Mount Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, Civil Action No. 94-Z-2978.
| Decision Date | 09 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 94-Z-2978. |
| Citation | 928 F. Supp. 1046 |
| Parties | MOUNT EMMONS MINING COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; The United States Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
John R. Henderson, Boulder, CO, Don H. Sherwood, Denver, CO, for plaintiff.
Kathleen L. Torres, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, CO, Gerald S. Fish, Dept. of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources, Washington, DC, for defendants.
AMENDED ORDER
The matter before the Court is Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. Specifically, defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub.L. No. 103-332, § 112, 108 Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994).
Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LR 72.1, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Donald E. Abram for the purpose of making a recommendation to the Court on Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. On January 31, 1996, Magistrate Judge Abram conducted a hearing on the issue, and on February 27, 1996, issued a Recommendation Of United States Magistrate Judge recommending that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment be granted. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) the parties were given ten days to file written objections to the Recommendation. On March 14, 1996, plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Objections To Recommendation Of United States Magistrate Judge.
The Court has reviewed de novo all pertinent papers, including the Recommendation, plaintiff's Objections, and defendant's Response. After careful consideration, the Court is satisfied that the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is thorough, well-reasoned, and correct.
Specifically, the Court agrees that plaintiff's application was not entitled to the moratorium exception. Section 113 of the mining moratorium legislation states that the moratorium shall not apply if the application has been filed with the Secretary of the Interior on or before September 30, 1994. This language has been interpreted to mean only applications which were forwarded to Washington, D.C. qualified as having been filed with the secretary on or before the enactment of the Act. R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt, No. CV-N-95-286-DWH(PHA), Report and Recommendation Of United States Magistrate Judge Phyllis Halsey Aitkins (D.Nev. Feb. 16, 1995). Magistrate Judge Abram concurred with this interpretation, and determined that since plaintiff's application had not been filed with the Secretary on or before September 30, 1994, Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment should be granted.
Plaintiff alleges that Magistrate Judge Abram's interpretation is in error. Plaintiff asserts that in passing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Congress never intended that pending applications need be filed with the Secretary of the Interior in Washington. Instead, plaintiff urges the Court to read the statute as requiring only that the application be filed with the Bureau of Land Management in the state where the land is located.
The Court is satisfied that Magistrate Judge Abram's interpretation is the correct one. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff's interpretation is contrary to that of the agency involved. Pursuant to §§ 112 and 113 of the Act, the Bureau of Land Management issued Instruction Memorandum No. 95-01, which provides: "Only the following applications may be processed: (1) Those for which a FHFC was signed before October 1, 1994 and; (2) those for which a FHFC was pending in Washington, D.C. as of September 30, 1994." An agency's construction of a statute will be upheld as long as it is reasonable and does not differ from the clear language of the statute. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 702, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2537, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991). The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823-24, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); State of Kansas v. United States, 995 F.2d 1505, 1509 (10th Cir. 1993).
In addition, plaintiff's interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute. Congress expressly stated that the application must be "filed with the Secretary." As such, Congress precluded plaintiff's interpretation that merely filing the application with the local Bureau of Land Management office is enough to exempt an application from the moratorium.
Since plaintiff's application was not forwarded to Washington, D.C. on or before September 30, 1994, the application was not timely filed with the Secretary of the Interior under § 113 of the Act. As a result, Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment should be granted. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, and the Complaint and cause of action are dismissed with prejudice, each party to pay his or its costs.
This matter comes before the Court regarding Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 9, 1995. This Motion was referred to this Court for a recommendation on October 18, 1995. Plaintiff filed a Response on November 13, 1995, and Defendants filed a Reply on January 4, 1996. On January 31, 1996, this Court held a hearing on the Motion and took the matter under advisement. Magistrate Judge Donald E. Abram hereby makes the following Recommendation.
This case arises out of The General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54. That law allows individuals to explore land in the public domain in search of valuable mineral deposits and sets forth the procedures for securing legal title to a mineral claim. See Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 885 F.Supp. 1356, 1357 (D.Nev.1995). On December 30, 1992, Plaintiff filed an application for a patent to ten lode mining claims in Gunnison County, Colorado with the Colorado State Office, Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). On September 15, 1994, the BLM accepted a check for $875 as payment of the purchase price for the ten claims.
On March 2, 1993, the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior ("Secretary") issued Order No. 3163 revoking the delegation of authority to the BLM to issue First Half Final Certificates ("FHFC")1 and patents. Pursuant to the Secretary's Order, the BLM would continue to receive mineral patent applications, but only the Secretary could issue FHFCs and grant mineral patents.
On September 30, 1994, Congress enacted the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub.L. No. 103-332, § 112, 108 Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994) ("mining moratorium legislation"). Section 112 of the mining moratorium legislation prohibits the Department of the Interior from spending any funds during fiscal year 1995 to accept or process applications for mineral patents.2 Pursuant to § 113 of the mining moratorium legislation, the moratorium does not apply if the Secretary determines that the applicant fully complied with all requirements established under the mining laws by September 30, 1994.3 Pursuant to §§ 112 and 113, the BLM issued Instruction Memorandum No. 95-01, which provides: "Only the following applications may be processed: (1) Those for which a FHFC was signed before October 1, 1994 and; (2) those for which a FHFC was pending in Washington, D.C. as of September 30, 1994." See Complaint, Exhibit 5. Because a FHFC had not been issued to Plaintiff, and because Plaintiff's application was not pending in Washington, D.C., Defendants refused to further process Plaintiff's application.
On December 30, 1994, Plaintiff filed this action challenging Defendants' refusal to continue processing Plaintiff's mineral patent application. Plaintiff requested mandamus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 or an order compelling agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 792 (10th Cir.1988). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual record and any reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.1980). Summary judgment may be granted if the court concludes that, based on the record as a whole, no "rational trier of fact" could find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The summary judgment procedure is particularly appropriate in cases in which the court is asked to review or enforce a decision of a federal administrative agency." 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2733 at 366 (2d ed. 1983).
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Rather, the dispute involves the proper interpretation of the mining moratorium legislation, namely, whether Plaintiff's application is exempt from the moratorium pursuant to § 113. Stated another way, the question presented by this case is whether the Defendants properly construed the mining legislation moratorium.
Judicial review of an agency decision is conducted pursuant to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977) (...
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