Moss v. Martin

Citation473 F.3d 694
Decision Date02 January 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-3689.,05-3689.
PartiesWilliam H. MOSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Timothy MARTIN, Robert Millette, and Brian Piersma, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John E. Kerley (argued), Kerley & Associates, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Erik G. Light, Gary S. Feinerman (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before BAUER, POSNER, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

William Moss brought this civil rights action against Illinois Department of Transportation ("IDOT") employees Timothy Martin, Robert Millette, and Brian Piersma, seeking monetary and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Moss alleges that he was fired from his position as the IDOT's Chief of the Highway Sign Shop because of his political affiliation, in violation of the First Amendment and without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I. Background

The IDOT is the department in Illinois' state government that is responsible for developing a statewide master plan for transportation, spending state funds for roads and highways, developing and coordinating effective programs and activities to facilitate the movement of motor vehicle traffic, and protecting and conserving life and property on Illinois' streets and highways. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2705/2705-200, 255, 210 (2004). The IDOT is headed by the Secretary of Transportation, who oversees the IDOT's five Divisions and five Offices. 2 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1225.210(b). The Division of Highways has ten separate bureaus, including the Bureau of Operations. The Bureau of Operations consists of the Central Bureaus of Construction, Maintenance, Materials and Physical Research, and Traffic. 2 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1225.280(b). The Highway Sign Shop falls within the Bureau of Operations.

According to the IDOT position description, the Chief of the Highway Sign Shop "is accountable for administering the Highway Sign Shop Section of the Bureau of Operations." The Chief "formulates and implements policies, procedures, programs, and operational concepts for maintenance and rehabilitation of the department's extensive sign and raised pavement marker systems throughout the state." In particular, the Chief "directs the manufacture and distribution of all standard high-way signs" and "directs the fabrication and installation of overlay panels for rehabilitation of the statewide freeway sign network." The Chief also "maintains the department's comprehensive raised pavement marker system in all highway districts and supervises a complete inventory, accounting, and budgetary system to administer a specific budget allocation for support of section activities."

The Chief supervises approximately five employees directly and twenty employees indirectly. The Chief reports directly to the Engineer of Operations and maintains contact with the District Engineers, Traffic Engineers, and Traffic Operations personnel in all district offices and other central bureaus. The Chief is in contact with the Department of Corrections, representatives of other states, governmental agencies, research organizations, private sign fabricators, suppliers of raw materials and installation equipment, and contractors.

The position description specifies that the Chief has both technical and managerial responsibilities: the Chief "is personally responsible for providing standard signs and sign making materials, directing the fabrication and field activities required to meet the department's statewide objectives for freeway sign and raised pavement marker rehabilitation, and administering the section's budgetary and manpower resources." The Chief also "develops programs, policies and procedures to address sign and raised pavement marker maintenance needs" and "administers the Sign Shop budget and prepares annual budget and long-range program requests...."

While the value of the sign system is approximately $104 million and the value of the raised pavement marker system is approximately $9 million, the annual operating expenses of the Highway Sign Shop are approximately $3.7 million. This figure includes the annual expenses associated with the fabrication of between 60,000 and 70,000 standard signs, the refurbishment of 100,000 square feet of sign panels and the maintenance of 25,000 raised pavement markers.1

On March 16, 2001, Moss became a certified employee of the IDOT. His employment as Chief of the Highway Sign Shop was terminated on April 26, 2004. Moss filed suit against the IDOT defendants on September 24, 2004, alleging that he was terminated because of his political affiliation even though his political affiliation was irrelevant to his job duties. He claimed that his termination violated his First Amendment right to political affiliation and, because it was without any pre-termination hearing or proceeding, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

The IDOT defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, attaching the position description for the Chief of the Highway Sign Shop to their motion. The district court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the functions of Moss' position rendered his political affiliation a proper employment consideration. The district court also concluded that Moss had failed to state a due process claim because his complaint failed to allege any basis that would support a finding that he had a property interest in his continued employment with the IDOT. The district court granted Moss leave to file an amended due process claim.

In his amended complaint, Moss asserted that the IDOT's Personnel Policy Manual (the "Manual") gave rise to an enforceable property right in his continued employment with the IDOT because the Manual requires that terminations only be for cause. The defendants attached the Manual to their answer to the amended complaint and filed another motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted. The district court found that the disclaimer language contained in the foreword section of the Manual negated any contention that the Manual created a contract of employment. And even if the Manual created a contract, the district court concluded that the Manual contained language that allowed the termination of an employee either with or without cause. This timely appeal followed.

II. Analysis
A. Political Affiliation as a Valid Qualification for Employment

Moss first argues that the district court erred in granting the IDOT defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings because Moss's position as Chief of the Highway Sign Shop is not the type of position for which a politically-motivated personnel action is constitutionally permitted. Under Rule 12(c), a party can move for judgment on the pleadings after the filing of the complaint and answer. Brunt v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir.2002) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c)). Only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts to support a claim for relief and the moving party demonstrates that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved will a court grant a Rule 12(c) motion. Id. at 718-19 (citing N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir.1998)). We review a district court's ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion de novo. Id. at 719.

If the nature of a public official's job makes political loyalty a valid qualification for the effective performance of his position, that official may be terminated on the basis of his political affiliation. Riley v. Blagojevich, 425 F.3d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)). To determine whether political loyalty is a valid qualification, we consider whether the employee's position entailed "the making of policy and thus the exercise of political judgment." Allen v. Martin, 460 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 355 (7th Cir.2005)). We also consider the degree of discretion and responsibility exercised in the position by examining the official job description for the position. Id. at 944-945; Selch v. Letts, 5 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (7th Cir.1993). "We only look past the official job description where the plaintiff demonstrates systematic unreliability." Allen, 460 F.3d at 944. To show such systematic unreliability, a plaintiff "must provide specific facts demonstrating that the description was unreliable and unauthoritative." Id.

On prior occasions, we have held that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for various positions within state highway departments. See Selch, 5 F.3d at 1047 (political affiliation appropriate requirement for position of subdistrict superintendent of Indiana Department of Highways); Allen, 460 F.3d at 945 (political affiliation appropriate requirement for IDOT's bureau chief of accounting and auditing). Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Moss, however, we cannot conclude at this early stage in the litigation that political loyalty is a valid qualification for the Chief of the Highway Sign Shop position.

"Almost all jobs in government above the lowest level require the holder of the job to exercise at least a modicum of discretion . . . ." Riley, 425 F.3d at 359. The Chief of the Highway Sign Shop is no different. The Chief "exercises substantial independent judgment in making decisions concerning the development and implementation of innovative rehabilitation procedures"; "is afforded broad latitude in accomplishing his/her duties"...

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