Mouratidis v. Ayala
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-CV-824 |
| Parties | LOUIS MOURATIDIS, Plaintiff, v. HECTOR AYALA, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Louis Mouratidis commenced this pro se civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights and asserting other federal and state law claims. (ECF No. 2.) Mouratidis was previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF No. 7.) For the following reasons, the court will dismiss some of Mouratidis's claims with prejudice and some without prejudice. Mouratidis will be granted leave to file an amended complaint.
Mouratidis's Complaint names as Defendants the following: individuals alleged to be associated with Hispanic Community Counseling Services (“HCCS”): Hector Ayala, Jesus Herrera, and Gerald A. Floreza; the following individuals alleged to be associated with Community Behavioral Health (“CBH”): Joan Erney and Chris Tjoa; and the following individuals associated with the Department of Behavioral Health & Intellectual Disability Services (“DBHIDS”): Denise Taylor Patterson, David T. Jones, Donna F. M. Bailey, Andrea L. Brooks, Nicole Commell, Groland Lamb, Jeffrey Orin, Sosunmolu Shoyinka, and Sandy Vasko. (ECF No. 2 at 8-9.) Mouratidis names the defendants in their “professional and official capacities.” (Id. at 9.) His claims are based upon care he received at HCCS in Philadelphia.
Mouratdis alleges that he has a history of mental health problems.[2] (Id. at 12-13.) He alleges that in 2012, he began receiving mental health outpatient services at HCCS. (Id.) Defendant Herrera is alleged to have performed the initial psychiatric intake in 2012, and allegedly prescribed clonazepam to Mouratidis as late as October 2019. (Id. at 16; ECF No. 2-1 at 25.) During this 7-year period, Mouratidis alleges that his medications successfully treated his mental health conditions. (ECF No. 2 at 13, 17.) In 2019, he came under the care of defendant Floreza, who allegedly told Mouratidis that he intended to alter his medication. (Id.) Mouratidis objected to the change. (Id. at 14.) He alleges that, since that time, his medication has been tapered and denied. (Id.)
Mouratidis makes no substantive factual allegations against the other named defendants.
Mouratidis alleges that defendants Herrera and Floreza violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they refused to continue prescribing clonazepam. He also alleges state law claims based on disability discrimination, malpractice, violations of the Outpatient Psychiatric Oversight Act, the Pennsylvania Prescription Monitoring Program, and claims for willful harm, criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, malice, and flagrant indifference. (Id. at 20.) As relief, he requests an award of compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 21-22.)[3]
The court previously granted Mouratidis leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF No. 7.) Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation,' ‘[the court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,' ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor,' and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.'” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Mouratidis is proceeding pro se, the court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
When allowing a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis the court must review the pleadings and dismiss the matter if it determines, inter alia, that the action fails to set forth a proper basis for this court's subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (); Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) ( that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) .
Mouratidis does not include any factual allegations as to the involvement of defendants Erney, Tjoa, Patterson, Jones, Bailey, Brooks, Connell, Lamb, Orin, Shoyinka, and Vasko in the events giving rise to his claims. Therefore, he does not state any plausible claims against them. Because the court cannot conclude that Mouratidis will not be able to state plausible claims against these defendants, Mouraditis will be granted leave to amend his claims against them.
Read liberally, the court understands Mouratidis to be asserting constitutional and state law claims against the defendants because Drs. Floreza and Herrera would not continue to prescribe clonazepam to treat Mouratidis's explosive personality disorder. The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is Section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, which provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Additionally, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Mouratidis does not allege that defendants Herrera or Floreza are state actors. Whether an individual is acting under color of state law - i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor -depends on whether there is “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “To answer that question, [the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). Because Mouratidis has failed to allege that the defendants Herrera or Floreza are state actors, or may be treated as state actors under Kach, his § 1983 claims must be dismissed. Because the court cannot state that Mouratidis can never state a plausible §1983 claim, he will be permitted to amend this claim.
42 U.S.C § 1981. ‘“To establish a claim under § 1981, the plaintiff must allege (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.).'” White v. Wireman, Civ. A. No. 16-675, 2018 WL 1278588, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2018), report and recommendation...
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