Mount Ida Sch. for Girls, Inc. v. Rood

• Decision Date: 27 February 1931
• Docket Number: No. 96,96
• Parties: MOUNT IDA SCHOOL FOR GIRLS, Inc., v. ROOD.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

253 Mich. 482

235 N.W. 227

MOUNT IDA SCHOOL FOR GIRLS, Inc.,

v.ROOD.

No. 96

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 27, 1931.

Error to Circuit Court, Kent County; Major L. Dunham, Judge.

Action by the Mount Ida School for Girls, Incorporated, against Edward A. Rood. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench. Butterfield, Keeney & Amberg, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Smith & Searl, of Grand Rapids, for appellee.

NORTH, J.

Defendant herein signed a proposed contract with plaintiff under which defendant's minor daughter was to attend plaintiff's school for girls in Massachusetts during the school year of 1926 and 1927. Defendant signed the contract in Michigan. Thereupon it was forwarded to plaintiff in Massachusetts and there accepted by it. Defendant's contract was to pay for his daughter's board and tuition for the school year amounting to $1,200. He paid $50 with the application and $500 October 1, 1926. The balance was payable $350 January 1, 1927, and $300 February 1, 1927. Defendant's daughter attended the school until the Christmas vacation, but she did not return for the remaining portion of the school year. On January 2, 1927, plaintiff was notified by defendant that his daughter would not return. Defendant did not pay the $650 which accrued in 1927. After the expiration of the school year plaintiff brought suit to recover the balance of the contract price. On trial before the court without a jury plaintiff planted its right to recover solely upon defendant's contract to pay. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proof the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss because plaintiff had offered no proof of damages resulting from the breach of the contract. Judgment was entered in favor of defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The trial court made and filed the following conclusions of law:

‘(a) The refusal of the defendant to send his daughter back to school was a breach of the contract which was then executory. ‘(b) On account of the breach, the plaintiff never has performed its contract.

‘(c) The contract is a Massachusetts contract, but the remedy for the breach of the contract is to be governed by the laws of Michigan where the suit was brought.

‘(d) In Michigan the remedy for the breach of an executory contract which has not been performed is not the balance due on the contract, but the damages that follow from the breach.

‘(e) There being no proof of any damages arising to the plaintiff because of the breach, it cannot recover in this action, and the judgment is therefore to be for the defendant with costs.’

We think the foregoing conclusions of law and the disposition made of this case are fully sustained by Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 85, 226 N. W. 883, 884;International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N. W. 1031, and International Text-Book Co. v. Marvin, 166 Mich. 660, 132 N. W. 437. We would be disposed to rest decision on citation of these cases, were it not for the fact that counsel for appellant strenuously insist that the instant case can be and should be distinguished from the Stroud Case. They urge this upon the following grounds:

I. The instant case, unlike the Stroud Case, is based upon a contract not only made in and controlled by the laws of another state, but the contract also was to be performed in such other state, i. e. in Massachusetts.

II. Plaintiff is entitled to recover upon defendant's independent promise to pay the contract price, regardless of nonperformance by plaintiff.

III. That notwithstanding this contract covers both board and tuition, it is an indivisible contract, and plaintiff is entitled to recover the full consideration.

IV. Prima facie plaintiff should be allowed to recover the full contract price, subject only to plaintiff's right to reduce the amount recoverable because of plaintiff's having benefitted by defendant's renunciation; and the burden of such showing is on the defendant.

Touching the first of appellant's contentions above noted, it is claimed that the contract in the instant case was not only made in Massachusetts and its construction controlled by the laws of that state, but it was to be actually performed in Massachusetts. Appellant's counsel attempt to distinguish the above-noted Michigan correspondence school cases by asserting that performance in those cases was in Michigan instead of the state wherein the contract was consummated. If this distinction is of consequence, we think counsels' contention cannot be sustained. It is true in the correspondence school cases that the materials to be furnished by the school were to be forwarded to the student in Michigan. But at least in some of such cases ( International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, supra; International Text-Book Co. v. Marvin, supra) the forwarding was by mail, in which cases the plaintiff prima facie performed its full part of the contract by mailing with postage prepaid in the foreign state. Thus performance in such cases, at least prima facie, was fully completed in the state where plaintiff was domiciled the same as was contemplated in the instant case; and in principle the Michigan cases of this character cannot be distinguished from plaintiff's case

Further, this question was considered and squarely passed upon in the Stroud Case in terms amply sufficient to be here controlling. It was there announced, with authorities cited to support the proposition, that in Michigan it is a rule of law, and we think a rule of procedure or remedy, that a party to an executory contract may always stop performance by the other party and refuse further to perform on his part, and after his refusal he is ‘liable only upon the breach of the contract’; and further, quoting from cases cited, it is said: ‘The contract price is recoverable only upon the theory of performance, never upon the theory of inability to perform.’ Mr. Justice Potter, writing for the court, in commenting upon this phase of the case aptly said:

‘Plaintiff contracted with defendant with full knowledge of defendant's rights, which it must be presumed to know. It knew defendant had a right to renounce the contract and refuse to perform further, and that he thereafter was liable only for damages for breach of contract. * * *

‘By comity, citizens of Illinois may sue in the courts of Michigan, but the law of Illinois has no extra-territorial force. The courts of this state may not be used to prosecute to effect a cause of action in a manner contrary to the laws of Michigan. A foreign citizen cannot avail himself in the courts of this state of remedies which are denied to our own citizens.’

Not only are the courts of this state committed to the foregoing propositions of law, but, as is revealed by the instant case, the remedy provided enables courts to arrive at a just result between the parties litigant. In this case, if plaintiff's contention were accepted, it would recover from defendant the cost to it of boarding defendant's daughter for the unexpired portion of the school year; but confessedly plaintiff has not and will not furnish this item. In other words, plaintiff is here asking the courts of this state to enforce payment for something which it has not and will not furnish to or for defendant. The Michigan rule relegating plaintiffs in such cases to an action for damages for breach of contract obviates such an illogical and unjust result, but affords such plaintiffs full compensation for the loss sustained. As stated in the Stroud Case, the law ‘aims at compensation of the injured party-to make him whole.’ Much of appellant's brief is devoted to the proposition that...