinue using the name, but petitioners responded by changing the store's name to "Victor's Little Secret." Respondents then filed suit, alleging, inter alia, "the dilution of famous marks" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). This 1995 amendment to the Trademark Act of 1946 describes the factors that determine whether a mark is "distinctive and famous," 15 U. S. C. § 1125(c)(1), and defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," § 1127. To support their claims that petitioners' conduct was likely to "blur and erode" their trademark's distinctiveness and "tarnish" its reputation, respondents presented an affidavit from a marketing expert who explained the value of respondents' mark but expressed no opinion concerning the impact of petitioners' use of "Victor's Little Secret" on that value. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment on the FTDA claim, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that respondents' mark was "distinctive" and that the evidence established "dilution" even though no actual harm had been proved. It also rejected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the FTDA "requires proof that (1) a defendant has [used] a junior mark sufficiently similar to the famous mark to evoke in ... consumers a mental association of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods or services," Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F. 3d 449, 461.
Held:
1. The FTDA requires proof of actual dilution. Pp. 428-434.
(a) Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers. The approximately 25 state trademark dilution laws predating the FTDA refer both to injury to business reputation (tarnishment) and to dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark or trade name (blurring). The FTDA's legislative history mentions that the statute's purpose is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the mark's distinctiveness or tarnish or disparage it, even absent a likelihood of confusion. Pp. 428-431.
(b) Respondents' mark is unquestionably valuable, and petitioners have not challenged the conclusion that it is "famous." Nor do they contend that protection is confined to identical uses of famous marks or that the statute should be construed more narrowly in a case such as this. They do contend, however, that the statute requires proof of actual harm, rather than mere "likelihood" of harm. The contrast between the state statutes and the federal statute sheds light on this precise question. The former repeatedly refer to a "likelihood" of harm, rather than a completed harm, but the FTDA provides relief if another's commercial use of a mark or trade name "causes dilution of the [mark's] distinctive quality," § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, it unambiguously requires an actual dilution showing. This conclusion is confirmed by the FTDA's "dilution" definition itself, § 1127. That does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved. This Court disagrees with the Fourth Circuit's Ringling Bros. decision to the extent it suggests otherwise, but agrees with that court's conclusion that, at least where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. Such association will not necessarily reduce the famous mark's capacity to identify its owner's goods, the FTDA's dilution requirement. Pp. 432-434.
2. The evidence in this case is insufficient to support summary judgment on the dilution count. There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the VICTORIA'S SECRET mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its catalogs. The officer who saw the ad directed his offense entirely at petitioners, not respondents. And respondents' expert said nothing about the impact of petitioners' name on the strength of respondents' mark. Any difficulties of proof that may be entailed in demonstrating actual dilution are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation. P. 434.
259 F. 3d 464, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 435.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
James R. Higgins, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Scot A. Duvall.
Walter Dellinger argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Jonathan D. Hacker.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Irving L. Gornstein, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Mark S. Davies, John M. Whealan, Nancy C. Slutter, Cynthia C. Lynch, and James R. Hughes.*
†
In 1995 Congress amended § 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U. S. C. § 1125, to provide a remedy for the "dilution of famous marks." 109 Stat. 985-986. That amendment, known as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), describes the factors that determine whether a mark is "distinctive and famous," and defines the term "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."1 The question we granted certiorari to decide is whether objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective "likelihood of dilution" standard) is a requisite for relief under the FTDA.
Petitioners, Victor and Cathy Moseley, own and operate a retail store named "Victor's Little Secret" in a strip mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. They have no employees.
Respondents are affiliated corporations that own the VICTORIA'S SECRET trademark and operate over 750 Victoria's Secret stores, two of which are in Louisville, Kentucky, a short drive from Elizabethtown. In 1998 they spent over $55 million advertising "the VICTORIA'S SECRET brand— one of moderately priced, high quality, attractively designed lingerie sold in a store setting designed to look like a wom[a]n's bedroom." App. 167, 170. They distribute 400 million copies of the Victoria's Secret catalog each year, including 39,000 in Elizabethtown. In 1998 their sales exceeded $1.5 billion.
In the February 12, 1998, edition of a weekly publication distributed to residents of the military installation at Fort Knox, Kentucky, petitioners advertised the "GRAND OPENING Just in time for Valentine's Day!" of their store "VICTOR'S SECRET" in nearby Elizabethtown. The ad featured "Intimate Lingerie for every woman"; "Romantic Lighting"; "Lycra Dresses"; "Pagers"; and "Adult Novelties/ Gifts." Id., at 209. An army colonel, who saw the ad and was offended by what he perceived to be an attempt to use a reputable company's trademark to promote the sale of "unwholesome, tawdry merchandise," sent a copy to respondents. Id., at 210. Their counsel then wrote to petitioners stating that their choice of the name "Victor's Secret" for a store selling lingerie was likely to cause confusion with the well-known VICTORIA'S SECRET mark and, in addition, was likely to "dilute the distinctiveness" of the mark. Id., at 190-191. They requested the immediate discontinuance of the use of the name "and any variations thereof." Ibid. In response, petitioners changed the name of their store to "Victor's Little Secret." Because that change did not satisfy respondents,2 they promptly filed this action in Federal District Court.
The complaint contained four separate claims: (1) for trademark infringement alleging that petitioners' use of their trade name was "likely to cause confusion and/or mistake in violation of 15 U. S. C. § 1114(1)"; (2) for unfair competition alleging misrepresentation in violation of § 1125(a); (3) for "federal dilution" in violation of the FTDA; and (4) for trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of the common law of Kentucky. Id., at 15, 20-23. In the dilution count, the complaint alleged that petitioners' conduct was "likely to blur and erode the distinctiveness" and "tarnish the reputation" of the VICTORIA'S SECRET trademark. Ibid.
After discovery the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The record contained uncontradicted affidavits and deposition testimony describing the vast size of respondents' business, the value of the VICTORIA'S SECRET name, and descriptions of the items sold in the respective parties' stores. Respondents sell a "complete line of lingerie" and related items, each of which bears a VICTORIA'S SECRET label or tag.3 Petitioners sell a wide variety of items, including adult videos, "adult novelties," and lingerie.4 Victor Moseley stated in an affidavit that women's lingerie...
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