Moulds v. State, 6 Div. 655
Citation | 426 So.2d 942 |
Decision Date | 28 December 1982 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 655 |
Parties | Danny Eugene MOULDS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
George C. Lucas, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was indicted and convicted under Alabama Code § 13A-5-31(a)(2) (Supp.1977) for robbery or attempts thereof when the victim is intentionally killed. His punishment was fixed at life imprisonment without parole.
The sufficiency of the State's evidence is not raised on appeal. 1 Therefore, a lengthy recital of the facts is unnecessary. Briefly stated, Ms. Gail Nix, the victim was abducted by appellant around 7:18 p.m. on February 12, 1979, at the Green Springs branch of the First National Bank of Birmingham. The victim had just made a ten-dollar withdrawal from her checking account by using her "William Teller" card at the bank's automatic teller system. Bank records demonstrated that Ms. Nix's "William Teller" card was used twice more during the next two hours. Eighty dollars was withdrawn from Ms. Nix's checking account at the Century Plaza branch at 8:46 p.m. and ten dollars was withdrawn at the Center Point branch at 9:13 p.m.
Charles Edward Vanderford, who was with appellant when Ms. Nix was abducted, and appellant's wife, Christine Moulds, also used the victim's credit cards to purchase clothing at Penney's and Zayre's department stores that night. After making the clothing purchases, Vanderford and Mrs. Moulds returned to appellant's residence where they met appellant and the victim.
Appellant removed certain rings the victim was wearing, took her back to her car and instructed Vanderford and his wife to "follow him." Appellant drove the victim to the Graysville area on Highway 78, pulled off the side of the road and summarily shot her in the back of the neck with his pistol. Appellant later admitted to State witness George Curtis Burnett, Jr. that the victim "was sitting there begging me for her life" and "I blew her brains out."
Appellant's motion for change of venue was properly denied by the trial court. The trial court conducted an extensive voir dire examination of the prospective jurors and ascertained that many of the jurors had read about the case in the newspaper or had seen something about the case on television. When these prospective jurors were questioned further, individually, in the trial court's chambers, a large majority of the jurors stated that they could not remember any of the details about the pretrial publicity and that the publicity would not influence their verdict. The few prospective jurors who felt that the pretrial publicity would influence them were successfully challenged for cause. We have carefully reviewed this matter and find no error in the trial court's ruling. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966).
The granting of an accused's motion for change of venue rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed except for gross abuse. Cobern v. State, 273 Ala. 547, 142 So.2d 869 (1962); Burnett v. State, 350 So.2d 718 (Ala.Cr.App.1977). As this court stated in Anderson v. State, 362 So.2d 1296, 1298-1299 (Ala.Cr.App.1978):
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the facts in this case, we find that the jury was impartial and adhered to its sworn duty to base its verdict upon the evidence adduced and the law as explained in the court's instruction. Bowen v. State, 274 Ala. 66, 145 So.2d 421 (1962); Anderson, supra. The fact that jurors knew of the case did not establish that at the time of empaneling they were biased against the defendant where they swore that their knowledge would not affect their judgment. Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976, 91 S.Ct. 1680, 29 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971). Absent inherently prejudicial publicity which has so saturated the community as to have a probable impact upon the prospective jurors, there must be some showing of a connection between the publicity generated by the news articles, radio and television broadcasts, and the existence of actual jury prejudice. Anderson, supra.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring the prosecutor and defense counsel to begin striking the jury after both sides had been given approximately one hour to review the prospective juror lists. From the record we find the following:
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...had the burden of proving that he could not receive an impartial trial and an unbiased verdict in Colbert County. Moulds v. State, 426 So.2d 942 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Magwood v. State, 426 So.2d 929 (Ala.1983), and cases cited therein; Hopkins, supra. The trial judge heard all the evidence and......
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