Mott v. Mott

• Decision Date: 16 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2D00-739.,2D00-739.
• Citation: Mott v. Mott, 800 So. 2d 331 (Fla. App. 2001)
• Parties: Marcia E. MOTT, Appellant, v. James Lee MOTT, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

800 So.2d 331

Marcia E. MOTT, Appellant, v.James Lee MOTT, Appellee.

No. 2D00-739.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 16, 2001.

Rana Holtz of Rubinstein & Holtz, Fort Myers, for Appellant.

Linda H. Fried of Fried and Fried, Fort Myers, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Marcia E. Mott appeals from the denial of her request for an award of attorneys' fees.Because the trial court did not properly apply the prevailing party fee provision contained in the marital settlement agreement and the trial court looked beyond the individual financial resources of Ms. Mott in making the fee determination, we reverse.

The Motts were divorced in 1994, and the final judgment of dissolution incorporated the terms of their marital settlement agreement.The agreement provided that Mr. Mott would pay rehabilitative alimony to Ms. Mott.It also provided that Ms. Mott was entitled to receive permanent alimony in an amount to be determined when the payment of rehabilitative alimony ended.

The marital settlement agreement contained two provisions for attorneys' fees.The first provided that "[e]ach party shall be responsible for his or her own attorneys' fees and costs of this action."The second provision, contained in the paragraph dealing with amendment and enforcement of the agreement, provided that "if the terms of this Agreement are not complied with, the non-complying party will be liable for and pay the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the party seeking to enforce the terms of this Agreement, should that party prevail."

In 1998, Mr. Mott stopped paying alimony.He filed a supplemental petition that requested modification of the final judgment of dissolution or, alternatively, termination of his obligation to pay rehabilitative alimony.In later pleadings, he requested that the trial court terminate any obligation that he pay rehabilitative and permanent alimony.In response, Ms. Mott filed pleadings that requested a determination of the dates when rehabilitative alimony was to end and when permanent alimony was to begin, a determination of the amount of permanent periodic alimony to be paid by Mr. Mott, the enforcement of the marital settlement agreement and final judgment of dissolution, and an award of attorneys' fees.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered an amended supplemental judgment of modification.The trial court found that Mr. Mott owed to Ms. Mott unpaid alimony and prejudgment interest totaling $31,612.84, and the trial court terminated Mr. Mott's obligation for permanent alimony.Subsequently, an evidentiary hearing was held on Ms. Mott's claim for attorneys' fees.At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court asked each party to prepare a proposed order consistent with the relief requested by that party.The trial court made no findings at the hearing and did not give any indication as to how it intended to rule.

The proposed order submitted by Mr. Mott was eventually entered by the trial court.The order contained a finding that Mr. Mott's gross income was more than double the amount of Ms. Mott's income, but noted that Ms. Mott's standard of living was substantially higher than her income because of her living with and receiving benefits from another individual.The trial court concluded that Ms. Mott had the ability to pay her own attorneys' fees.

Ms. Mott raises several issues in this appeal, all arising from the denial of her request for attorneys' fees.First, she argues that the trial court erred by ignoring the prevailing party fee provision contained in the marital settlement agreement.We agree.

A marital settlement agreement is governed by contract principles.Maas v. Maas,440 So.2d 494, 496(Fla. 2d DCA1983);Coe v. Abdo,790 So.2d 1276, 1277-78(Fla. 4th DCA2001).Indeed, when the agreement provides for fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, the trial court is without discretion to decline to enforce that provision.Davids v. Davids,718 So.2d 1263(Fla. 2d DCA1998);Rose v. Rose,615 So.2d 203, 204(Fla. 4th DCA1993);Jacobson v. Jacobson,595 So.2d 292, 294(Fla. 5th DCA1992).

The trial court applied the fee provision contained in the marital settlement agreement that each party was responsible for his or her own fees and costs of the dissolution action, rather than the fee provision that applied to amendment and enforcement of the agreement.The proceeding giving rise to this appeal involved both modification and enforcement issues.Therefore, the trial court erred because the fee provision dealing with amendment and enforcement of the agreement should have been applied, enabling the trial court to award fees and costs to the prevailing party and against the noncomplying party.

In the fee order, the trial court briefly summarized the rulings that it had made in the amended supplemental judgment of modification.It appears that the trial court gave little consideration to the fact that Ms. Mott prevailed on the issue of alimony arrearages owed by Mr. Mott and the fact that she successfully enforced the marital settlement agreement due to Mr. Mott's noncompliance.While the fee order mentions that Ms. Mott did not prevail as to certain demands, those demands did not arise from any noncompliance on the part of Ms. Mott with the marital settlement agreement.

Under a prevailing party attorneys' fee provision, the trial court must determine which party prevailed on the significant issues that were tried before the court.Hutchinson v. Hutchinson,687 So.2d 912, 913(Fla. 4th DCA1997).In Hutchinson,the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of fees and noted that although the husband prevailed on certain issues, the wife recovered a substantial portion of the amount that she claimed as child support and alimony arrearages.Id.

The fact that Mr. Mott succeeded in obtaining an order...