Moss v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 November 2001
• Citation: 822 So.2d 392
• Parties: George T. MOSS and Susan D. Moss v. Teddy E. WILLIAMS. George T. Moss and Susan D. Moss v. Jerry Glenn Coaker and Audrey Ellen Coaker.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

822 So.2d 392

George T. MOSS and Susan D. Moss v. Teddy E. WILLIAMS.

George T. Moss and Susan D. Moss v. Jerry Glenn Coaker and Audrey Ellen Coaker.

1953.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

November 21, 2001.

Norton W. Brooker, Jr., and William E. Shreve, Jr., of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., Mobile; and S.G. Laurie, Chatom, for appellants.

Edward P. Turner, Jr., and E. Tatum Turner of Turner, Onderdonk, Kimbrough & Howell, P.A., Chatom, for appellees Jerry Glenn Coaker and Audrey Ellen Coaker.

E. Mark Ezell, Butler, for amicus curiae Red, L.L.C.

On Application for Rehearing

MOORE, Chief Justice.

The December 15, 2000, no-opinion order of affirmance is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor.

This case involves a dispute over the nature of the interest conveyed in two similar deeds executed in 1904. In two separate cases, the Washington Circuit Court found that the deeds conveyed a right of way (an easement) and entered judgment for the plaintiffs Teddy E. Williams and Jerry Glenn Coaker and Audrey Ellen Coaker. The cases proceeded to trial; both juries entered verdicts for the plaintiffs and the juries awarded $100 in compensatory damages to Williams and $1 in compensatory damages to the Coakers. The trial courts entered judgments on those verdicts. George T. Moss and Susan D. Moss appealed. The cases were consolidated on appeal, and this Court affirmed, without an opinion. Moss v. Williams, (No. 1991217) 807 So.2d 614 (Ala.2000) (table); Moss v. Coaker, (No. 1991253) 807 So.2d 614 (Ala.2000) (table). The Mosses filed an application for rehearing. We grant the application, and we reverse and remand.

Normally, we apply the "clearly-erroneous" standard of review to a trial court's judgment. In this case, however, the material facts are undisputed. The trial court based its decision on the pleadings, documentary and other evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion for a summary judgment, and arguments of counsel. "[W]hen a trial court sits in judgment on facts that are undisputed, an appellate court will determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to those undisputed facts." Craig Constr. Co. v. Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752, 756 (Ala.1990). The question before this Court is one of law: namely, the nature of the interest conveyed by documents equally available to this Court as the trial court below. "`[O]n appeal, the ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness, and this Court's review is de novo.'" Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala.1999) (quoting Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Ala.1997)). See also Hacker v. Carlisle, 388 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1980) (trial court's judgment is afforded no presumption of correctness in a case tried without a jury on stipulations, briefs, and documentary evidence and in which no testimony was admitted on any material matter). The disputed land in this case is a portion of a 100-foot wide abandoned railroad bed in Washington County. The two deeds at issue were executed in 1904. The companion deeds transferred a property interest in the strip of land from the Tombigbee Lumber Company ("Tombigbee Lumber Company") and the Tombigbee and Northern Railway Company ("Northern Railway") to the Tombigbee Valley Railroad Company ("Valley Railroad"). The deeds, executed on April 6, 1904, each conveyed the same land in nearly identical language. Henry C. Flower signed one deed as the president of the grantor, the Tombigbee Lumber Company; he signed the other as president of the grantor, Northern Railway. In 1905, the Tombigbee Lumber Company executed another deed to A.D. Terrill, purporting to convey land that included the strip of land in dispute here.

In 1995, the Mosses acquired an interest in the property by the execution of a quitclaim deed from Burlington Railroad, which had removed the railroad tracks and abandoned the railroad bed before transferring its interest in the land to the Mosses. Burlington Railroad derived its interest in the land from Valley Railroad. If the interest conveyed to Valley Railroad in the 1904 deeds was a fee-simple interest, the Mosses own the 100-foot strip of land at issue. If, however, the deeds conveyed merely a right of way, then Williams and the Coakers take title to the center line of the abandoned right of way that abuts their land. Ex parte Jones, 669 So.2d 161 (Ala.1995).

The 1904 deed from the Tombigbee Lumber Company to Valley Railroad ("Deed 1") stated, in pertinent part:

"State of Alabama

Washington County

"Know All Men By These Presents, That for [and] in consideration of the sum of one dollar and other valuable consideration received by the Tombigbee Lumber Company, a corporation hereinafter called the first party, from the Tombigbee Valley Railroad Company, a corporation under the laws of Alabama, hereinafter called the second party, the first party does hereby remise, release and forever quit claim unto the said second party the strip of land one hundred feet wide being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the railroad of the Tombigbee & Northern Railway Company, as the same is now operated across the following described lands situated in Washington County, Alabama, to-wit:

"[Detailed list of acreage in sections of Washington County, including the parcel in dispute in this case, omitted.]

"Reference being hereby especially made to the said survey of the said railroad for a more accurate description of the land hereby conveyed, together with the right to cut down any trees, which might fall upon said road and the further right to do all necessary things for the adequate and proper drainage of said road.

"The intent and purpose of this conveyance and above description is to embrace all the right of way now occupied by the Tombigbee & Northern Railway.

"Also the depot grounds and round house at Fairford, Alabama and premises thereof described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a point in the south line of the right of way of the Tombigbee & Northern Railway Company, 25 feet east of the present water tank on the main line, and run thence at right angles with railroad main line south one hundred and fifty (150) feet to a point, thence at right angles five hundred (500) feet west and parallel with the main line to a point, thence at right angles north to a point on the right of way of said railroad one hundred and fifty (150) feet, thence along the south line of the right of way to the point of beginning, being the land now occupied and in use as depot and round house at Fairford—all being in township 2, Range 1 West, section 3, all in Washington County and State of Alabama.

"Also a parcel of land two hundred and fifty feet wide by three hundred and fifty feet long laid off so as to include the land now occupied by the railroad shop and brass foundry at Fairford.

"Also the right of way and terminals at Calvert, Alabama described as follows, to wit: A strip of land ....

"[Descriptions of land repeatedly using phrases such as `parcel of ground' and `right of way,' omitted.]

"The purpose for this instrument is for the first party herein to remise, release and quitclaim unto the second party all railway and mixed property of every kind, character and description described in and conveyed by a certain deed made on even date herewith by the Tombigbee & Northern Railway Company to the Tombigbee Valley Railroad Company.

"To Have and To Hold the same unto the said second party, its successors and assigns forever.

"In witness Whereof the said Tombigbee Lumber Company has caused these presents to be signed by its President and its corporate seal to be hereto affixed by its Secretary in furtherance of a resolution of this Board of Directors and likewise pursuant to authority given at a meeting of the stock holders of said Company this the 6th day of April A.D. 1904."

(Emphasis added.)

The other deed, from Northern Railway to Valley Railroad ("Deed 2"), contained the same terms as Deed 1, with consistent (and even more detailed) property descriptions. The only significant difference was that Northern Railway, not the Tombigbee Lumber Company, was the grantor. Deed 2 stated, in pertinent part:

"[T]he Tombigbee and Northern Railway Company, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the Tombigbee Valley Railroad Company, ... all the following described property [including the parcel in dispute in this case]....

". . . .

"Reference being hereby especially made to the said survey of the said railroad for a more accurate description of the land hereby conveyed, together with the right to cut down any trees, which might fall upon said road and the further right to do all necessary things for the adequate and proper drainage of said road.

"The intent and purpose of this conveyance and above description is to embrace all the right of way now occupied by the Tombigbee & Northern Railway."

(Emphasis added.)

Our analysis begins with § 35-4-2, Ala.Code 1975: "Every estate in lands is to be taken as a fee simple, although the words necessary to create an estate of inheritance are not used, unless it clearly appears that a less estate was intended." (Emphasis added.) Under the statute, "the presumption is, and all doubts are resolved in favor of, a fee simple estate." Hacker v. Carlisle, 388 So.2d at 950. "The intention to create a lesser estate must clearly appear, for the courts will not construe the grantor's words as conveying a lesser estate if a different meaning can be fairly given them." 388 So.2d at 950. This Court has long recognized that § 35-4-2 is simply "a statutory affirmance of the general rule that a deed is construed most strongly against the grantor." Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Karr, 241 Ala. 525, 527, 3 So.2d 409, 410 (1941) (discussing the predecessor statute to § 35-4-2: Tit. 47, § 14, Code of 1940).

A fundamental rule of construction is that, in construing the terms of a deed, a court is to ascertain the...