Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court

Citation410 F.3d 602
Decision Date21 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-16878.,03-16878.
PartiesGeorge L. MOTHERSHED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT; Clerk of the Supreme Court, State of Arizona; Supreme Court of Arizona Disciplinary Commission; Hearing Officer; Bar Counsel of Arizona State Bar Association; State of Oklahoma Justices of the Supreme Court; Oklahoma Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court, Chief Master; Oklahoma Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court, Trial Panel of February 1, 2002; General Counsel of Oklahoma Bar Association; Trial Counsel of Oklahoma Bar Association; Rudolph Hargrave, Oklahoma Supreme Chief Justice; Madeline Hargrave, Wife; Robert E. Lavender, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Maxine Lavender, Wife; Joseph M. Watt, Vice-Chief Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Cathy Watt, Wife; Ralph B. Hodges, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Janelle Hodges, Wife; Marian P. Opala, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Jane Doe Opala, Wife; Daniel J. Boudreau, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Jane Doe Boudreau, Wife; Yvonne Kauger, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Ned Bastow, Husband; Hardy Summers, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Marilyn Summers, Wife; James Winchester, Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Susan Winchester, Wife; J. Daniel Morgan, Chief Master, Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma; Jane Doe Morgan, Wife; J. Patrick Kent, Presiding Master, Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma; Jane Doe Kent, Wife; Robert L. Hert, Jr., Member of Trial Panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma; Jane Doe Hert, Wife; Dana Williams, Member of Trial Panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma; Dale Cabiness, Member of Trial Panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma; Jane Doe Cabiness, Wife; Dan Murdock, General Counsel, Supreme Court of Oklahoma; Jane Doe Murdock, Wife; Allen J. Welch, Bar Counsel, Oklahoma Supreme Court; Jane Doe Welch, Wife; Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; Jane Doe Jones, Wife; Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; John Doe McGregor, Husband; Stanley Feldman, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; Jane Doe Feldman, Wife; Rebecca White Berch, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; John Doe Berch, Husband; Michael D. Ryan, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; Jane Doe Ryan, Wife; Peter Cahill, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; Jessica Gifford Funkhouser, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; Cynthia L. Choate, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; Barbara Atwood, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; C. Alan Bowman, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; Craig Mehrens, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; Steven G. Nelson, Member of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona; Loren J. Braud, Bar Counsel, Arizona Supreme Court aka Loren J. Broad; Jane Doe Braud, Wife aka Jane Doe Broad; John Pressley Todd, Hearing Office 7X, Arizona Supreme Court; Jane Doe Todd, Wife; Noel K. Dessaint, Clerk, Arizona Supreme Court; William M. Spence, Attorney; Jane Doe Spence, Wife, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

George L. Mothershed, Phoenix, AZ, argued the cause for the appellant and filed a brief.

LeslieAnn Haacke, Renaud Cook Drury Mesaros, P.A., Phoenix, AZ, argued the cause for the appellees; Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, Rosa Mroz, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, N. Todd McKay, Renaud Cook Drury Mesaros, P.A., Phoenix, AZ, Charles K. Babb, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, and Allen J. Welch, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, OK, were on the brief.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; Robert C. Broomfield, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-02-02375-RCB.

Before: GOODWIN, BEEZER, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether a disbarred attorney may collaterally attack his state bar disciplinary proceedings1 in federal court.

I

In 1999, the State Bar of Arizona initiated disciplinary proceedings against George L. Mothershed, an attorney who was licensed by the Oklahoma Bar Association but who lived and practiced in Arizona. In response to the disciplinary board's allegation that he had unlawfully practiced law in the State, Mothershed entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he had not received a summons. The hearing officer denied this motion, and Mothershed subsequently refused to participate further in the disciplinary proceedings. A default judgment was entered against him, and the Supreme Court of Arizona issued an order censuring Mothershed for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. See In re Mothershed, No. SB-01-0076-D, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 63 (2001).

The Oklahoma Bar Association thereafter initiated its own disciplinary proceedings against Mothershed. A three-member trial panel found that he had unlawfully practiced law in Arizona, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma entered an order disbarring him. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed, 66 P.3d 420, 428 (Okla.2003).

Mothershed responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the three members of the Oklahoma disciplinary trial panel, and several officials of the Oklahoma Bar Association (the "Oklahoma Defendants"). He also sued the Justices of the Arizona Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, the members of the Arizona Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, the hearing officer in the Arizona disciplinary proceedings, and a state bar staff counsel (the "Arizona Defendants"). Mothershed alleged that the Arizona disciplinary proceedings were invalid because he had not been served with a summons. He contended that the Oklahoma proceedings were likewise defective because his hearing did not occur between thirty and sixty days after appointment of the trial panel, as required by Rule 6.7 of the Oklahoma Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings.2 Based upon these alleged procedural shortcomings, Mothershed asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process and other constitutional violations, as well as state law tort claims for interference with contractual relationships, defamation, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Mothershed also contended that Arizona Supreme Court Rules 33(d) and 34,3 which set forth the pro hac vice admission requirements for out-of-state attorneys and the standards for admission to the State Bar of Arizona, violate Arizonans' First Amendment right to consult with an attorney and contravene both the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1402. Mothershed requested damages totaling more than $330 million and an injunction reinstating his membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association and prohibiting the defendants from interfering with his Arizona law practice.

After the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds, the district court dismissed the Oklahoma defendants due to the absence of personal jurisdiction. The court later dismissed the claims against the Arizona defendants on the ground that Mothershed was improperly seeking review of the Arizona bar disciplinary proceedings in a lower federal court and that subject matter jurisdiction was therefore absent under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mothershed timely appealed.

II

In the face of growing judicial uncertainty about the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's parameters, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that its applicability "is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

We must therefore decide whether Mothershed's claims fall within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's narrowed scope.

A

Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an Indiana state court's decision); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (holding that a federal district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 ("Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari....").

The doctrine does not, however, prohibit a plaintiff from presenting a generally applicable legal challenge to a state statute in federal court, even if that statute has previously been applied against him in state court lit...

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