Motyka v. State
| Decision Date | 05 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–356–Appeal.,NM 09–249,2014–356–Appeal. |
| Citation | 172 A.3d 1203 |
| Parties | Jeremy MOTYKA v. STATE of Rhode Island. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
David D. Prior, Esq., for Applicant.
Aaron L. Weisman Department of Attorney General, for State of Rhode Island.
Present: Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
The applicant, Jeremy Motyka, appeals from the December 3, 2014 denial of his application for postconviction relief following a hearing in Newport County Superior Court. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful consideration of the parties' arguments (both written and oral), we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
In 2001, Mr. Motyka was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree murder and first-degree sexual assault. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole on the first-degree murder charge and life on the first-degree sexual assault charge. This Court affirmed Mr. Motyka's conviction in State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 291 (R.I. 2006) ( Motyka I ). We refer the interested reader to our previous opinion for a detailed recitation of the facts. We will restrict ourselves to a discussion of only those facts which are pertinent to the instant case.
On May 11, 2009, Mr. Motyka filed an application for postconviction relief. That application was denied, and he appealed that denial to this Court. In Motyka v. State, 91 A.3d 351, 351–52 (R.I. 2014) (mem.) ( Motyka II ), we vacated the denial of Mr. Motyka's application for postconviction relief following the concession by the state that the hearing justice had failed to follow the procedure set forth by this Court in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000). We remanded the case to the Superior Court to conduct further proceedings. Motyka II, 91 A.3d at 352.
On remand, Mr. Motyka filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Second Amended Application for Post-conviction Relief."1 On October 8, 2014, Mr. Motyka's court-appointed counsel filed both a motion to withdraw his appearance and a memorandum in support of that motion, the grounds for which were counsel's determining "the issues raised in plaintiff's Petition for Post–Conviction Relief to be wholly frivolous, and not supported by existing law, or by a good faith basis for reversal, extension, or modification of existing law * * *." The state filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Motyka's application on October 10, 2014, averring that "no genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] and the State [was] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The docket reflects the fact that, thereafter, Mr. Motyka filed a response to his court-appointed counsel's motion to withdraw. A hearing was subsequently held on December 3, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice granted court-appointed counsel's motion to withdraw and also denied and dismissed Mr. Motyka's application for postconviction relief. A final judgment entered on February 17, 2016. Mr. Motyka had filed a notice of appeal on December 3, 2014.2
On appeal, Mr. Motyka contends that he was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his application for postconviction relief. He posits that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and that the December 3, 2014 hearing on his court-appointed counsel's motion to withdraw did not qualify as such. Mr. Motyka further argues that his court-appointed postconviction relief counsel did not conduct appropriate discovery and investigation on his behalf. He also avers that the hearing justice erred in dismissing the following claims contained in the application for postconviction relief at issue: (1) actual innocence; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) double jeopardy; (4) insufficient jury instructions; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (6) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (7) abuse of judicial discretion; (8) violation of his due process rights; and (9) violation of his equal protection rights.
In Rhode Island, postconviction relief is set forth in G.L. 1956 § 10–9.1–1. We have stated that, "the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such [postconviction] relief is warranted" falls on the applicant. Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Duvere v. State, 151 A.3d 314, 317 (R.I. 2017). On appeal, "[w]e afford great deference to the hearing justice's findings of historical fact and the inferences drawn from those facts." Duvere, 151 A.3d at 317. As such, we will not "impinge upon the fact-finding function of a hearing justice * * * absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in arriving at those findings." Njie v. State, 156 A.3d 429, 433 (R.I. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gomes v. State, 161 A.3d 511, 518 (R.I. 2017). However, this Court conducts a de novo review of postconviction relief decisions that "involve[ ] questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant's constitutional rights * * *." Merida v. State, 93 A.3d 545, 549 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gomes, 161 A.3d at 518. That being said, "[f]indings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension." Merida, 93 A.3d at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
In Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), we stated the following with respect to the proper procedure to be followed in a case involving the consideration of an applicant's first application for postconviction relief:
Shatney, 755 A.2d at 135 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Subsequently, in Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277, 1287 (R.I. 2012), this Court declared that, from that point forward, "an evidentiary hearing [would be] required in the first application for postconviction relief in all cases involving applicants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole." Accordingly, it is clear from our precedent that Mr. Motyka was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the instant application for postconviction relief.
In order to assess whether or not Mr. Motyka was provided with the evidentiary hearing to which he was entitled pursuant to our ruling in Tassone, we must carefully scrutinize the December 3, 2014 proceeding; it is the result of that proceeding from which Mr. Motyka is appealing.
At the outset of the December 3, 2014 hearing, court-appointed counsel noted that he had moved to strike Mr. Motyka's response to counsel's motion to withdraw because that response had been filed pro se despite the fact that Mr. Motyka had legal representation. However, court-appointed counsel asked the court to do the following with respect to the motion to strike: "[D]efer ruling on * * * the Motion to Strike until after the Motion to Withdraw is heard, and if it's granted, then I would suggest that the Court treat the plaintiff's memorandum as his memorandum of law under Shatney as to whether any arguable basis exists to proceed with the application in support * * * of any other information he may produce at the hearing." Mr. Motyka was not consulted as to whether he agreed with this procedure.
Court-appointed counsel then proceeded to discuss each of Mr. Motyka's contentions in the operative application for postconviction relief and also asked the court to give Mr. Motyka an opportunity to address the court "as to what he believes he should be able to show." After court-appointed counsel discussed why the first contention in the operative application for postconviction relief—actual innocence—had no merit, the hearing justice gave Mr. Motyka what the justice characterized as the "opportunity to be heard as to whether any arguable basis exists to proceed with the application as to this issue * * *." In attempting to respond to the hearing justice, Mr. Motyka stated that he became "tongue-tied in the courtroom" and also stated "I can't" more than once. After conferring with court-appointed counsel,...
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