Mota, Matter of
| Decision Date | 29 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 56284-9,56347-1,s. 56284-9 |
| Citation | 788 P.2d 538,114 Wn.2d 465 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Julio MOTA, Petitioner. Julio MOTA, Respondent, v. The STATE of Washington, Petitioner. The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Robert L. BAKER, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., William L. Williams, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for petitioner.
C. Danny Clem, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Irene K. Cleavenger, Deputy, Irene Asai, Deputy, Port Orchard, for appellant.
Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n., Eric J. Nielsen, Seattle, for respondent Mota.
Crawford, McGilliard, Peterson & Yelish, Richard L. Peterson, Port Orchard, for respondent Baker.
These two cases were consolidated for purposes of the appeal and are decided together. Julio Mota and Robert Baker contend they are entitled to "good-time" credit under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, RCW 9.94A.150, for time spent in county jail prior to sentencing. The State has appealed from decisions in favor of Mota and Baker.
We hold that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that indigent prisoners who cannot make bail prior to trial and sentencing are entitled to receive good-time credit for the period spent in county jail awaiting sentencing.
Julio Mota was convicted of first degree robbery and kidnapping in Yakima County. The sentencing court sentenced Mota to 53 months for count 1 and 75 months for count 2, pursuant to the sentencing reform act, RCW 9.94A. The terms ran concurrently for a total of 75 months. Mota was credited with 67 days of pretrial detention.
Mota filed a personal restraint petition in the Court of Appeals on February 17, 1989. He sought credit against his sentence for 22 days of good-conduct time for the time spent in jail awaiting trial and sentencing.
On April 26, 1989, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division Three, entered an order granting Mota's personal restraint petition. The Chief Judge ruled that Mota's total sentence should be reduced by the maximum earned early release time of one-third, and the pretrial incarceration credit then be given against the sentence as reduced. This would give Mota good-time credit for pretrial incarceration. The Chief Judge remanded the matter to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for implementation of the new calculation.
The DOC moved for reconsideration. The DOC pointed out that State v. Phelan, 100 Wash.2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983), held that the failure to award good-time credit for pretrial confinement does not violate equal protection. Also, under RAP 16.11(b), the Chief Judge only has authority to dismiss frivolous petitions.
The Chief Judge rescinded the prior order, and referred the petition to a panel of the court for determination without oral argument. The Court of Appeals held that the DOC violated Mota's right to equal protection by failing to give good-time credit for presentence time served in county jail. In re Mota, 54 Wash.App. 252, 773 P.2d 129 (1989).
The DOC moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, which was denied. The DOC petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review. The Supreme Court Commissioner granted discretionary review, transferred the case to this court and consolidated it with State v. Baker on July 31, 1989.
The DOC moved this court to stay the effect of In re Mota, supra, pending final decision of the case. The Supreme Court Clerk granted this motion on August 9, 1989.
Baker pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent liberties without forcible compulsion in Kitsap County Superior Court. Baker was sentenced to 34 months. The trial court gave Baker credit for 53 days confinement before sentencing. Baker moved for an order for good-time credit against the 53 days served in Kitsap County Jail before being sentenced to the DOC. The trial court granted 7 days good-time credit.
The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division Two. The commissioner transferred the case to this court and consolidated it with In re Mota.
Mota contends that the Legislature intended RCW 9.94A.150 (prior to 1989 amendment) to apply to the time an inmate serves in county jail prior to trial and formal sentencing as well as to the time spent in prison. He also contends that the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions are violated by the failure of the DOC to award good-time credit to an inmate for time served in county jail prior to formal sentencing. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Legislature did not so intend, but the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution is violated by the DOC's failure to award indigent defendants good-time credit for time served in the county jail prior to sentencing due to their inability to make bail. Because we grant the relief requested on this ground, we do not reach the due process issue presented by Mota.
In Baker's case, the State claims that the trial court did not have authority to grant 7 days good-time credit for time served in the county jail prior to being sentenced to confinement in the DOC. We agree that the trial court is without this authority and that the authority is vested in the DOC.
In 1981, the Legislature passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). RCW 9.94A.150 provides for the reduction of an offender's sentence for good behavior. The version of that provision at issue here states in relevant part:
No person serving a sentence imposed pursuant to this chapter shall leave the confines of the correctional facility or be released prior to the expiration of the sentence except as follows:
(1) ... the terms of the sentence may be reduced by earned early release time in accordance with procedures developed and promulgated by the department. The earned early release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as determined by the department. In no case shall the aggregate earned early release time exceed one-third of the sentence.
. . . . .
Under this provision, each offender's sentence is reduced by one-third for good time. Time is added back on to the sentence if an offender violates DOC rules. The one-third is computed from the sentence remaining after any pretrial incarceration time that the offender has is subtracted. The one-third good-time credit, then, amounts to a greater number of days for offenders with no pretrial incarceration time. The result is offenders who could not obtain pretrial release do not get as much good time as offenders with identical sentences who could obtain pretrial release, and, thus, serve longer periods in the DOC.
The Legislature amended this provision in April of 1989. It now reads in relevant part:
No person serving a sentence imposed pursuant to this chapter shall leave the confines of the correctional facility or be released prior to the expiration of the sentence except as follows:
(1) ... the terms of the sentence of an offender committed to a county jail facility, or a correctional facility operated by the department, may be reduced by earned early release time in accordance with procedures that shall be developed and promulgated by the correctional facility in which the offender is confined. The earned early release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as determined by the correctional facility. Any program established pursuant to this section shall allow an offender to earn early release credits for presentence incarceration. If an offender is transferred from a county jail to the department of corrections, the county jail facility shall certify to the department the amount of time spent in custody at the facility and the amount of earned early release time. In no case shall the aggregate earned early release time exceed one-third of the total sentence....
Laws of 1989, ch. 248; RCW 9.94A.150. (The underlined portions indicate the changes in statutory language.)
The statute now requires that all inmates sentenced for crimes committed after July 1, 1989 receive good-time credit for time served in presentence detention. Accordingly, our decision is confined in application only to those offenders sentenced under the SRA prior to the effective date of the amendment.
Mota argues that the 1989 amendment should be deemed remedial and retroactive, leading to the result that the Legislature intended all along that inmates receive good-time credit for time served in county jail prior to sentencing. An amendment is deemed remedial and applied retroactively when it relates to practice, procedure or remedies, and does not affect substantive or vested right. Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash.2d 503, 510, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986). The amendment clearly affects the substantive right to good-time credit. The change in the language of the provision is material. A material change in a statute gives rise to the presumption of change in legislative intent. Strunk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 90 Wash.2d 210, 213-14, 580 P.2d 622 (1978). The amendment evidences a major change in legislative intent because the plain language of the original enactment does not authorize good-time credit for presentence incarceration.
Accordingly, we find that the 1989 amendment to RCW 9.94A.150 is not remedial, and may not be applied retroactively. Therefore, we must reach Mota's constitutional claim.
Mota and Baker claim they are entitled to relief under both article 1, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. While the state privileges and immunities clause of article 1, section 12 has in the past been interpreted the same as the federal equal protection clause, those cases did not address the possibility that the difference in language might require a different...
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