Motorola, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n, Civ 6906 PHX.
Decision Date | 10 June 1968 |
Docket Number | No. Civ 6906 PHX.,Civ 6906 PHX. |
Citation | 317 F. Supp. 282 |
Parties | MOTOROLA, INC., an Illinois corporation, Petitioner, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, Phoenix, Ariz., Robert V. Nystrom, Associate Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Julia P. Cooper, Atty., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
We have before us: (1) Motorola's Petition for Order Quashing or Modifying Demand for Access to Evidence and Compliance to Give Testimony Under Oath, (2) Motion to Vacate Notice of Deposition of Vicente T. Ximenes made by Respondent, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and (3) Respondent's Motion to Amend the Commissioner's Charge.
The second document consisted of a sheet also entitled "Commissioner's Charge" but was undated and unsigned.2 This charged unlawful employment practices against Motorola, Inc., 5005 McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona, and set forth facts upon which the charge was based. Thereafter, the Commission made oral demand for access to employment records and information and served a demand in writing on Motorola, Inc., 8201 East McDowell Road, Scottsdale, Arizona, Attention Mr. Rufus Coulter, Director of Personnel, Motorola, Inc., RE: Vicente T. Ximenes, Charge File No. TAL9C0165.3 The demand makes it clear that all area affiliates were charged. Motorola thereupon filed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-9(c), a Petition for Order Quashing or Modifying Demand for Access to Evidence and Compliance to Give Testimony Under Oath. Respondent —E.E.O.C. answered the petition and cross-petitioned for an order enforcing the demand for access. Petitioner —Motorola filed a notice for the taking of Commissioner Ximenes' deposition. Respondent—Commission—moved to vacate the notice of taking Ximenes' deposition. Oral arguments were held on April 14, 1969, at which time Respondent orally moved to amend its charge by including the second page as a continuation of page one of the charge. This Court thereupon ordered the parties to brief the issue presented.
Respondent's oral motion to amend the Commissioner's Charge is granted. Petitioner has had, we feel, sufficient notice of the charge brought by the Commissioner. To give notice is, of course, the purpose of the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)4. That purpose is fulfilled by allowing the two documents to be construed as a single, two-page commissioner's charge. 1 Davis, Administrative Law 523 et seq., N. L. R. B. v. Royal Palm Ice Co., 193 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1952).
Respondent's Motion to Vacate Notice of Petitioner's taking Commissioner Ximenes' deposition is granted. Commission regulations 29 C.F.R. § 1610.20 and § 1610.30 to-.365 prohibit a disclosure of the desired information. Furthermore, by analogy, as the reasoning by the Court in Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Workers International Assoc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 303 F.Supp. 528 (N.D.Calif., 1969) makes clear, to allow the Commissioner's deposition to be taken would, at this point in the proceedings, require the Commissioner to reveal his sources of information and deter individuals from making complaints for fear of retaliation. This would violate Congressional intent. (See 110 Cong.Rec. 14188, 14191). Obviously, at some point in the proceedings, prior to any evidentiary hearing on the basic issues, the Commission would make available to petitioners herein, the witnesses and exhibits intended to be used to present the Commission's case. This disclosure, however, need not reveal the identity of those individuals who might have given the initial information.
Petitioner also seeks an order quashing or modifying demand for access to evidence and compliance to give testimony under oath. The petition alleges that (1) the evidence sought is not relevant and material to the charge and (2) the demand violates the Fourth Amendment. We find no merit in these contentions, Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, supra, except that the reference to "sex" in Item Three of the demand is stricken.
Petitioner also contends that the demand is not based on a valid Commissioner's Charge under § 706(d) of the Act because it is made 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. We find no merit in this contention. The practice of discrimination, if it exists, is by its nature, a continuing violation. Petitioner also alleges that the Commission's own rules and regulations, found in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.116 are violated. There is no merit in this contention. See Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, supra, and 1 Davis, Administrative Law, supra. Except to the extent the Commissioner's demand is modified by striking the reference to "sex", the petition to quash or modify the demand is denied and petitioners are ordered to comply with Respondent's Demand for Access to Evidence and Compliance to Give Testimony Under Oath.
APPENDIX A.
EXHIBIT A
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506
Seal
Pursuant to Section 706(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, I charge the following employer with unlawful employment practices:
Motorola, Incorporated 3102 N. 56th Street Phoenix, Arizona 85018
I have reasonable cause to believe that the employer is within the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and that it has committed the following unlawful employment practices:
The employer violates Section 703(a) (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by maintaining employment practices which virtually exclude Negroes and Spanish surnamed persons from employment.
Pursuant to Section 706(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, I charge the following employer with unlawful employment practices:
MOTOROLA INCORPORATED 5005 McDowell Road Phoenix, Arizona
I have reasonable cause to believe that the above employer is within the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and that it has committed and is now committing the following unlawful employment practices:
1. The above employer violates Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against Negroes, American Indians, and Spanish Surnamed Americans, male and female, with respect to hiring.
I base this charge on the following facts:
______________ __________________ Date Commissioner
APPENDIX C.
EXHIBIT B
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
To: Motorola, Inc. RE: Vicente T. Ximenes 8201 East McDowell Charge File No Scottsdale, Arizona TAL9C0165 ATTN: Mr. Rufus Coulter Director of Personnel Motorola, Inc.
Pursuant to Section 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, you and each of you are hereby required and directed to furnish RAY R. BACA, a duly authorized representative of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, at Motorola, Inc., 8201 East McDowell, Scottsdale, Arizona, and all its area affiliates, on November 20, 1968, the information within your possession or control as set forth below:
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