Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Eclair Film Co.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
• Citation: Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Eclair Film Co., 208 F. 416 (D. N.J. 1913)
• Decision Date: 04 September 1913
• Parties: MOTION PICTURE PATENTS CO. v. ECLAIR FILM CO.

208 F. 416

MOTION PICTURE PATENTS CO. v. ECLAIR FILM CO.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

September 4, 1913

Melville Church, of Washington, D.C., and Louis Hicks, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Waldo G. Morse and John L. Lotsch, both of New York City, for defendant.

RELLSTAB District Judge.

The bill of complaint charges infringement of certain patents. The answer sets up as defenses inter alia that the plaintiff was a monopoly denounced by the Federal anti-Trust Act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p 3200)), and that it was guilty of unfair competition in the use of such patents. It also interposed a counterclaim for damages sustained by reason of such premises. Of the paragraphs challenged, No. 55 alleges the institution by the United States of a suit against the plaintiff charging that it is a monopoly and combination inhibited by the Anti-Trust Act. It alleges further that the plaintiff is such a monopoly and that it is using the patents in suit in furtherance thereof.

Neither allegation is a defense. The one averring that such a suit is pending does not charge the existence of such monopoly but merely that such a charge is made by a plaintiff in another proceeding. The proving of the issue here tendered, viz that some one else made such a charge, would be no more a defense to the charge of infringement herein laid against the defendant than that such charge would preclude defendant from disproving it. The further allegation that such a monopoly exists, as well as the allegations in paragraphs 56, 57, 58 59, and 60, charging unfair competition, founded upon the existence of such monopoly and the use of such patents (assuming that these conditions are defenses available in a suit of this character), are couched in too general and indefinite terms to require answer. A separate bill of complaint thus framed would be dismissed on motion, under equity rule 29.

That the plaintiff is guilty of an infraction of the Anti-Trust Act and in appropriate proceedings will be dissolved is not enough to constitute a case of unfair competition against a particular person. U.S. Fire Escape, etc., Co. v. Halsted Co. (D.C.) 195 F. 295; Fraser v. Duffey (D.C.) 196 F. 900, and cases cited. Specific injury suffered by the defendant different from that sustained by it as a member of the community is essential to its recovery of damages or to restrain further infringement upon its rights. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 121 C.C.A. 200.

It is elementary that a plaintiff in equity must allege with particularity all material (ultimate) facts necessary to establish his right to the relief prayed, and an articulated array of generalities, no matter how well sounding, will not satisfy this requirement. Story's Eq. Pl. Sec. 241; Shipman's Eq. Pl. p. 520; Wilson v. American Ice Co. (D.C.) 206 F. 736.

Fraud is at the root of all actionable unfair competition; and, as no intendment is made in favor of fraud, the facts (but not the mere evidence thereof) upon which such a charge is predicated must be set forth distinctly and with as much particularity as the nature of the transactions involved and the circumstances in which they have their being or development are within complainant's knowledge or could have been ascertained by his employing such means as were at his command. That the pleader had no such idea of his duty in this case is manifest by a reading of the challenged paragraphs. The general charge of unfair competition against the defendant appears. However, this is but a mere conclusion of law. The allegations following pertain almost exclusively to a charge that the plaintiff is violating the Anti-Trust Act and, so far as they may be said to consist in facts, are framed for the purpose of supporting such a charge. The application of such allegations to the defendant is of the most general character. Paragraph 59 will suffice as illustrative of such lack of particularity:

'59. That complainant has under and pursuant to said agreements aforesaid (only one is specifically named and that with the plaintiff's assignor

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