Motor Boat Sales v. Parker

Citation116 F.2d 789
Decision Date06 January 1941
Docket NumberNo. 4693.,4693.
PartiesMOTOR BOAT SALES, Inc., v. PARKER, Deputy Commissioner, et al.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Before PARKER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and CHESTNUT, District Judge.

M. J. Fulton, of Richmond, Va., for appellant.

Robert R. Parrish, of Richmond, Va., and Harry H. Holt, Jr., Sp. Asst. to U. S. Atty., of Norfolk, Va. (Sterling Hutcheson, U. S. Atty., John V. Cogbill, Asst. U. S. Atty., T. C. Gordon, Jr., and Parrish, Butcher & Parrish, all of Richmond, Va., on the brief), for appellees.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

George Armistead, Jr. (hereinafter called Armistead), an employee of Motor Boat Sales, Incorporated (hereinafter called the Boat Corporation), was drowned, when a motor boat in which he was riding was overturned on the James River. Armistead's widow and minor children filed a claim against the Boat Corporation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950, hereinafter called the Act. E. V. Parker, Deputy Commissioner for the Fifth Compensation District of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission (hereinafter called the Deputy Commissioner), made an award in favor of the claimants and against the Boat Corporation. Thereupon, the Boat Corporation instituted an action, under the terms of the Act, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to review, set aside and enjoin the Deputy Commissioner's award. The District Court, by a final decree, sustained the award of the Deputy Commissioner and dismissed the Boat Corporation's complaint. This appeal was duly taken from that decree.

Armistead was employed by the Boat Corporation as a janitor, porter or handyman at its store, No. 3 West Grace Street, in the City of Richmond, Virginia. His duties appear to have been of the general character usually involved in such a job. He had no specialized knowledge about boats or motors. The Boat Corporation was engaged in selling small boats, outboard motors and maritime supplies needed in the types of boats it sold. The Boat Corporation did not service boats and did not do repair work on boats, engines or motors upon navigable waters. The boats it sold were fully equipped and ready for service. Unlike the situation as to automobiles, it was not customary for the Boat Corporation to demonstrate on navigable waters the boats that it had for sale; for, in this type of business, it seems that a boat, when once placed in the water and run, becomes, for trade purposes, a second-hand boat. On occasions, employees were sent, in the performance of their duties, upon navigable waters, but these occasions were rather few and somewhat far-between. The testimony is clear that Armistead had been repeatedly and specifically cautioned and instructed that he was not to get on boats, ride in boats, or perform any services on navigable waters.

On August 8, 1938, the day on which Armistead was drowned, a Mr. Crown and his brother came by the store of the Boat Corporation, with a fifteen-foot row boat. The Crowns talked with Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Lloyd, Assistant Managers of the Boat Corporation, about the purchase of a second-hand outboard motor for this boat, and two particular motors were examined by the Crowns, with the idea that one of these might be purchased. It was decided that these two motors would be sent down to the James River to be attached to the boat and to be tested and operated. Both Johnnie Cooper (hereinafter called Cooper), a mechanic's helper of the Boat Corporation, and Armistead went with the motors.

The testimony is not altogether clear as to just what instructions were given by the officers of the Boat Corporation as to Armistead's duties. It seems, though, that these instructions contemplated that Armistead was to go along as a strongarm man to help lift the motors from the car to the boat on the river and, after the motors had been tested, to help in lifting the motors back from the boat to the car. It would, of course, have been the mark of wisdom for the officers of the Boat Corporation to caution Armistead, then and there, against going out on the James River in the boat. This was not done. These officers testified, however, that though they said nothing on this particular occasion about Armistead going out on the river in the boat, Armistead had been previously given specific warning against going out on boats; and that they, therefore, fully contemplated that he would not go out on the river in the boat, but would stay on shore and limit his activities solely to such efforts as were necessary to carry the motors to and from the boat. The testimony shows that Armistead had never before been sent by the Boat Corporation on any work that might take him upon navigable waters. There was testimony that Armistead had once acted as watchman on a boat; but this was an undertaking completely on his own, outside of his hours of work and not on behalf of the Boat Corporation.

When the party, on the day in question, reached the shore of the James River, one of the outboard motors was, with the assistance of Armistead, attached to the boat and a trip on the James River was begun. Armistead got in the boat with the others and made this trip. No one either specifically told him to go in the boat or impliedly encouraged him to do so. However, it is equally clear that before he got in the boat, no one told him not to get in, and that, after he had taken his place, no one told him to get out of the boat.

After this first trip was completed, when one of the outboard motors had been tested on the boat, the two Crowns stated that they had an engagement and left. Thereupon, with Armistead's aid, the first outboard motor was removed from the boat and the second outboard motor was attached. Armistead again got in the boat and the ill-fated second trip was begun. Cooper occupied the stern of the boat, operating and navigating the boat, while Armistead sat in the bow. On this second trip, again Armistead was not asked to get in the boat; again no one forbade him to get in, and no one later asked him to get out of, the boat. Cooper testified that he gave Armistead no instructions as to any duty that Armistead was to perform on his ill-fated trip; but Cooper testified further that Armistead did act as lookout on this trip. The boat struck some obstruction, was capsized, and Armistead was drowned.

Some questions of administrative procedure under the Act are involved in this appeal. We shall confine ourselves, however, to a discussion of the single question of whether or not Armistead's employment brought him within the ambit of the Act. As to that inquiry, we think that the answer must be in the negative and that, in the light of this answer, the judgment of the District Court must be reversed.

The federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act of 1927 was enacted, with the New York State Compensation Act as a model, to set up a compensation scheme for injury or death on navigable waters, provided that no recovery could be had under state laws, by reason of the maritime character of the employment of the person who was killed or injured. The history of the Act is outlined by Chief Justice Hughes in Nogueira v. New York, etc., Ry. Co., 281 U.S. 128, at page 136, 50 S.Ct. 303, at page 375, 74 L.Ed. 754; while many of its provisions are sketched by the Chief Justice in the leading case of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598. The Act is admirably discussed, with ample citation of authorities, in Robinson on Admiralty, pages 109-133. As we interpret the Act, it was designed to cover a gap between the real seamen and sailors — "seafaring men with sad, seaweary eyes" — on the one hand, and the landlubbers, whose labors never took them upon the bounding deep, on the other hand. Between these two classes was a large group of laborers whose tasks have been called amphibious — a part of their work was on the land, another part was on navigable waters. These were the longshoremen and harbor workers. For them a federal compensation act seemed fair; so Congress enacted this statute.

The Act applies "only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States" Act, Section 3(a). There seems to be no question that this requisite was completely fulfilled in the instant case. Clearly, too, the employer-employee relation, another requisite of liability, existed between Armistead and the Boat Corporation at the time of Armistead's death.

This same section of the Act also permits recovery under the Act "if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law". And under Section 2(4), we find: "The term `employer' means an employer, any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States". Sections 2 and 3 of the Act are the nub of this case. "Maritime employment" under the Act excludes matters that are purely "local". Thus, in 2 C.J.S., Admiralty, § 62, at page 132, we find: "Under federal compensation act, providing that compensation shall be payable only if recovery may not validly be provided by state law, an injury received in an employment, although maritime, pertaining to local matters and having only an incidental relation to navigation and commerce, is subject to the application of the local compensation act and without the scope of the federal act."

It is not necessary here for us to discuss in detail the well-known hair-line that divides the federal admiralty jurisdiction, on the one hand, from the purely local jurisdiction of the states, on the other hand. Landmarks in this field are Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205. 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086, L.R.A.1918C, 451, Ann.Cas.1917E, 900; Chelentis v. Luchenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor v. Perini North River Associates
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 11 January 1983
    ...or the place of his injury. The employer did not have the minimum number of employees to bring it under the Virginia statute. See 116 F.2d 789, 793. The happenstance that the janitor was riding in a motorboat at the time of his injury enabled the Court to find a basis for sustaining an awar......
  • Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 14 December 1942
    ......See e.g., Ayers v. Parker, D.C., 15 F.Supp. 447. Such a result defeats the purpose of the federal ...In our decision in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184, we held that ......
  • Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co Donovan v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 4 June 1962
    ...one of the employer's outboard motors for which the boatowner was a prospective purchaser. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 116 F.2d 789, had held that the employee's work was 'so local in character' that Virginia could validly have included it under a state workmen's compensati......
  • Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 81-1455
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 23 June 1982
    ...used to oust federal jurisdiction. For example, Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184, rev'g, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1941), set forth a paradigmatic maritime-but-local fact situation: a janitor in a boat store "had been repeatedly and specifically cautio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT