Mouser v. Haulmark Trailers

• Decision Date: 11 April 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-249
• Parties: TRICIA LYNN MOUSER, Plaintiff, v. HAULMARK TRAILERS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

TRICIA LYNN MOUSER, Plaintiff, v. HAULMARK TRAILERS, Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-249

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

April 11, 2022

HON ROBERT J. JONKER JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SALLY J. BERENS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Tricia Lynn Mouser filed this action on March 17, 2022 against her former employer, Haulmark Trailers, for personal injury, wrongful termination because of personal injury medical neglect, and gross negligence “needing exemplification.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.1.) Having granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed as a pauper, I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based on this review, I conclude that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured at work due to Defendant's negligence. According to her allegations, the injury occurred on August 5, 2020, when steel walls in Defendant's weld shop located in Bristol, Indiana, fell on her, rendering her unconscious for a period of time. Although Plaintiff's head, back, neck, hips, and leg hurt, and she had other injuries, she was able to hobble to the bathroom to assess her condition. When she exited the bathroom, the General Manager told her that she could go back to work. (Id. at PageID.4-5.) Later that day, a supervisor gave her an incident report to complete. Plaintiff asked him where she should go for emergency services. The supervisor said he would ask but never got back to her. Plaintiff alleges that each day over the next four workdays she asked where to go for emergency services, but Defendant never provided that information. Plaintiff eventually went to the Three Rivers Emergency Room on August 14, 2020. (Id. at PageID.5-6.) Plaintiff called the office at work on August 17 and 18, 2020, leaving messages both days that she was unable to work due to the injuries she sustained on August 5, 2020. Plaintiff asked for a call back on both days but never heard anything from Defendant. Defendant terminated Plaintiff on August 18 under its three-day no-call-no-show policy. Plaintiff claims that she was terminated due to her injury. (Id. at PageID.6-7.) Defendant rehired Plaintiff in October 2020 but eventually discharged her in February 2021. (Id. at PageID.7.)

Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim with the Indiana Workers' Compensation Commission in August 2020 and eventually retained an attorney to represent her in that action. From October 2020 through January 2022, Plaintiff was examined and treated by various medical providers, apparently both her own and providers employed or retained by Defendant's workers' compensation insurance carrier, who diagnosed multiple impairments, including cervical and lumbar spine stenosis, posterior disc bulging, and disc height loss. (Id. at PageID.10-20.) In February 2021, Plaintiff was given permanent work restrictions for seated work only. Plaintiff alleges that the restrictions included “lies and withholding of injuries to dismiss Plaintiff because of a personal bias, and/or to minimize financial impact to the workers compensation program.” (Id. at PageID.12; ECF No. 1-3 at PageID.66.) Plaintiff submitted the restrictions to Defendant to determine whether it had any positions available for Plaintiff within her restrictions. Defendant's human resources representative told Plaintiff that no sit-down jobs were currently available. She told Plaintiff that she would check with Defendant's other plants and get back with Plaintiff if a sit-down job was available, but Plaintiff never heard back from her. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.13; ECF No. 1-3 at PageID.99.)

After several months, Plaintiff became frustrated with her attorney's representation in the workers' compensation action, and their relationship deteriorated. Plaintiff's attorney withdrew in August 2021. Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability benefits in November 2021. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.18-19.) A pretrial conference in the workers' compensation action is currently scheduled for May 3, 2022.

II. Discussion

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged- but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).

A. Federal Claims

Plaintiff alleges that she “was injured at work due to negligence of the defendant Haulmark, ” and is being deprived of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2-3.)

First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant is a state actor. Indeed, it is a private company that is not subject to liability under Section 1983 for violations of the federal constitution.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the ADA. The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as to employment matters such as hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation, and training. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A failure to make a reasonable accommodation also constitutes disability discrimination. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Although Plaintiff refers to the ADA in her complaint, she fails to allege any fact supporting such a claim. For example, she does not allege that she is disabled under the ADA, which defines disability as “ (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . .; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). But even if Plaintiff had alleged a disability as defined by the ADA, she alleges no fact indicating that disability played any part in Defendant's actions. Instead, she alleges that Defendant terminated her employment “because she was injured, seeking emergency medical treatment.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3.) Plaintiff also does not allege that she made a request for a reasonable accommodation, which Defendant denied. Although Plaintiff does allege that that she was medically restricted to sit-down work in February 2021, and she asked Defendant whether it had any sit-down jobs available, she admits that Defendant's human resources representative told her that no such jobs were available. Thus, even assuming that this was a request for a reasonable accommodation- which Plaintiff does not actually allege-the accommodation was not reasonable as Defendant had no sit-down jobs available. See Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 869 (6th Cir. 2007) (the ADA does not require an employer to create a new job or displace existing employees from their positions in order to accommodate an employee's disability).

Plaintiff also alleges that she “believes . . . that she is being retaliated against and deprived of rights under Chapter 126 of U.S. Code 42 § 12117(a).” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3.) Section 12117(a) pertains to remedies under the ADA. To the extent Plaintiff asserts an ADA retaliation claim, which is authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 12203, that claim also fails. To establish a...