Moshassuck Encampment, No. 2 v. Arnold & Maine

• Decision Date: 18 March 1903
• Citation: 54 A. 771,25 R.I. 65
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: MOSHASSUCK ENCAMPMENT, NO. 2, et al. v. ARNOLD & MAINE.

54 A. 771

25 R.I. 65

MOSHASSUCK ENCAMPMENT, NO. 2, et al.

v. ARNOLD & MAINE.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 18, 1903.

Assumpsit by Moshassuck Encampment, No. 2, and others, against Arnold & Maine. On petition of defendants for new trial. Petition denied.

The following is the opinion below of Douglas, J.:

"The plaintiffs in this case were owners of a building standing on leased land. Their lease expired June 30, 1899, but contained a clause providing that they should give up possession when the value of the building, to be decided by arbitration, should be paid them by the lessors. The defendants were tenants of a part of the building by lease from the plaintiffs, which expired June 30, 1899. On October 9, 1899, the plaintiffs were paid the appraised value of the building, and gave up possession of the estate. The defendants, without any agreement with the plaintiffs, continued to occupy the part of the building they had leased after their lease expired, and until the plaintiffs vacated. April 20, 1899, the defendants procured a lease of the land from the owners; beginning its term on the 1st day of July, and running for twenty years. On the 9th day of October the defendants, by arrangement with the owners of the land, supplied the money, which was paid for the building, and became the owners of it. This suit was brought to recover rent of the defendants from July 1st to October 9th at the rate formerly paid under their lease. The defendants deny their liability to pay the rent, and plead in set-off a claim to all rents received by the plaintiffs after June 30.

"Both parties agree that the clause in the lease from the owners of the land to the plaintiffs which determines when the plaintiffs shall surrender possession of the premises, viz., when they shall be paid for the building, gives the plaintiffs the right of possession until that time. This interpretation is also sustained by authority. Van Rensselaer's Heirs v. Penniman, 6 Wend. 569; Boulton v. Shea, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 742; Holsman v. Abrams, 2 Duer, 435; Ecke v. Fetzer, 65 Wis. 55, 26 N. W. 266; Mullen v. Pugh, 16 Ind. App. 337, 45 N. E. 347. The plaintiffs were therefore entitled to hold the land and building, as against their lessors, and all parties claiming under these lessors, until October 9th. They had the same right that they had before to collect rent or recover for the use and occupation of the premises by the defendants or any other persons whom they (the plaintiffs) permitted to occupy portions of the premises. The very contention advanced by the defendants' plea, that the plaintiffs should be held responsible for rents and profits during this occupation, assumes that the plaintiffs had the right to let and recover rent during that period. The defendants, therefore, as lessees holding over their specified term, were liable, at the option of the plaintiffs, to pay rent at the same rate as before. Providence County Savings Bank v. Hall, 16 R. I. 154, 13 Atl. 122.

"I am unable to see how the defendants' transactions with the owners of the land alter their relations to the plaintiffs. The owners of the land could not sell the building to the defendants till they had paid for it themselves. Neither could they ...