Moutal v. Exel, Inc., 3:17-cv-01444-HZ
| Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:17-cv-01444-HZ,3:17-cv-01444-HZ |
| Parties | ERIC MOUTAL and ANDREA NEWMAN, Plaintiffs, v. EXEL, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiffs Andrea Newman and Eric Moutal brought this negligence claim against Defendant Exel, Inc. Currently before the Court are Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [153] and Motion for New Trial or Remittitur [152]. The Court DENIES Defendant's motions.
Plaintiffs are Canadian citizens who were vacationing in the Columbia River Gorge near Hood River, Oregon in the summer of 2016. Defendant provides trucking services throughout the United States, including Oregon. On August 3, 2016, Plaintiffs were bicycling along Interstate 84 when Defendant's employee, Terry Tisdale, ran into Plaintiffs with his semi-truck.
The case proceeded to a five-day jury trial beginning on December 9, 2019. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs, awarding Newman $400,000 in noneconomic damages, and Moutal $1,258,893.75 in economic damages, $4 million in noneconomic damages, and $4 million in punitive damages. Defendant now moves for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur on the punitive damages awarded to Moutal.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 50(b), a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law ("RJMOL") should be granted "'if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.'" Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Supreme Court has set forth the following standard for a court to apply when a losing party moves to set aside a jury verdict:
[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, thecourt should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 US 133, 150-51 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because a RJMOL is a renewed motion, a party cannot "raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its preverdict Rule 50(a) motion." E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Where "a clear and convincing standard applies, the court . . . inquires 'whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.'" Pirv v. Glock, Inc., No. CV 06-145 PK, 2010 WL 11579455, at *14 (D. Or. July 19, 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Under Oregon law, "[e]vidence is clear and convincing when 'the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.'" Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1130 (D. Or. 2000) (quoting In re Conduct of Blaylock, 328 Or. 409, 411 (1999)).
The court may grant a motion for new trial "on some or all of the issues" after a jury trial, "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). "Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims 'that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.'" Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940)). A court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence and may not grant a new trial simply because the court would have arrived at adifferent verdict. DSPT Int'l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010); Silver Sage Partners Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001).
A "motion for remittitur of a jury verdict is subject to the same standard as a motion for new trial under [Rule] 59." Morris v. Walgreen Oshkosh, Inc., Case No. 3:14-cv-01718-ST, 2016 WL 1704320, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 18, 2016); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989) (). The district court may, in its discretion, "grant the motion and order a new trial on damages[,] deny the motion[,] or grant a remittitur with the alternative of a new trial if the remittitur is not complied with." Minthorne v. Seeburg Corp., 397 F.2d 237, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1968). If the court decides to offer the option of remittitur, the jury's verdict should be reduced to the "maximum amount sustainable by the proof," so as to ensure that the court's judgment is not substituted for that of the jury. D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982). "If the prevailing party does not consent to the reduced amount, a new trial must be granted." Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983). On the other hand, "[i]f the prevailing party accepts the remittitur, judgment must be entered in the lesser amount." Id.
The Court declines to address Defendant's RJMOL to the extent it challenges the admissibility of the evidence related to Tisdale's post-accident conduct. In its motion, Defendant argued that Tisdale's post-accident conduct "should not have been . . . allowed before the jury" and "[t]he post-accident conduct improperly factored into the jury's decision to award punitive damages." Def. RJMOL 17, ECF 153. Despite challenging the admissibility of the evidence in itsmotion, Defendant now claims it "does not dispute whether the post-accident conduct should have been admitted and considered by the jury"; instead, Defendant contends it has "consistently assert[ed] the post-accident evidence simply is insufficient to support punitive damages as a matter of law." Def. Reply RJMOL 23, ECF 160.
Although Defendant concedes that it is not challenging the admissibility of Tisdale's post-accident conduct in its RJMOL, the Court notes that "a party cannot properly raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its preverdict Rule 50(a) motion." Go Daddy Software, 581 F.3d at 961. Defendant's Rule 50(a) motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, not its admissibility. See Def. Mot., ECF 122. Thus, even if Defendant had not conceded the challenge, it waived the argument by not raising it in its preverdict motion.
In addition, the Court rejects Defendant's argument—presented for the first time in its reply briefs—that it cannot be held liable for punitive damages absent evidence of individual fault on its part. To the extent Defendant asserts that it is entitled to a directed verdict on this basis, it waived that argument by not bringing it in its Rule 50(a) motion. Go Daddy Software, 581 F.3d at 961. As to Defendant's argument that it is entitled to a new trial for this reason, Defendant has also waived that argument because the Court does not consider new arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. In re Rains, 428 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir. 2005). And even assuming the argument was properly before this Court, the Oregon Supreme Court has squarely rejected it: "If the servant has committed a tort within the scope of his employment so as to render the corporation liable for compensatory damages, and if the servant's act is such as to render him liable for punitive damages, then the corporation is likewise liable for punitive damages." Johannesen v. Salem Hosp., 336 Or. 211, 219 (2003) (quoting Stroud v. Denny'sRest., Inc., 271 Or. 430, 435 (1975)). Because Tisdale was acting within the scope of his employment when he struck Plaintiffs with his semi-truck, it was not clear error for the jury to assess punitive damages against Defendant for the tortious conduct of its employee.
Defendant re-moves for judgment as a matter of law on the jury's award of $4 million in punitive damages to Moutal. The crux of Defendant's argument is that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find Tisdale acted with the requisite culpability when he struck and severely injured Moutal with his semi-truck. Def. JMOL 2 (). Under Oregon law:
Punitive damages are not recoverable in a civil action unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages are sought has . . . shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others.
Or. Rev. Stat. § ("O.R.S.") 31.730.
Defendant argues that even accepting the totality of Moutal's evidence as true and construing all inferences in his favor, Moutal...
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