Mottley v. Louisville & N. R. Co.

• Citation: 150 F. 406
• Parties: MOTTLEY et al. v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO.
• Decision Date: 02 February 1907
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

150 F. 406

MOTTLEY et al. v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Kentucky.

February 2, 1907

Wright & McElroy, for complainant.

H. L Stone, B. D. Warfield, and E. W. Hines, for defendant.

EVANS District Judge.

On the 2d day of October, 1871, the complainants and the defendant entered into an agreement in writing in terms as follows:

'Louisville Ky., Oct. 2nd, 1871.

'The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in consideration that E. L. Mottley and wife, Annie E. Mottley, have this day released Company from all damages or claim for damages for injuries received by them on the 7th of September, 1871, in consequence of a collision of trains on the railroad of said Company at Randolph's Station, Jefferson county, Ky., hereby agrees to issue free passes on said railroad and branches now existing or to exist, to said E. L. & Annie E. Mottley for the remainder of the present year, and thereafter, to renew said passes annually during the lives of said Mottley and wife or either of them.

Thos. J. Martin, 'For Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.

'Willis Ranney, Sec. (Seal.)'

This agreement was accepted by the complainants, and, pursuant thereto, the defendant from its date until January 1, 1907, namely, for each of the next succeeding 35 years, issued to the complainants the passes it thereby stipulated to issue. At the date last named the defendant, conceiving itself bound to do so under the requirements of an act to amend an act entitled 'An act to regulate commerce,' approved February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. 379, c. 104 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154)), and acts amendatory thereof, and to enlarge the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, approved June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 584, c. 3591), refused to issue any further passes over its railroad and branches which extend into many states of the Union, but it did offer to issue free passes over so much of said railroad and branches as were located in the state of Kentucky. The complainants, contending that they were entitled under their contract to free passes over the defendant's entire railroad and all its branches wherever located and operated, declined the offer of the defendant of passes limited to the state of Kentucky. The complainants have brought this suit to compel the defendant to specifically perform the stipulations of the contract, and the defendant has filed a general demurrer to the bill.

The judiciary act of 1887 (Act March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552), as amended by the act of 1888 (Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433), gives the Circuit Court of the United States original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of suits of civil nature at common law or in equity where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000 and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508. The interpretations by the Supreme Court of this provision, when considered in connection with the averments of the bill, leave no room for doubt that the court has jurisdiction of this action; the bill also making averments showing that the value to each of the complainants of the right sought to be enforced exceeds $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. It is only necessary to cite in this connection the opinion of the Supreme Court in Patton v. Brady, Ex'x, 184 U.S. 608, 22 Sup.Ct. 493, 46 L.Ed. 713. That opinion, with the cases referred to in it, seems to leave nothing further to be said upon the question of jurisdiction. The contract set out in the bill was with both complainants; but no point is made by the defendant, and none need be made by the court, that their causes of action may possibly be several. The parties seem to agree that one suit is as good as two for the purpose of settling the rights involved, and we are not called upon nor required to question that conclusion, which, indeed, may be the proper one. The demurrer itself only raises the question whether the complainants or either of them should have any relief. There could be no doubt upon that proposition but for certain provisions of the act of June 29, 1906. The complainants had each in 1871 been greatly injured by the negligence of the defendant, and claimed compensation and damages therefor. That claim was acknowledged by the defendant, but for reasons satisfactory to the parties the complainants agreed, in lieu of money, to take transportation as provided for in the contract in settlement of their claims. This form of settlement the parties had a perfect right to agree upon, and the result was the contract above set out in full. The defendant, while admitting all of these propositions, nevertheless says that it cannot longer lawfully perform its contract with the complainants, except to the extent of issuing passes over its railroad and branches in the state of Kentucky for the reason that the act, by its first section, expressly provides that 'no common carrier subject to the provision of this act shall, after January first, nineteen hundred and seven, directly or indirectly issue or give any interstate free ticket, free pass or free transportation for passengers except to its employees and their families,' and many other persons, none of whom answer the description of either one of the complainants, and for the further reason that section 2 of the said act provides that section 6 of the act, to which it is an amendment, shall be further amended as follows:

'No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this act, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this Act, unless the rates, fares, and charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this act; nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time.'

Manifestly the two provisions of the act just copied might prohibit the making thereafter of contracts similar to the one made with the complainants in 1871, and it is insisted that as the case of the complainants is not expressly saved by any of the provisos or exceptions mentioned in section 1 of the act, and as the clause quoted from section 2 makes no exceptions, the complainants' contract is destroyed and annulled by the force of those provisions. Whether this view is the correct one is the very important question to be solved, while we bear in mind, on the one hand, that the complainants are threatened with the loss of a valuable right, and, on the other, that the defendant, and, indeed, the complainants as well, may be visited with serious criminal penalties if further performing the agreement must now be regarded as unlawful. Of course, contracts like the one sought to be enforced are extremely rare-- so rare that presumably they did not, in fact, come within the contemplation of Congress when it was perfecting sections 1 and 2 of the act of 1906. Nevertheless, the truth is that upon a highly valuable consideration the parties stipulated that for the settlement of a just and acknowledged claim for compensation for personal injuries the defendant, in lieu of paying money, would furnish to the complainants all the transportation they wanted for themselves personally over all its lines for the full period of the natural lives of the complainants, respectively. The words 'free pass,' as used in the contract, add nothing to the controversy; for the transportation to be furnished was all paid for by the complainants, and the passes, while called 'free,' were in fact no more 'free' than is an ordinary ticket issued to a traveler after it has been paid for in cash. Did Congress intend to abrogate such previously made contracts founded upon valuable and legitimate considerations? Certainly it did not say so. Was the abrogation of such pre-existing contracts within the policy of the legislation referred to? There is nothing to indicate that it was, although it is obvious that contracts of a similar nature could not be made after the act became effective. Was it the policy of Congress to annul any previously made contract founded upon good consideration? Except through the bankruptcy act, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that Congress ever passes an act designed to impair the obligation of any contract theretofore lawfully and fairly made upon valuable consideration. True Congress is not, although the state are, prohibited by the Constitution from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, but there is a moral obligation and stress upon Congress not lightly to do so, which we believe always is as effective upon Congress not and its conscience as would be a constitutional inhibition. If these propositions be true, then we should construe the act as containing an exception to the general language used, and hold that the issuing of the free passes provided for in the contract was not meant to be prohibited by the statute. Do the authorities justify us in doing this? The question is one of interpretation, and in our efforts to solve it we may bring to our aid certain well-established rules of construction.

Our Blackstones taught us the lesson which Endlich, in section 25 of his work on the Interpretation of Statutes, has amplified. He says:

'Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense; and to

...