Moss v. Standridge
Decision Date | 17 June 1926 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 608 |
Citation | 110 So. 17,215 Ala. 237 |
Parties | MOSS et al. v. STANDRIDGE. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 1926
Certiorari to Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Roger Snyder, Judge.
Petition of C.L. Moss and G.B. McCormack, Jr., doing business as Moss & McCormack, for certiorari to the circuit court of Jefferson county to review the judgment and finding of that court, in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, by Jane Standridge against the petitioners. Writ denied, and judgment affirmed.
Percy Benners & Burr, and J.R. Forman, all of Birmingham, for appellants.
Harsh Harsh & Harsh, of Birmingham, for appellee.
Petition was filed in the court below, under the Workmen's Compensation Statute, by Jane Standridge, widow of J.C Standridge, seeking compensation for herself and minor children on account of the death of her husband, which occurred on March 26, 1925. We quote the following from appellants' statement of the case:
The one pivotal question here presented, is whether or not the claim for death compensation is barred. It is insisted by appellants that, under section 7554, Code of 1923, no compensation is provided for the death of an employee, unless the death results proximately from the accident within three years, and that, as the undisputed proof discloses that the petition was filed after the expiration of such time, petitioner is not entitled to relief. That portion of said section relied upon by appellants reads as follows:
"In death cases, where the death results proximately from the accident within three years, compensation payable to dependents shall be computed on the following basis, and shall be paid to the persons entitled thereto without administration,"
--followed by classifications as basis for compensation payment.
In support of this contention, appellants cite the case of Partusch v. Kaufman-Straus Co., 209 Ky. 345, 272 S.W. 884, which bears some analogy to the instant case, so far as the language of section 7554 of our Code is concerned. But we do not find that the Kentucky statute contains provisions corresponding with section 7570 of the Code of 1923, which deals specifically with the question of limitation of actions, that portion of which, here pertinent, reads:
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