Mothering Justice v. State
Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
Docket Number | 362271 |
Parties | MOTHERING JUSTICE, MICHIGAN ONE FAIR WAGE, MICHIGAN TIME TO CARE, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF MICHIGAN, JAMES HAWK, and TIA MARIE SANDERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendant-Appellee, and STATE OF MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Court of Claims LC No. 21-000095-MM
Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Murray and Riordan, JJ.
The issue we must decide in this expedited appeal is whether two statutes that were enacted by the Legislature under the initiative process outlined in the state Constitution, 1963 Mich. Const, art 2, § 9, can be amended during the same legislative session in which they were enacted. The Court of Claims held that the Legislature was prohibited from doing so, and thus ruled that 2018 PA 368 and 369 were unconstitutional. Because the trial court's conclusions are not supported by either the text or intent of art 2 § 9, we reverse the Court of Claims' order and remand for entry of an order granting the state's motion for summary disposition.
Before turning to our decision, we reluctantly add a disclaimer to emphasize a point we hope is obvious, but we know is often lost by those who focus solely on the result of a court decision, rather than the analysis within that decision: the underlying policies set forth in the public acts at issue are completely irrelevant to our decision. Whether "the underlying subject matter is taxes, abortions, sentencing of criminals, you name whatever that social issue is, is not relevant to this matter." Frey v Dir of Dept of Social Services, 162 Mich.App. 586, 589 n1; 413 N.W.2d 54 (1987), aff'd Frey v Dep't of Mgt & Budget, 429 Mich. 315; 414 N.W.2d 873 (1987). See also Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Michigan, 395 Mich. 52, 76; 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975) () . Instead, because our judicial task is to uphold the Constitution as adopted by the people, our focus is exclusively on the constitutionality of the procedure used by the Legislature to amend these acts.
The procedural background to the legislation was set forth by Justice (now Chief Justice) Clement in her concurring opinion in In re House of Representatives Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2018 PA 368 & 369, 505 Mich. 884, 884-885; 936 N.W.2d 241 (2019) (Clement, J., concurring):
In 2019, the Legislature sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369, but that Court denied the requests because it was "not persuaded that granting the requests would be an appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion." In re House of Representatives Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2018 PA 368 & 369, 505 Mich. 884.
Two years later, plaintiffs filed a complaint (which was later amended) asserting that 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369 were unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 2, § 9, and that 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338 remained in effect. After several procedural matters were addressed,[1] each party moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiffs and the Attorney General moved for summary disposition on the basis that Const 1963, art 2, § 9 did not permit the Legislature to adopt a proposed initiative and amend it within the same legislative session[2] because allowing it to do so would be contrary to the common understanding of the Michigan Constitution. The Attorney General further argued that if 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369 were declared unconstitutional, 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338 would be in full effect. The State sought judgment in its favor on the basis that the Constitution did not preclude the Legislature from amending a voter-initiated law in the same session in which the Legislature approved it.
The Court of Claims issued a thorough written opinion. In its opinion, the court recognized that Const 1963, art 2, § 9 outlined three options that the Legislature could take during the first 40 days after receiving an initiative petition: it could reject the petition, it could reject the petition and propose a different law, or it could enact the law without change. The court opined that "[a]rticle 2, § 9 does not provide the Legislature with any other options during (or after) the 40-day period, including the option to significantly amend the proposed law after adopting it." Because the people gave the Legislature the option to propose an alternative, the court ruled that the Legislature could not simply adopt the legislation and amend it after it was enacted.
Part of the court's reasoning was premised upon two effects that the court perceived would occur if the Legislature were permitted to adopt and amend initiative laws. First, as to the right of the people to a referendum, the court concluded that "the use of the words 'such' and 'it' [within art 2, § 9] indicates that the People intended that the exact law will be subject to the referendum," and therefore the initiated law could not be amended until after the referendum period had passed. Second, it noted that, once passed by voters, an initiated law could only be repealed by another vote of the people or by a supermajority vote of ¾ of the Legislature. The court opined that if the Legislature could adopt and significantly amend a voter-initiated law in the same legislative session, it would render the supermajority provision meaningless because a Legislature that opposed the initiative would only need to adopt it and then amend or repeal it by a simple majority. Permitting it to do so would effectively eliminate the supermajority provision given to laws passed by the people through the initiative process.
The trial court also determined that Const 1963, art 4, § 1, which granted the Legislature full legislative authority with only two limitations, was limited by Const 1963, art 2, § 9, which outlined and constrained the Legislature's power regarding initiatives and did not allow the Legislature to immediately amend an initiative that it adopted. The court concluded that Const 1963, art 2, § 9 prohibited the Legislature from taking an action outside of the options that the people provided in Const 1963, art 2, § 9.
Taking these legal conclusions and applying them to 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369, the court held that the substantive amendments to these voter-initiated acts effectively thwarted the intent of the people by denying them the opportunity to vote on whether they...
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