Motton v. Travelers Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. CA,s. CA |
| Citation | 484 So.2d 816 |
| Parties | Juanita MOTTON v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Ascension Parish Emergency Ambulance Service District and Ascension Parish Police Jury. Audrey L. FAVORITE v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Gail Lynette A. FAVORITE v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. 84 1296-CA 84 1297, CA 84 1298. 484 So.2d 816 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Cyrus J. Greco, Baton Rouge, for Juanita Motton, plaintiff-appellee.
Amy E. Counce, Baton Rouge, for Mary Jones, Eldora Garrett Thomas, Eloise Motton Walker, Isaac Motton, Jr. and Leola Garrett James, defendants-appellees in intervention.
Grayson Brown, Baton Rouge, for Travelers Ins. Co., Ascension Parish and Emergency Ambulance Service Dist., Defendants-appellees in intervention.
W. Arthur Abercrombie, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Travelers Ins. Co., defendant-appellee.
Gordon Crawford, Gonzales, for Ascension Parish Police Jury, defendant-appellee.
Stephen C. Riedlinger, Baton Rouge, for Juanita Motton, plaintiff/appellee.
Raymond Gautreau, Donaldsonville, for State Dept. of Transp. and Development, defendant-appellant.
Arion Boyle, New Orleans, for Gail L. Favorite, plaintiff-appellant.
Before LOTTINGER, COLE and CRAIN, JJ.
The primary issues presented in this appeal are whether a rut on the shoulder of a state highway was a cause in fact of the subject vehicular accident; whether comparative fault is applicable in cases such as the present ones, involving a highway shoulder defect; and, quantum.
This matter involves two consolidated wrongful death and survival suits filed, respectively, by Audrey Favorite, the mother of decedent Rita Jackson, against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (State) and by Juanita Motton, the half-sister of decedent George Hardy, against the Ascension Parish Police Jury, the Ascension Parish Ambulance Service and its insurer, the Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). 1 A petition of intervention was filed in the Motton suit by Mary Jones, Eldora Garrett Thomas, Eloise Motton Walker, Isaac Motton, Jr. and Leola Garrett James, additional collateral relatives of decedent George Hardy. Subsequently, both Motton and intervenors filed an amending and supplemental petition adding the State as an additional defendant. Prior to trial these plaintiffs settled with and released the Ascension Parish Ambulance Service and its insurer, Travelers. Further, the Ascension Parish Police Jury was dismissed from this suit by the trial court, leaving the State as the only remaining defendant in both suits. 2
Following trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs and intervenors and against the State, the court determining the damages suffered by each party to be as follows: Audrey Favorite, $60,000, Juanita Motton, $20,000, Mary Jones, $20,000, Eldora Garrett Thomas, Leola Garrett James, Eloise Motton Walker and Isaac Motton, Jr., $20,000, collectively. However, the court reduced the amount awarded to each party to one-half of the stated amounts, for reasons discussed below. The court also awarded special damages to Motton and the intervenors, collectively, in the amount of $10,876.52. The State was cast for all costs. The State appealed this judgment and Favorite, Motton and intervenors have each answered the appeal.
The two suits in this matter arise from a vehicular accident which occurred on November 23, 1981. At approximately 1:27 P.M. on that date, Rita Jackson was driving an ambulance owned by her employer, the Ascension Parish Ambulance Service District, south on Highway 1 between Donaldsonville and White Castle. At that time she was transporting two elderly passengers, who had had medical checkups in White Castle, back to their homes in Donaldsonville. The trip did not involve any emergency.
Driving conditions at the time of the accident were good. The weather was clear and visibility was unobstructed. The two-lane asphalt surface of the highway was in excellent condition, bordered on each side by wide, dirt shoulders. There was no oncoming traffic which could have affected Ms. Jackson.
Nevertheless, for no apparent reason, the two right wheels of the ambulance suddenly dropped off the paved surface of the highway and into a rut, which was located on the dirt shoulder immediately adjacent to the pavement. The ambulance quickly traversed the rut, which was at least seven inches deep and approximately two feet wide, and continued in a southerly direction straddling the rut, with its two left wheels on the pavement and its two right wheels on the shoulder. The ambulance then reentered the highway at a point where there was no defect or rut on the shoulder. The distance from the point at which the ambulance first partially left the pavement to the point at which it reentered the roadway was approximately ninety-four (94) feet. The ambulance then traveled in its own lane of traffic for one hundred and thirty-four (134) feet before again partially leaving the pavement and going onto the shoulder. The ambulance traveled a distance of one hundred and twenty-eight feet (128) in this manner. It then once again reentered the roadway, began flipping over and careened across the highway into the northbound lane of traffic and then onto the shoulder adjacent to that lane. At this point the ambulance righted itself and slid across the shoulder and into an adjacent ditch, where it finally came to rest.
Ms. Jackson was thrown out of the ambulance and onto the highway at some point while it was flipping over. She sustained serious injuries, which were ultimately fatal, but was alive and conscious at least twenty to thirty minutes after the accident.
George Hardy was not ejected from the ambulance, but was hanging partially out of it when it finally came to rest. He sustained serious injuries, including a deep laceration running from his left ear, along his jawbone and down to the corner of his mouth. Immediately following the accident, Mr. Hardy was conscious and in great pain. He was taken to a hospital in Baton Rouge where surgery was performed. His condition immediately began to deteriorate and he subsequently died from his injuries, approximately five days after the accident.
The State argues the trial court erred in not finding the accident was due solely to the negligence of the ambulance driver, Rita Jackson, and in imposing liability upon the State without finding the rut was a cause in fact of the accident.
The trial court concluded the State was liable for the plaintiffs' damages on the basis of both strict liability and negligence. A finding that the rut or depression was a cause in fact of the accident at issue was essential to the imposition of liability upon the State under either of these theories. While it is true the trial court did not explicitly state the rut was a cause in fact of the accident, this finding is implicit in its reasons for judgment. In any event, unless there is evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed the trial court applied the correct rule of law to the evidence in this case. Blackwell v. Blackwell, 413 So.2d 1331 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982); Helms v. Helms, 349 So.2d 441 (La.App.3d Cir.1977). The learned trial judge's reasons document his capability and experiences and there is nothing in the record to indicate he did not apply the correct rule of law, relative to a finding of liability on the part of the State. In fact, all indications are that the correct rule of law was applied. In its written reasons for judgment, the court specifically lists each of the requirements for the imposition of strict liability, including the requirement that the defect in the thing be a cause of the accident. Thus, it is clear the court was cognizant of the requirement of a causal connection between the rut and the accident in order to impose strict liability upon the State. Although the court did not delineate the specific requirements for liability based on negligence, it is obvious from the written reasons as a whole the court was aware of this requirement and found it to be present. 3
Furthermore, the record adequately supports the court's implicit finding that the rut was a cause in fact of the accident. Plaintiffs and defendant each presented an accident reconstruction expert, who offered contradictory opinions as to the cause of the accident. Plaintiffs' expert was of the opinion the existence of the rut was the primary cause of the accident. Defendant's expert opined the existence of the rut was only a minor factor, with the primary causes of the accident being the driver's failure to maintain control and overcorrection in her steering of the vehicle. However, all parties agreed dropping from the roadway into a seven inch rut would cause a quite substantial jolt to the ambulance and its occupants. The effect of such a jolt, more likely than not, would be to cause the driver either to completely lose control of her vehicle or to hinder her efforts to regain control.
The trial court apparently accepted the opinion of plaintiffs' expert. The opinions of expert witnesses are not binding on the trial court and are to be weighed in the same manner as any other evidence before the court. Holmes v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 422 So.2d 1200 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982), writ denied, 429 So.2d 133 (La.1983). The trial court's evaluation of expert and lay testimony will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Id. Upon review of the entire record, we find no manifest error in the conclusion the rut was a contributing factor which, together with the negligence of the ambulance driver, caused the accident in question.
Appellees argue the conduct of Ms. Jackson in inadvertently leaving the paved roadway does not constitute negligence under Rue v....
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