MOUNDZOURIS v. State, 33A01-0209-CR-378.
| Decision Date | 08 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 33A01-0209-CR-378.,33A01-0209-CR-378. |
| Citation | 792 N.E.2d 952 |
| Parties | April M. (Hill) MOUNDZOURIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Amy K. Noe, Arnold & Noe, Richmond, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
April M. Hill Moundzouris ("Hill") appeals her convictions for two counts of Welfare Fraud, as Class C felonies. She presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her convictions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Hill and her former husband, Randy D. Hill ("Randy"), have two children, and Randy was granted sole custody of both children pursuant to a dissolution decree issued in 1995. The dissolution court granted Hill visitation with the children and ordered Hill to pay Randy $30 per week in child support.
Hill has enjoyed extensive visitation with her children, well beyond that provided for in the dissolution decree. Randy routinely drops off the children at Hill's house in the morning and Hill gets them ready for school, and the children often return to Hill's house after school until Randy's work day is over. In addition, the children frequently spend the night at Hill's house and eat many of their daily meals there. During the summer, especially, the children often eat three meals a day at Hill's house. Despite these circumstances, custody of both children has remained with Randy.
On February 9, 1998, Hill applied for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") because she suffers from interstitial cystitis, which causes chronic inflammation of the bladder. In her SSI application, Hill stated that she lived alone. But in a subsequent application for SSI she submitted on August 30, 1999, Hill stated that both of her children had lived with her since March 1, 1997. And on August 26, 1998, when Hill applied for food stamps, Hill also stated that both of her children lived with her.
On September 9, 1999, Hill applied for SSI for her son, T.H., and she stated in that application that she had custody of T.H. and that both children lived with her. That application, which Hill signed and dated, provided in part that she acknowledged that lying or misrepresenting the truth in the application could result in penalties under state and/or federal law. Hill subsequently admitted to investigators that she did not have custody of T.H.
Hill received SSI from August 1999 until June 2001, with a total benefit of $11,324. And Hill received food stamps from August 26, 1998, until September 30, 1999, with a total benefit of $2,742. The State charged Hill with welfare fraud in obtaining SSI benefits and in obtaining food stamps. A jury found her guilty as charged on both counts, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal ensued.
Hill contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Ferrell v. State, 746 N.E.2d 48, 50 (Ind.2001). We will affirm the conviction unless, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict, we conclude that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Robertson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 138, 139 (Ind. 2002).
To convict Hill of welfare fraud, as a Class C felony, the State was required to prove that she knowingly obtained public relief or assistance by means of false or misleading oral or written statements of an amount greater than $2,500. See Ind.Code § 35-43-5-7. Hill's sole contention on appeal is that the State did not prove that she knowingly used false or misleading statements to obtain assistance. We address each of Hill's two convictions in turn.
Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-2 provides in relevant part that a person engages in conduct "knowingly" if she is aware of a high probability that she is doing so. At trial, Hill testified that a social worker told her that custody of the children was not required in order to receive SSI on behalf of T.H., but that she only had to be the "primary caregiver[.]" Hill also testified that when she explained to the social worker that the children "lived with [her] ... [and that she] took care of them[,]" the social worker told her that she would be considered the primary caregiver. In light of that advice from the social worker, Hill maintains that she was not aware of a high probability that she was using false or misleading statements to obtain SSI.
But the State presented undisputed evidence that Hill, in her application for SSI on behalf of T.H., represented to the Social Security Administration that she had custody of T.H. And the undisputed evidence shows that Hill has never had custody of T.H. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support Hill's conviction for welfare fraud in obtaining SSI benefits. Hill merely asks that we reweigh the evidence, a task not within our prerogative on appeal.
Hill next contends that she did not knowingly make any misrepresentations in her food stamp application. In that application, submitted on August 26, 1998, Hill represented to the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration Division of Family and Children ("FSSA") that both of her children lived with her. But, unlike the SSI application, the food stamp application does not include any questions regarding custody of the children. And the application is silent concerning whether the children must live with the applicant full-time for her to be eligible for benefits. The application merely states, in relevant part:
On appeal, the State makes no argument in support of affirming this conviction; the State only addresses Hill's conviction for obtaining SSI benefits. Accordingly, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the State, as that duty remains with the appellee. See Railing v. Hawkins, 746 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ind.Ct. App.2001). Applying a less stringent standard...
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