Mountain Home Contractors v. United States, 87-63.
| Decision Date | 15 May 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-63.,87-63. |
| Citation | 192 Ct. Cl. 16,425 F.2d 1260 |
| Parties | MOUNTAIN HOME CONTRACTORS, a Joint Venture, Consisting of Arthur A. Danekas, W. G. Ellis, John J. Martin and Sea View Lumber Co., Inc., a California Corporation v. The UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Peter A. Lewi, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff. John J. Geraghty, Raleigh, N. C., attorney of record; Peter A. Lewi, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel.
Robert R. Donlan, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. William D. Ruckelshaus, for defendant.
Before COWEN, Chief Judge, and LARAMORE, DURFEE, DAVIS, COLLINS, SKELTON, and NICHOLS, Judges.
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This lawsuit by plaintiff, Mountain Home Contractors,1 arises out of a Capehart-Housing contract with the Department of the Air Force for the construction of 300 housing units at a total contract price of $4,918,600. Plaintiff's original and amended petitions allege two causes of action, however, only the second claim, set forth in plaintiff's amended petition, is now before us for decision. The dispute concerns the installation of 298 kitchen exhaust fans in 298 of the 300 housing units. Plaintiff says the installation of these fans was not called for in the contract, and seeks compensation for costs incurred due to the contracting officer's demand that the fans be installed. Both the contracting officer and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) denied plaintiff's claim (ASBCA No. 7961, 1963 B.C.A. ¶ 3725) on the ground that installation of the fans was a part of the contract. The case is now before us on cross-motions for summary judgment. We have concluded that plaintiff is entitled to recover.
This contract was for the construction of 149 duplex buildings (containing 298 housing units) and two separate one unit buildings at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. There were six basic types of buildings, as follows:
Number
Building Type of units Description
1-A & 1-B __________ 116 Airman, 3-Bedroom, Single-story
Duplex
2-A ________________ 68 Airman & Officers, 4-Bedroom
Two-story, Duplex
3-A & 3-B __________ 72 Officers, 3-Bedroom, Single-story
Duplex.
4-A, 4-B, & 4-C ____ 36 Officers, 3-Bedroom, Single-story,
Duplex.
5-A ________________ 6 Officers, 4-Bedroom, Two-story,
Duplex.
6-A & 6-B __________ 2 Colonels, 4-Bedroom, Single-story,
Single unit.
As can be seen by this list, 298 of the 300 units were in duplex type buildings. The specifications called for installation of the kitchen exhaust fans where shown on the contract drawings. Drawings numbers 72-77 related to all the buildings (types 1-A through 6-B), and picture kitchen exhaust fans. But drawings 72-76, covering the 298 duplex type units (types 1-A through 5-A), contained the following notation:
NOTE: KITCHEN EXHAUST FANS, DUCT WORK & GRILLE TO BE UNDER ALTERNATE BID
Drawing 77, for the two single-unit buildings designed for the colonels, did not contain this notation.
Under a government contract like the present one, additive alternates are bid separately, and the government has the option of selecting any or all of the alternate items to be included in the contract work. In Section C of the present specifications, 19 alternates were listed, none of which included a kitchen exhaust fan. Of these 19, the defendant ultimately selected 12 for inclusion in the contract work. Plaintiff interpreted this lack of an alternate covering a kitchen exhaust fan to mean that the government did not desire the fans in the 298 duplex units, but only wanted them in the two more expensive units designed for the colonels. Based on this interpretation, plaintiff included in its bid price the cost of only two kitchen fans, and in fact, constructed the 300 units, installing only two kitchen fans (in units 6-A and 6-B). The contracting officer concluded that the contract called for fans in all 300 units, and ordered plaintiff to proceed with installation. This the plaintiff did, and requested additional consideration for the work. On November 29, 1961, the contracting officer denied plaintiff's request. This decision was appealed to the ASBCA, which denied the appeal. Plaintiff is now before us alleging that the decision of the ASBCA is arbitrary and is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff says his interpretation of the contract was reasonable. Defendant, of course, says the decision of the ASBCA is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and is supported by substantial evidence, and that, therefore, under the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1964), the decision is final and conclusive.
Defendant justifies its inadvertent failure to remove the troublesome notation from the drawings by citing Paragraph 4 of the Invitation for Bids, which stated:
* * * Should the bidder find discrepancies in, or omissions from, such Drawings and Specifications or other documents attached hereto, or should he be in doubt as to their meaning, he should at once notify the Contracting Officer, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho and obtain clarification prior to submitting a bid. * * *
This general language was repeated in Paragraph 2(d) of the General Provisions of the contract. Therefore, says defendant, plaintiff had the burden of clarifying this discrepancy, and having failed to do so, the government is under no obligation to pay for the fans.
Supplementing this argument, the goverment cites Paragraph 2(c) of the General Provisions of the contract, which states, "In case of difference between drawings and specifications, the specifications shall govern." Since the specifications called for fans "where shown," and the drawings showed fans, the government says it was not reasonable for plaintiff to rely on the notation subjecting the fans to an alternate bid, and that the specifications should govern.
The plaintiff says that in any event the contract documents were ambiguous. We agree. This ambiguity will be apparent in the following paragraphs of this opinion.
Thus, the parties have framed the two issues in this case, which must be answered consecutively. See L. Rosenman Corp. v. United States, 182 Ct.Cl. 586, 590, 390 F.2d 711, 713 (1968). The first issue is whether the discrepancy, omission or ambiguity was drastic, glaring or patent. Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 161 C.Cl. 1, 314 F.2d 501 (1963); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 323 F.2d 874 (1963). If this issue is answered in the negative, we must reach the second issue, whether plaintiff's interpretation of the ambiguous provisions was reasonable. WPC Enterprises, Inc., supra; Gorn Corporation v. United States, 191 Ct.Cl. ___, 424 F.2d 588 (April 1970).
Considering the first issue, there was in actuality a discrepancy on the face of this contract between the specifications, the drawings with the notation, and the list of alternates. Kitchen exhaust fans were to be installed "where shown," yet the notation on the drawings said fans were to be bid as an alternate. Then there was no alternate for a kitchen exhaust fan. But this is not the kind of "glaring" discrepancy that we have said must exist before a contractor is required to shoulder the burden of seeking clarification of the government's ambiguous specifications from a contracting officer. In Beacon Constr. Co., supra, we found that something was "gravely askew" with the contract papers. The discrepancy there was so manifest that this court charged the contractor with knowledge of it. Therefore, we held that, "If the bidder fails to resort to the remedy proffered by the Government, a patent and glaring discrepancy * * * should be taken against him * * *." Id. 161 Ct.Cl. at 7, 314 F.2d at 504.
But the court was careful to point out that not all ambiguities were to be held against the bidder, even in the presence of a clause in the Invitation for Bids such as the one presently before us, requiring the bidder to obtain clarification from the contracting...
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