Moulton v. Beals

Decision Date29 January 1954
Citation102 A.2d 489,98 N.H. 461
PartiesMOULTON et al. v. BEALS et al.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Charles F. Hartnett, Dover, for plaintiffs.

Burns, Calderwood & Bryant, Donald R. Bryant, Dover, for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

R.L. c. 57, § 3, as amended, provides that selectmen 'shall warn' a special meeting upon application of a specified number of voters, and section 8 provides that a Justice of the Superior Court upon application of the voters, may issue a warrant for such meeting 'if the selectmen unreasonably neglect or refuse to warn'. By the decree and order providing for the special meeting, the Presiding Justice impliedly found that the refusal of the selectmen to call the meeting was unreasonable. The defendants' exceptions to the decree and order raise the question of whether the Court was warranted in so finding. In support of their exceptions the defendants urge that the town is without authority to act upon the matters stated in the warrant, or to commit them to any representative of the town other than the selectmen.

R.L. c. 59, § 11, provides that selectmen 'shall manage the prudential affairs of the town and perform the duties by law prescribed', and § 50 provides that 'if any town fails to choose agents * * * the selectmen shall discharge the duties and have the powers of such offices until the same are filled * * * as provided by law.' Numerous statutory provisions charge selectmen with specific duties, but none of them deals expressly with the management of actions against the town, or the employment of counsel, other than legislative counsel. R.L. c. 51, § 9.

The nature of the duties encompassed in management of 'the prudential affairs of the town' has been considered in a number of the earlier cases, see Pike v. Middleton, 12 N.H. 278, 282; Sanborn v. Town of Deerfield, 2 N.H. 251, 253; Carlton v. Town of Bath, 22 N.H. 559; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N.H. 298, but as was pointed out in Summer v. Town of Dalton, 58 N.H. 295, 297: 'The particular duties comprehended within the meaning of the phrase 'prudential affairs' are not easily enumerated.' In Rich v. Town of Errol, 51 N.H. 350, 354, it was said: 'Under these statutes, selectmen have not been regarded as the general agents of the town, 'clothed with the general powers of the corporate body for which they act'. 'They can only exercise such powers and perform such duties as are properly incident to the special and limited authority conferred on them by their office.' They are 'empowered to do only such acts as are required to meet the exigencies of ordinary town business''. (Emphasis supplied.) See Smith v. Inhabitants of Cheshire, 13 Gray, Mass., 318. It has been settled that as an incident of their special authority selectmen may 'bring all suits * * * which the proper and faithful discharge of their duties requires'. Albany v. Abbott, 61 N.H. 157, 159.

In the performance of certain of their statutory duties, 'where the duties are imposed specifically by statute on the officer, and the town has no duty to perform, no right to defend, and no direct interest to protect,' as when selectmen act in a judicial capacity, they act as state officers and 'not as the agents or servants of the town.' Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N.H. 126, 134; cf. Felch v. Weare, 69 N.H. 617, 45 A. 591; Spinney v. Town of Seabrook, 79 N.H. 34, 36, 104 A. 248; Shea v. City of Portsmouth, 98 N.H. 22, 94 A.2d 902. It is reasonably plain however that the duties of selectmen with respect to the prudential affairs of the town relate to matters in which the town has a direct interest and concerning which it has the authority and right of control. In such matters, as previously noted, selectmen are not 'general agents of the town', and their duties relate to the ordinary business of the town. Rich v. Town of Errol, supra.

The proceedings pending in the United States District Court for the condemnation of rights and interests of the town, are not the 'ordinary business' of the town, with the management which the selectmen are primarily charged. Doubtless in the absence of special action by the town, the selectmen would be under a duty to protect the interest of the town, see R.L. c. 59, § 50, supra, and in the event of doubt to seek its instructions by calling a special meeting. See Albany v. Abbott, supra; Rich v. Town of Errol, supra, 51 N.H. 355, 356. But the town was free to place the management of the litigation in the hands of a special committee, or the selectmen, as it might see fit, with such instructions as it might choose to give with respect to counsel or otherwise. Kinsley v. Norris, 60 N.H. 131; Id., 62 N.H. 652; Town of Lisbon v. Holton, 51 N.H. 209; Bachelder v. Epping, 28 N.H. 354, 359. See also Davis v. School District, 43 N.H. 381; Adams v. Plunkett, 274 Mass. 453, 462, 175 N.E. 60 and cases cited. 'In New England town meetings the voters are the sovereigns, and their will, when duly expressed, is supreme.' Attorney General v. Folsom, 69 N.H. 556, 557, 45 A. 410. In the early case of Town of Union v. Crawford, 19 Conn. 331, 337, it was said that while 'selectmen, under the general authority given them * * * have a right to appear as such in suits in which the town is a party, * * * towns have the right, at their pleasure, to appoint agents or attorneys to take the immediate charge of their legal proceedings.' See Town Officer (1886), 102.

We find no statutory provision which precludes this conclusion, and as the statute placing the selectmen in charge of the prudential affairs of the town is interpreted, we do not consider that it vests them with exclusive authority to conduct litigation to which the town is a party. Under these circumstances, and in view of the uncertainties with respect to the special meeting of September 8, 1953 raised by the action brought by the defendants, there was no error in the finding that the selectment unreasonably refused to warn a second special meeting upon the application made to them.

The argument has been made that it was erroneous for the Court to allow a special town meeting before it decided whether the action of the previous town meeting was valid. We see no error in this procedure. If the prior meeting was illegal, a new one was necessary to correct the errors therein. If it was legal, the new meeting has the authority to reaffirm the previous action or take different action if the voters so desire. Accordingly the order is

Exceptions overruled.

BLANDIN, Justice (dissenting).

It is settled here beyond question that towns as mere subdivisions of the state have only such powers as are given them by the legislature. Leavitt v. Town of Northampton, 98 N.H. 193, 197, 96 A.2d 554, and cases cited. Among such powers are those of suing, being sued, and prosecuting and defending suits 'in any court or elsewhere.' R.L. c. 51, § 1. Towns are...

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12 cases
  • Piper v. Meredith
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1970
    ...of Errol, 51 N.H. 350, 354-357; Sumner v. Town of Dalton, 58 N.H. 295, 297; New London v. Davis, 73 N.H. 72, 59 A. 369; Moulton v. Beals, 98 N.H. 461, 102 A.2d 489; DeRochemont v. Holden, 99 N.H. 80, 105 A.2d Town of Jaffrey v. Heffernan, 104 N.H. 249, 183 A.2d 246, also relied on by the Co......
  • Rossi v. Town of Pelham, Civil No. 96-139-SD.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire
    • September 29, 1997
    ...meet the exigencies of ordinary town business....'" DeRochemont v. Holden, 99 N.H. 80, 82, 105 A.2d 43 (1954) (quoting Moulton v. Beals, 98 N.H. 461, 463, 102 A.2d 489). The authority to manage the prudential affairs of the town would ordinarily include authority to take apparently necessar......
  • Board of Public Works of Wellesley v. Board of Selectmen of Wellesley
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 26, 1979
    ...indeed the present action, which sought to settle an internal town dispute, resulted from a vote at town meeting. Cf. Moulton v. Beals, 98 N.H. 461, 102 A.2d 489 (1954). (Specific authorization to commence the present suit was evidently not thought necessary, and in any event would, we supp......
  • De Rochemont v. Holden
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • May 19, 1954
    ...faith according to their best judgment in their official administrative and judicial capacity.' In the recent case of Moulton v. Beals, 98 N.H. 461, 102 A.2d 489, 490, occasion was presented to consider the nature of the authority of selectmen with respect to the management of suits against......
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