Moseti v. Collin Coll.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
• Writing for the Court: Michael J. Truncale United States District Judge
• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:25-CV-00358-MJT-CLS
• Decision Date: 05 November 2025
• Citation: Moseti v. Collin Coll., Civil Action 4:25-CV-00358-MJT-CLS (E.D. Tex. Nov 05, 2025)
• Parties: PETER J. MOSETI, Plaintiff, v. COLLIN COLLEGE, ROBERT PEVEHOUSE, CHARLES WALTZ, TODD DOUGHERTY, SANDRA ESCALANTE, G'ANNA SAUNDERS, and CHRISTOPHER EYLE, Defendant.
• topic: Civil Rights,Contracts,Employment Law,Ongoing or Prospective Litigation

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PETER J. MOSETI, Plaintiff, v. COLLIN COLLEGE, ROBERT PEVEHOUSE, CHARLES WALTZ, TODD DOUGHERTY, SANDRA ESCALANTE, G'ANNA SAUNDERS, and CHRISTOPHER EYLE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:25-CV-00358-MJT-CLS

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

November 5, 2025

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Michael J. Truncale United States District Judge

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Court for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges, the district court referred this proceeding to the Honorable Christine L. Stetson, United States Magistrate Judge, to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter findings of fact and recommend disposition on case-dispositive matters, and to determine non-dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72.

I. Background

On October 7, 2025, Judge Stetson issued a Report and Recommendation [Dkt. 79] recommending this Court grant the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Robert Pevehouse, Charles Waltz, Todd Dougherty, Sandra Escalante, G'Anna Saunders, and Christopher Eyle [Dkt. 64]; and grant in part and deny in part the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Collin County Community College District [Dkt. 24]. In short, Judge Stetson recommended dismissing all pro se Plaintiff Peter J. Moseti's claims except his Title VII retaliation claim against Collin College. [Dkt. 79 at 21]. Plaintiff and Collin College objected within the time permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

II. Legal Standard

A party who timely files specific, written objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation is entitled to a de novo determination of the findings or recommendations to which the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. “Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

III. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation

A. Plaintiff's improper filings

In response to Judge Stetson's Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits for Objections and to File Integrated Second Amended Complaint” [Dkt. 80] and an accompanying “Objection to Report and Recommendation and in the Alternative, Second Amended Complaint” [Dkt. 81]. In his motion, Plaintiff requests leave to file 11-page objections, exceeding the eight-page limit in Local Rule CV-72(c). [Dkt. 80 at 1]. He also asks for permission to file a second amended complaint “as part of the same document (or, alternatively, as a separately docketed exhibit to the objections).” [Id.].

In line with Local Rule CV-7(k), Plaintiff did file his objections/proposed complaint immediately after the motion for leave. See [Dkt. 81]. The portion of that document comprising his objections spans only four-and-a-half pages. [Id. at 1-5]. The part that is his proposed second amended complaint begins on page five and runs until the end of the document. [ Id. at 5-10]. Since Plaintiff's objections do not exceed the page limit in Local Rule CV-72(c), his request for leave to file objections exceeding that limit is DENIED as moot.

Regarding his request for leave to amend, Plaintiff's motion violates Local Rule CV-7(a). Although styled as a motion for alternative relief, Plaintiff's requested relief is not alternative. The Court could grant both requests, so they should have been set out in separate motions. Moreover, Plaintiff's proposed amendment was premature. He claims that the “R&R expressly invite[d] Plaintiff to cure pleading deficiencies.” [Dkt. 80 at 2]. It did not. It suggested giving leave to amend, but only if this Court adopted that recommendation. [Dkt. 79 at 22]. Plaintiff was not “expressly invited” to cure his pleading deficiencies just yet, so he should not have filed his proposed second amended complaint.

In fact, “failing to request leave from the court when leave is required” renders “amended pleadings filed without leave of court” as “having no legal effect.” United States ex rel. Mathews v. HealthSouth Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane (Wright & Miller), Federal Practice & Procedure § 1484, at 601 (1990)). Typically, the Court would strike an improper document filed after a motion for leave. See E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-7(k). However, courts can still give legal effect to proposed amended complaints filed without leave if “leave would have been granted had it been sought” and “the plaintiff could still re-file the complaint without prejudicing another party.” Mathews, 332 F.3d at 296-97. Although prejudice was found in Mathews, the Fifth Circuit expressly sanctioned a district court's decision to “consider[] [an] amended complaint filed even though the plaintiff never requested leave” when “it was more procedurally expedient to consider the complaint filed than to strike the amended complaint and then grant leave to file another complaint that raised the exact same issues,” especially since “the parties would be in the same position regardless.” Id.

Here, the Court finds it “procedurally expedient” to consider the second half of docket entry 81 as Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint. No Defendant objected to Judge Stetson's recommendation to grant leave, and granting leave would not affect any rights of the parties,^[1] so amendment should not prejudice anyone. Accordingly, despite violating Local Rule CV-7(a), the Court will consider Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint at the conclusion of this Order. See infra section V.

Before that, though, the Court addresses Plaintiff's objections, which, again, comprise the first four-and-a-half pages of docket entry 81. [Dkt. 81 at 1-5].

B. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims

Plaintiff objects to Judge Stetson's findings that he failed to plausibly allege that any individual Defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against discriminatory treatment in public employment. [Id. at 2; Dkt. 79 at 7-12]. Plaintiff “[r]espectfully” asserts that Judge Stetson “overlook[ed] concrete facts demonstrating race-based selective enforcement.” [Dkt. 81 at 2 (emphasis removed)]. In support, Plaintiff provides facts relating to each individual Defendant's treatment of him. [Id. at 2-4]. But these facts do not appear in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. They might appear in his other motion-to-dismiss briefing, but as Judge Stetson said in the Report and Recommendation, she was “not permitted to consider those facts in [her] review” because they were not included in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [Dkt. 79 at 21]. Similarly, the Court here will not consider these new allegations because analyzing whether Plaintiff stated a claim only looks to “the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).

Therefore, the Court reviews de novo whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a § 1983 claim against each individual Defendant based on the same record as Judge Stetson. And after that review, the Court similarly finds that Plaintiff failed to state such claims against each Defendant. Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. The recommendation to dismiss the § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants is ADOPTED.^[2]

C. Plaintiff's Title VII disparate-treatment and hostile-work-environment claims

Plaintiff notes that he objects to Judge Stetson's recommendation to deny his Title VII disparate-treatment claim [Dkt. 81 at 1]. Otherwise, he does not brief it. He simply relies on his newly listed allegations; but, as stated above, the Court cannot consider those. Accordingly, his disparate-treatment claim fails because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not allege that anyone's treatment of him was racially motivated. [Dkt. 79 at 15-16].

Plaintiff last takes issue with Judge Stetson's recommendation to deny his Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. [Dkt. 81 at 4-5]. Plaintiff claims that his “complaint alleges a work environment charged with racial favoritism” that “is plausibly severe or pervasive.” [Id. (emphasis removed)]. Plaintiff misreads Judge Stetson's Report and Recommendation. Judge Stetson did find that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleged a pervasively hostile environment. [Dkt. 79 at 17]. What she did not find was that Plaintiff alleged any of the workplace's harassment was “because of his race.” [Id.]. A fresh look at Plaintiff's pleading leads the Court to agree.

Plaintiff's objections to dismissal of these two claims are OVERRULED. The recommendations to dismiss his Title VII disparate-treatment and hostile-work-environment claims are ADOPTED.

IV. Collin College's Objection

Collin College “objects to the Report and Recommendation with respect only to Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.” [Dkt. 82]. Judge Stetson found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged this claim because (1) Plaintiff “engaged in a protected activity” by filing an internal workplace complaint that opposed “a practice made unlawful...