Mountain Cement Co. v. the South of Laramie Water & Sewer Dist.
| Decision Date | 13 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | S–10–0238.,Nos. S–10–0199,s. S–10–0199 |
| Parties | MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY, a Nevada corporation, Appellant (Plaintiff),v.The SOUTH OF LARAMIE WATER & SEWER DISTRICT, Appellee (Defendant).In the Matter of the Petition of Mountain Cement Company for the Exclusion from the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District.Mountain Cement Company, Appellant (Petitioner),v.The South of Laramie Water & Sewer District, Appellee (Respondent). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Philip A. Nicholas & Mitchell H. Edwards of Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Nicholas.Representing Appellee: Kermit C. Brown and Elisa M. Butler of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Brown.Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.VOIGT, Justice.
[¶ 1] In these consolidated appeals, Mountain Cement Company, a Nevada corporation (Mountain Cement), challenges the district court's conclusions that Mountain Cement's property was properly included in the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District (the District) and that the District lawfully issued certain general obligation bonds, and also challenges the refusal of the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County (the Board) to exclude Mountain Cement's property from the District. Finding that Mountain Cement is barred from challenging the inclusion of its property in the District, and finding that the District's proposed general obligation bond issue was not unlawful, we affirm the district court in S–10–0199. In S–10–0238, we answer the certified questions as set forth below.1
[¶ 2] 1. Whether the District had the authority to include Mountain Cement's property within the District's boundaries without Mountain Cement's written consent?
2. Whether the District's proposed general obligation bond issue for the purpose of improving and expanding the District's existing water system is in violation of law?
3. Whether the District's proposed general obligation bond issue for the purpose of improving and expanding the District's existing water system violates the District's statutory indebtedness limitation?
[¶ 3] We have agreed to answer the following questions certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b):
1. Does a Wyoming board of county commissioners have the power and authority to remove real property from a water and sewer district?
2. If the answer to the first question is “yes,” under what circumstances may a board of county commissioners remove property from a water and sewer district?
3. Does the Petition for Exclusion of Mountain Cement Company from the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District (the Petition), taking the facts alleged in the Petition as true and the allegations viewed in the light most favorable to Mountain Cement, state a claim upon which relief can be granted?
[¶ 4] The District was established by the Board in 1992.2 The persons attempting to organize the District represented that the District would not levy property taxes, but would fund itself solely through user fees. Both the Petition submitted to the Board and the District's Amended Rules and Regulations provided that the District intended to fund its systems with user fees, and not to levy taxes. Since its inception, the District has obtained water pursuant to an Agreement for the City of Laramie to Furnish Municipal Water to the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District.
[¶ 5] Mountain Cement owns land south of the City of Laramie, with a portion of said land exceeding 20 acres in size lying within the District.3 It is undisputed that, in 1992, Mountain Cement's plant manager signed a petition favoring organization of the District, but that no one with actual authority ever consented in writing to Mountain Cement's inclusion in the District. It is also undisputed that Mountain Cement obtains no water or other services from the District.4
[¶ 6] In October 2008, Mountain Cement learned from the Albany County Assessor that the District intended to levy a tax for the 2009 tax year against property lying within the District. On January 29, 2009, Mountain Cement filed in the district court the Complaint that underlies this Court's case no. S–10–0199. The Complaint alleged eight claims or causes of action, some being in the alternative:
Claim I: Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief
(MCC's Property Not Properly Included w/in District)
Claim II: Estoppel
(Tax Assessment & General Obligation Bonds)
Claim III: Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief
(Signatures Invalid for Fraud in the Inducement)
Claim IV: Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief
(Tax Resolution Invalid)
Claim V: Declaratory Judgment & Affirmative Relief
(Bond Issue Invalid)
(Tax Assessment & General Obligation Bond Violation of Equal Protection)
(Tax Assessment & General Obligation Bond Violation of Due Process)
(Tax Assessment Unconstitutional Taking of Private Property)
[¶ 7] A day after the above-described Complaint was filed in the district court, Mountain Cement filed with the Board the Petition mentioned above. This Petition, which underlies this Court's case no. S–10–0238, contained the same allegations found in the Complaint, but sought relief under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41–10–120 (LexisNexis 2007) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22–29–307 (LexisNexis 2007), as will be discussed more fully below.
[¶ 8] On March 26, 2009, the District filed in the district court a motion to dismiss Mountain Cement's Complaint, citing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The gravamen of a “12(b)(6) motion” is that there has been a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Both parties filed memoranda of law, after which the motion was heard on August 5, 2009. The district court issued a Decision Letter on September 8, 2009, and an order on September 22, 2009, dismissing all but Claim IV (Tax Resolution Invalid) and Claim V (Bond Issue Invalid), leaving those claims for further development.
[¶ 9] On November 9, 2009, the District filed a motion seeking summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 on Claims IV and V. Mountain Cement filed its response on January 7, 2010, and the matter was heard on April 2, 2010. In separate decision letters issued April 20, 2010, and July 8, 2010, the district court granted the District's motion on both counts. A final order disposing of all eight claims in the District's favor was entered on August 3, 2010. The appeal from that order was docketed in this Court as S–10–0199.
[¶ 10] While the district court action proceeded as described above, the Petition Mountain Cement had filed with the Board was also being considered. In the Petition, the factual allegations of which generally tracked those set forth in the district court Complaint, Mountain Cement sought to have its property “excluded,” meaning “removed,” from the District. After certifying three questions of law to the district court and receiving the district court's responses thereto, the Board dismissed the Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mountain Cement then filed in the district court a petition for review of the Board's order. Upon the parties' stipulated motion, the district court certified to this Court the same three questions that the Board had certified to it. Those questions have been listed hereinabove. See supra ¶ 3. In their briefs to this Court, the parties have focused primarily upon the question of whether Mountain Cement's Petition was time barred by the provisions of § 41–10–120 and § 22–29–307.
[¶ 11] Review of a dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is de novo, with this court applying the same standards and examining the same materials as the district court. Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo.2008). Id. Dismissal is granted sparingly because it is a drastic remedy, but dismissal is proper where, for instance, the complaint clearly shows that the action is barred by a statute of limitations. Id.; Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 200 (Wyo.2000); Gillis v. F & A Enters., 934 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo.1997).
[¶ 12] Review of a grant of summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56(c) is similar to review of a dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6):
On appeal, this Court evaluates the propriety of a district court's summary judgment ruling by examining the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. We examine the record de novo in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record. If upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of genuine issues of material fact, we resolve that doubt against the party seeking summary judgment. We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the district court's determinations. If we can uphold summary judgment on any proper legal basis appearing in the record, we will.
Heimer v. Antelope Valley Improvement & Serv. Dist., 2010 WY 29, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 860, 863 (Wyo.2010) (quoting Wagner v. Reuter, 2009 WY 75, ¶ 11, 208 P.3d 1317, 1321–22 (Wyo.2009) (internal citations omitted)). “Summary judgment may be the appropriate resolution in a declaratory judgment action.” Coffinberry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Hot Springs, 2008 WY 110, ¶ 3, 192 P.3d 978, 979 (Wyo.2008).
[¶ 13] These appeals largely involve statutory interpretation, for which...
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