Motors Ins. Corp. v. Morgan, 43250
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Writing for the Court | WHITMAN; FELTON, C.J., and EBERHARDT |
Citation | 117 Ga.App. 654,161 S.E.2d 382 |
Parties | MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION v. C. I. MORGAN |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 43250,43250,1 |
Decision Date | 19 April 1968 |
Page 382
v.
C. I. MORGAN.
Page 383
Perry, Walters, Langstaff & Lippitt, Walter W. Hays, Albany, for appellant.Smith, Gardner, Wiggins & Geer, Peter Zack Geer, Albany, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
[117 Ga.App. 654] WHITMAN, Judge.
This action was brought by C. I. Morgan against Motors Insurance Corporation seeking to recover damages as a result of certain alleged fraudulent acts by an agent of Motors Insurance Corporation regarding a release which Morgan executed.
Morgan's petition alleges that he was involved in an automobile accident when his automobile collided with another automobile being driven by Nathan Lee Spence, an uninsured motorist, and that as a result of said collision, Morgan sustained damage to his automobile and also certain personal injuries and that the said Nathan Lee Spence was at fault in causing said damage and injuries.
Morgan carried collision insurance with Motors Insurance Corporation and carried liability insurance with Preferred Mutual Risk Insurance Company. His liability insurance with 'Preferred Mutual' also provided protection in the event he suffered damage from and was entitled to recover from any uninsured motorist.
Morgan alleges that during the course of the settlement of his claim for property damages to his automobile with Motors Insurance Corporation, the latter's agent, C. J. Faulkner, fraudulently procured a release which operated as a general release, i.e., released Spence from all claims arising out of the collision, and that Preferred Mutual, because of the release, has refused to pay Morgan what was due him for his personal injuries but has only paid $1,280 'to avoid litigation.'
To Morgan's petition, Motors Insurance Company filed a general demurrer. The single enumeration of error of appellant questions the propriety of the trial court's overruling the general demurrer.
[117 Ga.App. 655] Morgan's petition alleges in particular that the release presented to him by Faulkner, defendant's agent, pertained to both property damage and personal injuries and that he told Faulkner that 'he did not know whether he was seriously injured or not and * * * that he did not want to sign this release.' Whereupon Faulkner told him 'that he would have to have a signature on the release and that the release would pertain only to the damage to the automobile and anything pertaining to personal injuries would be deleted from the release form before he filled it out and presented it to Nathan Lee Spence.' Faulkner assured Morgan, it is alleged, 'that his signature on the release would not affect the rights of the plaintiff against his liability insurance company.' Morgan also affirmatively alleges that he 'reluctantly signed the release relying entirely upon the assurance of the agent of the defendant that he would fill in the amount of the cost of repairs in the release and delete anything pertaining to bodily injury.'
Thereafter, it is alleged: 'Because of the general release executed by the plaintiff at the insistance of the agent for the defendant and because those portions of the release relating to bodily injuries had not been deleted as represented by the agent of the defendant, the plaintiff had no cause of action against the uninsured motorist (Spence) or Preferred Mutual...
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...51-6-1. By the express language of the statute, only fraud which results in damage is actionable. See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Morgan, 117 Ga.App. 654, 161 S.E.2d 382 (1968) ("Fraud without damage, or damage without fraud, gives no cause of action, but when these two concur an action lies.") Th......
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...made to appellee constituted promises to perform in the future, upon which appellee could not rely, citing Motors Ins. Corp. v. Morgan, 117 Ga.App. 654, 656, 161 S.E.2d 382 (1968), "[w]here promises as to future events are made with the present intention not to perform or where the utterer ......
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