Mountain States Div. No. 17 v. Mountain States T. & T. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 August 1948
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 2445.
• Citation: 81 F. Supp. 397
• Parties: MOUNTAIN STATES DIVISION NO. 17, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA v. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

81 F. Supp. 397

MOUNTAIN STATES DIVISION NO. 17, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA v. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.

Civ. No. 2445.

United States District Court D. Colorado.

August 16, 1948.

Dickerson, Morrissey & Zarlengo and Thomas J. Morrissey, all of Denver, Colo., and Everett E. Cotter, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.

Brock, Akolt & Campbell, John R. Turnquist and Thomas M. Tierney, all of Denver, Colo., for defendant.

SYMES, District Judge.

The plaintiff, a labor organization within the definition of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., represents employees of the defendant telephone company in Colorado, New Mexico, El Paso, Texas, Utah, Arizona and Idaho.

The complaint charges defendant with breach of three contracts attached to the complaint. These are so-called bargaining agreements between the plaintiff representing each of the workers in three different departments of the defendant, and Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company. One dated January 14, 1947 and two of them May 15, 1947, respectively provide for bargaining and grievance procedures, arbitration, pensions, disability and death benefits, termination allowances, provisions for payroll deductions of dues, which the defendant company agrees to deduct and pay the plaintiff upon receipt of written requests signed by the employees, and other matters usually covered by collective bargaining agreements.

It is alleged the contracts confer rights, privileges and benefits upon the plaintiff of such a nature that money damages for breach of the same would not afford adequate relief.

This plan has been in operation during the lifetime of the contracts. Plaintiff alleges that if the defendant is permitted to improperly terminate the contracts it will cripple the union by depriving it of revenue derived from the checkoff of dues.

It is further alleged that the plaintiff has not given notice of its desire to terminate either of said contracts, and that plaintiff has received no notice from the defendant of the latter's desire or intention to terminate such contracts in accordance with the terms thereof, or in compliance with the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.

It is then alleged the defendant on May 15, 1948, in violation of the terms of the contracts and of the notice requirements of the Act, supra, notified the plaintiff the contracts were terminated as of midnight, May 15, 1948 (Ex. 9).

Plaintiff alleges that this action on the part of the defendant will leave the relationship between plaintiff and defendant company and its employees subject to unilateral action on the part of either the plaintiff or defendant, contrary to provisions of law and the terms of said contracts, and will interfere with the normal flow of commerce. All contrary to the public policy of the United States as expressed in said Act, which if permitted to continue will deprive the employees of all their rights and privileges granted by said contracts, deny them the use of the ordinary grievance and arbitration procedures established by said contracts, nullify the recognition and collective bargaining procedures, deprive the plaintiff of the income from members' dues, and deny plaintiff and the employees of the defendant other rights and privileges provided for in said contracts, which plaintiff was obligated to perform in its relation with its employees.

The plaintiff then alleges it is sustaining irreparable injury, and unless injunctive relief is granted it will continue to sustain irreparable injury. That it has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, prays for an injunction directing the defendant to continue in full force and effect said contracts until the same are terminated according to the terms of said contracts, or in the manner provided by law.

Defendant, by answer, admits the making of said contracts; that plaintiff has received no notice from the defendant of its desire or intention to terminate the same. Alleges beginning February 18, 1948, there was correspondence between the parties — reference to which is made. That plaintiff orally requested defendant to communicate to the plaintiff in writing its position with respect to the termination of the contracts, to which defendant replied by letter dated May 15, 1948 (Ex. 9). Further, that no agreement was reached by May 15, 1948 to amend or modify the contracts.

Other defenses pleaded are: The complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court has no jurisdiction, plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, and has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.

Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction argued on June 11, 1948, was on the question of jurisdiction. The court held tentatively that Tit. III, "Suits by and against labor organizations", § 301 (a, b) of the Act, conferred jurisdiction on district courts. It was thereupon stipulated that the status quo would not be disturbed, and the matter was set down for June 30th for final argument on all questions involved. On that date the matter was fully argued and briefs have been filed.

Sec. 301(a) and (b) of Tit. III of the Act is as follows:

"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization * * * may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties".

"(b) Any such labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce, may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States".

Unfair labor practices are defined in § 8 and the issues made here do not come within the definition thereof. The defendant's contention is that when this section is read in connection with other sections of the Act — together with the Clayton, 38 Stat. 730, and Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U. S.C.A. § 101 et seq., Acts — district courts have no jurisdiction of a case such as this, and that any unfair labor practice as defined in the Act is subject to enforcement, or as

Sec. 10(a) provides: "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce".

An examination of the complaint discloses that there is no unfair labor practice or dispute alleged as that term is defined in § 8 of the Act. The issue made by the pleadings before us is simply one for the enforcement of a contract openly arrived at between the parties, which the defendant claims has been cancelled by plaintiff pursuant to its terms, but which the plaintiff claims is still in force. True its terms affect the relations between the defendant and employees, but there is nothing in the pleadings from which it can be said that an unfair labor practice is involved. According to the terms of the agreement — as well as the provisions of the Act § 8(d) (1) — either party had the right to terminate the contract upon 60 days' notice in writing. The correspondence attached to the answer, which the defendant relies upon as constituting notice of termination, may be summarized as follows:

On February 18, 1948 the plaintiff union addressed a communication to the telephone company in which it stated among other things: "the union desires a meeting with management beginning March 3, 1948 for the purpose of collective bargaining".

Also saying it was the union's desire to amend all agreements covering the units which it represents, and: "In addition we wish to consider amendments and modifications of the specific provisions as applied to the separate units; and to mutually explore present economic factors, including consideration of the general rise in the cost of living; as a basis for a wage increase for our members".

This was the first of a series of letters back and forth, concluded by a letter of May 15, 1948 by Mr. Morris, Vice-President of the telephone company, stating the Company considers "by virtue of the Union's written notices to the Company of its intention to amend and modify the existing contracts, that said contracts will terminate at midnight on May 15, 1948, unless, of course, agreement is reached prior to that time".

And, continuing: "The Company is willing to continue to bargain in an effort to reach agreement".

A close scrutiny of this correspondence indicates that neither party ever expressly denounced the contracts, or attempted, or intended to, exercise the 60 day option to cancel the same. On the contrary it indicates the parties were sparring back and forth. Reference is made to several informal discussions between the parties, which are not of record. The union in its letter of February 26, 1948, indicated several points they wanted to bargain on, such as: "the union feels that a meeting at the departmental levels of organization as you suggest, would be completely sterile of any constructive results, and that progress in this matter can only be made by preliminary discussion and a transfer of ideas between a union committee such as we have suggested, and a similar management committee with representatives of each department as members".

And, further: "In view of our membership's wishes as manifested by our present union structure, this seems to be the only logical method of reaching an agreement which might be used as a basis for negotiating any specific provisions as applied to the separate units".

In fact all the correspondence relates to a desire on the part of the union to negotiate (letter of February 26, 1948) "for the purpose of amending the current collective bargaining contract covering wages, hours and other conditions of employment, which would otherwise be automatically renewed beginning May 15, 1948".

In the defendant telephone company's letter of March 3, 1948, they refer to "the setting up of a negotiating committee to consider an overall contract embodying provisions common to each department, * * * we do not think that...