Mosley v. N.J.

Decision Date31 August 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 20-18885 (ZNQ) (DEA)
PartiesNOAH MOSLEY, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

ZAHID N. QURAISHI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon two motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[1] 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the Motions without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 2) filed by defendants Township of Edison Charles Zundel, and Michael Carullo, grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) (ECF No. 12) filed by County of Middlesex, and grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 20) filed by defendants State of New Jersey, Andrew Carey, Tzvi Dolinger, and Bina Desai.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

To decide motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) the Court accepts the non-conclusory allegations in the Complaint as true.[2] (“Compl.” or “Complaint,” ECF No. 1.)

Defendant Zundel, an officer employed by Defendant Township of Edison, was present on the scene where the drug transaction occurred and in which one person was arrested and one escaped. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-23.) Although Zundel did not see the person who escaped, he identified Plaintiff Noah Mosley as the escaped suspect based on his observation of a DMV photo. (Id.¶ 23.) Defendant Carullo, a detective employed by Defendant Township of Edison, prepared reports, drafted a criminal complaint implicating Plaintiff as the person who escaped the scene, and obtained warrants for Plaintiff's arrest based on Zundel's identification. (Id. ¶ 24.) On September 12, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Police Officers John Doe and Jane Doe, who are members of the Edison Police Department, and his car was confiscated and subsequently seized. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff posted bail for the charges relating to his narcotics arrest on September 19, 2014. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, through county prosecutor Defendant Andrew Carey, then sought to prosecute Plaintiff in state court for violating the terms of his probation in an unrelated case. (Id.) Defendant State of New Jersey, represented by Defendants Tzvi Dolinger and Bina Desai[3] (collectively with Carey, the Prosecutor Defendants), relied on Carullo's reports and testimony to prosecute the violation. (Id. ¶ 27.) Ultimately, Plaintiff was sentenced to five years imprisonment on January 15, 2015 for violating probation in an unrelated case and committed to the custody of the New Jersey Department of Corrections. (Id. ¶ 31.)

Later that year, Plaintiff was tried in state court for the narcotics violations. (Id. ¶¶ 32-34.) Dolinger prosecuted the charges on behalf of the State of New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 34.) Zundel first testified that he had observed Plaintiff's hand connect with the person purchasing narcotics. (Id. ¶ 34.) He later changed his testimony during trial and denied observing the connection. Two other witnesses testified to confirm that Plaintiff was not present at the narcotics deal. (Id. ¶¶ 3637.) On January 23, 2018, the trial court found Plaintiff not guilty on all charges related to the alleged narcotics incident. (Id. ¶ 38.)

The issue of Plaintiff's probation violation, however, continued. The Appellate Division affirmed the violation, but on March 6, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in State v. Mosley, 232 N.J. 169, 190 (N.J. 2018) on the basis that Plaintiff was deprived of an important due process confrontation right. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-42.) On October 17, 2018, the trial court entered an Amended Judgment of Conviction consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling but did not enter an amended judgment vacating the violation of probation. (Id. ¶ 43.) According to Plaintiff, the trial court amended the judgment to make it appear that Plaintiff's sentence on the violation of probation was valid, commenting that “Probation withdrew the Violation of Probation” and “Mr. Mosley fully served the five (5) year prison term for which he was resentenced to this violation of probation.” (Id.)

On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed this suit in New Jersey state court to redress the deprivations of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution through 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.[4] Plaintiff also alleged violations of his rights under the New Jersey Constitution, New Jersey Civil Rights Act (N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2), and the common laws of the State of New Jersey.[5]

Defendants Township of Edison, Zundel, and Carullo (collectively, the “Edison Defendants) removed this case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. Soon after, Edison Defendants timely filed this motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (the “Edison Motion,” ECF No. 2) and a brief supporting the Edison Motion (the “Edison Motion Br.,” ECF No. 2-2). Defendant County of Middlesex (“Middlesex”) timely filed an answer to the complaint (the “Middlesex Answer,” ECF No. 7), a motion for judgment on the pleadings[6] (the “Middlesex Motion,” ECF No. 12), and a brief supporting the Middlesex Motion (the “Middlesex Motion Br.,” ECF No. 12-1). Finally, Defendants State of New Jersey, Andrew Carey, Tzvi Dolinger, and Bina K. Desai (collectively, the “State Defendants) timely filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the State Motion,” ECF No. 20) and a brief supporting the State Motion (the “State Motion Br.,” ECF No. 20-1). Plaintiffs filed briefs opposing the Edison Motion (“Edison Opp'n Br.,” ECF No. 4) and opposing the Middlesex Motion[7] (“Middlesex Opp'n Br.,” ECF No. 17). Edison Defendants replied. (“Edison Reply Br.,” ECF No. 5). Middlesex likewise replied. (“Middlesex Reply Br.,” ECF No. 17).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's non-conclusory factual allegations as true. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). However, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must provide the opportunity to amend a complaint that is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008); see Oran v. Stafford, 34 F.Supp.2d 906, 913-14 (D.N.J. 1999), aff'd, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, dismissal for failure to state a claim is justified where there is an “insuperable barrier” to a claim, such as immunity. See Flight System, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys., 112 F.3d 124, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1997); Camero v. Kostos, 253 F.Supp. 331, 338 (D.N.J. 1966).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) “must be filed before any responsive pleading,” but a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) may be filed at any time. United States v. Estate of Elson, 421 F.Supp.3d 1, 4 (D.N.J. 2019). When a Rule 12(c) motion asserts that the complaint fails to state a claim, the Rule 12(b)(6) standards apply: the court must accept the nonmoving party's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and disregard any unsupported conclusory statements. DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2008); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233.

Under Rule 12(c), a court will grant judgment on the pleadings if, on the basis of the pleadings, no material issue of fact remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. DiCarlo, 530 F.3d at 259.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Edison Motion

Edison Defendants argue that a two-year statute of limitations bars all of Plaintiff's state law claims (Counts I-X) and federal law claims (Courts XI-XV). (Edison Motion Br. at 13-14.) They contend that the statute of limitations began running on September 12, 2014 for the false arrest claim, on January 23, 2018 for the malicious prosecution on the narcotics charges, and on March 6, 2018 for the malicious prosecution on the violation of probation charge. (Id. at 14.) Given the Complaint was filed on October 13, 2020, Edison Defendants argue the claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)

Plaintiff's opposition first objects to the law firm's representation of all Edison Defendants. (Edison Opp'n Br. at 2.) He next argues for remand because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in light of the fact that State Defendants-and Edison Defendants as agents of the State-are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that the case must be remanded to state court because Edison Defendants did not obtain consent of all defendants before removal to federal court. (Id. at 3.) With respect to the accrual dates, Plaintiff argues that the dates are incorrect because the harms he suffered are part of a pattern and therefore the continuing violations theory applies. (Id. at 3-4.) Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the deferred accrual rule from Heck v Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), should apply. (Id. at 5.) Thus, the accrual of his claims should be deferred until October 17, 2018, the date that his criminal judgment was amended by the trial court to invalidate the violation of probation. (Id.)...

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