Moss v. Decatur Land Imp. Co.

• Citation: 93 Ala. 269,9 So. 188
• Parties: MOSS v. DECATUR LAND IMP. CO.
• Decision Date: 15 April 1891
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

9 So. 188

93 Ala. 269

MOSS v. DECATUR LAND IMP. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 15, 1891

Appeal from city court of Decatur; W. H. SIMPSON, Judge.

This action was brought by G. H. MOSS, against the Decatur Land Improvement Company, and sought to recover the amount alleged to be due for a month's wages according to a contract. Plaintiff appeals.

Wert & Speake, for appellant.

Brickell, Harris & Eyster, for appellee.

COLEMAN J.

There was no conflict in the evidence, and it was the duty of the court to declare the conclusion of the law. The court charged the jury, if they believed the evidence, to find for the defendant. It appears from the bill of exceptions that in the month of February plaintiff was employed as book-keeper for defendant at the price of $50 per month; that he went to work beginning on the 6th day of February, and worked the balance of the month at that rate; that nothing more was said, and he worked through March and April, receiving at the end of each month $50. On the 1st of May it was agreed that defendant should pay plaintiff $60 per month, which amount was paid him at the end of the month. "That nothing was said about a hiring by the day or week or year, but that he was employed and was to be paid by the month, at sixty dollars per month for no special time." Without any further understanding plaintiff continued his services until he was discharged on the 14th day of June. There was no reason assigned for discharging plaintiff, except a desire to lessen expenses and plaintiff offered to continue his services. Defendant tendered to plaintiff $28 for the 14 days of services rendered in June, being the amount then owing at the rates of $60 per month, which sum plaintiff refused to receive in satisfaction, but claimed that defendant was indebted to him for the entire month of June. The suit was brought to recover the amount of $60 claimed to be due under the agreement for the month of June. The question is, do these facts constitute an entire contract of hiring by the month, or a contract terminating at will, entitling the party to be paid only at the rate of $60 per month? Whatever may have been the effect of the contract made in February, the evidence is that in May "plaintiff was employed and was to be paid by the month at sixty dollars per month." This was not a hiring by the day, at the rate of $60 per month. In the case of Beach v. Mullen, it was held "that a contract...