Mounce v. John Doe

Decision Date10 June 2014
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 12-669
PartiesSTEVEN DALE MOUNCE v. JOHN DOE ET AL.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.

ORDER AND REASONS ON MOTIONS

Plaintiff, Stephen Dale Mounce, is a prisoner currently incarcerated in the Rayburn Correctional Center ("Rayburn"). He originally filed this complaint pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law against "John Doe 1," "John Doe 2" and "John Doe 3," whom plaintiff described as the St. Tammany Parish Jail's medical director and two dentists who had treated him when he was incarcerated at that jail. Defendants, identifying themselves as medical director Richard D. Inglese, M.D., Ronald S. Leggio, D.D.S., and Gary Benscek, D.D.S., moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Record Doc. No. 21. After the court appointed counsel to represent Mounce, the court dismissed without prejudice defendants' motion to dismiss, and Mounce filed an amended complaint naming St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Jack Strain, Jr., Warden Greg Longino, Dr. Inglese, Dr. Bencsek and Dr. Ronald S. Leggio as defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that, while he was incarcerated at the St. Tammany Parish Jail from February 2, 2011 to March 19, 2012, defendants had a policy of offering only extractions of teeth and were deliberately indifferent to his serious dental needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also asserts negligence claims under state law. He seeks monetarydamages and "[a]ffirmative relief to ensure that the complained of violations do not recur." Amended Complaint, Record Doc. No. 28 at p. 18.

Counsel for defendants answered the amended complaint on behalf of all named defendants, including Ronald S. Leggio, D.D.S. Record Doc. No. 34. Defendants then began referring to Michael L. Leggio, D.D.S., as a defendant in some, but not all, of their subsequent submissions to the court. Defendants have sometimes referred to both names in the same filing (e.g., Record Doc. No. 40 at pp. 1, 8), and they even named Ronald S. Leggio, D.D.S., as both a defendant and a fact witness on their witness list, Record Doc. No. 59, although they explain in their memorandum in support of their pending motion in limine that "Dr. Ronald Leggio . . . is the father of the Dr. Leggio who is a defendant in this suit." Record Doc. No. 64-1 at p. 2.

The stipulated facts and evidence submitted in conjunction with the pending cross-motions for summary judgment establish that Michael L. Leggio1 and Dr. Benscek were the only dentists employed by the St. Tammany Parish Jail during the relevant time period. None of the litigants has moved to amend the pleadings to substitute Michael L. Leggio for Ronald S. Leggio, but it is clear that Michael L. Leggio, not Ronald S. Leggio, is the proper defendant in this lawsuit. Therefore, all references to "Dr. Leggio" in the remainder of this decision refer to Michael L. Leggio.

This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 24.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by Mounce's arrest record; his jail dental records; the transcript of this court's hearing conducted pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), and its progeny on May 31, 2012,2 at which Mounce testified under oath; excerpts from the depositions of Dr. Leggio and Dr. Bencsek; the affidavit of Dr. R. Demaree Inglese; the report and curriculum vitae of plaintiff's expert dentist, Kathryn Sturm, D.D.S.; portions of the St. Tammany Parish Jail Medical Policy and Procedure Manual; and the declaration under penalty of perjury of Dr. Thomas Sutherland, a dentist who treated plaintiff at Rayburn, where Mounce has been incarcerated since April 16, 2012. Record Doc. No. 60. Defendants argue that they never had, and plaintiff has no evidence to prove that they had, an extraction-only policy at the St. Tammany Parish Jail. They argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claims of deliberate indifference to his serious dental needs. They further contend that plaintiff's negligence claims should be dismissed either because Mounce must first bring any claim of dental malpractice before a medical review panel, pursuantto La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.41 et seq., but has not done so; or because the court lacks jurisdiction over his state law claims if it dismisses his federal claims.

Mounce filed a timely cross-motion for summary judgment with an incorporated memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion. He supports his submission with the complete deposition transcripts of Warden Longino and Drs. Inglese, Bencsek and Leggio; the declarations under penalty of perjury of plaintiff himself,3 fellow inmate George Duffy, and Dr. Sutherland; the dental records of 16 other inmates who were incarcerated at the St. Tammany Parish Jail during the same time period as Mounce; a few of plaintiff's own dental and medical records that were not included in defendants' submissions; and an inmate complaint form by another inmate at the St. Tammany Parish Jail regarding his dental care, dated August 3, 2011. Record Doc. No. 67. Mounce argues that the undisputed facts establish that defendants had a customary policy of extracting restorable teeth; they disregarded his serious dental needs despite their actual knowledge of those needs; and their deliberate indifference was objectively unreasonable under clearly established Eighth Amendment law.

Defendants received leave to file a memorandum in reply to plaintiff's opposition to their motion for summary judgment and in opposition to Mounce's cross-motion for summary judgment. Record Doc. Nos. 72, 75, 78.

Defendants also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony and report of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Sturm. Record Doc. No. 64. Mounce filed a timely memorandum in opposition. Record Doc. No. 66. Defendants received leave to file a reply memorandum. Record Doc. Nos. 73, 76, 77.

After oral argument on the pending motions, the court ordered the parties to confer and file a joint stipulation of those facts as to which they agree there is no genuine dispute for trial. The court also continued without date the final pretrial conference and trial dates to permit a thorough consideration of the cross-motions for summary judgment and their voluminous supporting evidence. Record Doc. No. 79. The parties timely filed a joint stipulation of undisputed facts. Record Doc. No. 82.

Having considered the complaint, as amended; the record; the stipulated facts; the submissions of the parties and the applicable law; and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion in limine is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as set forth below. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Judgment will be separately entered.

I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendants moved to exclude the report of plaintiff's expert witness, Kathryn Sturm, D.D.S., Record Doc. No. 64-3 (which is also in the record as an exhibit to defendants' motion for summary judgment, Record Doc. No. 60-12), and anticipated testimony on grounds that (1) her evidence will not assist the trier of fact to understandthe evidence or determine a fact in issue, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and (2) her report exceeds the bounds of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 because it offers legal conclusions. Defendants concede that Dr. Sturm is qualified as an expert in the field of general dentistry. However, they contend that she is not qualified by experience or specialized training, and has never been accepted by a court, as an expert in correctional dentistry, in which they assert that the standards of care are different than in general dentistry. Defendants also argue that a conflict of interest exists between Dr. Sturm and Dr. Leggio that taints her testimony, but they have offered no evidence to support this speculative allegation.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides that a witness

who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Under Rule 704(a), "opinion testimony otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it includes an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 697 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 399 (5th Cir. 2009).

"In Daubert, the Supreme Court explained that Rule 702 assigns to the district judge a gatekeeping role to ensure that scientific testimony is both reliable and relevant."Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). "The aim is to exclude expert testimony based merely on subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 04-3201, 2008 WL 1930681, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2008) (Vance, J.) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). Plaintiff, as the party offering the expert testimony, bears the burden of establishing its reliability and relevance by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson, 685 F.3d at 459.

To qualify as an expert, the witness "must have such knowledge or experience in [his] field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier [of fact] in his search for truth." United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 524 (5th Cir. 20...

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