Moutray v. People ex rel. Morris

• Decision Date: 12 June 1896
• Citation: 44 N.E. 496,162 Ill. 194
• Parties: MOUTRAY et al. v. PEOPLE ex rel. MORRIS, State's Attorney.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

162 Ill. 194

44 N.E. 496

MOUTRAY et al.

v.PEOPLE ex rel. MORRIS, State's Attorney.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 12, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Richland county; S. Z. Landes, Judge.

Proceeding in the nature of an information by the state's attorney of Richland county, on the relation of a number of attorneys at law practicing at the bar of the circuit court of such county, charging Jasper I. Moutray and Mark O. Moutray, practincing attorneys, with changing and altering a certain bill of exceptions after it had been signed by the judge and filed, and asking that they be suspended from the practice of law in such court. From a judgment suspending defendants for a specified time, they appeal. Reversed.

R. P. Hanna and J. C. Allen, for appellants.

H. G. Morris, State's Atty., John Lynch, Jr., R. B. Witcher, and T. W. Hutchinson, for appellee.

BAKER, J.

This was a proceeding in the nature of an information instituted in the circuit court of Richland county by the state's attorney of said county upon the relation of a number of attorneys at law practicing at the bar of said court against Jasper I. Moutray and Mark O. Moutray, also practicing attorneys, charging them with changing and altering a certain bill of exceptions after the same had been signed by the presiding judge and filed in said court. The information was entitled as of said Richland circuit court, and in its introductory part it named said Jasper I. Moutray and said Mark O. Moutray as respondents, and asked ‘that they each be suspended from the practice of law in this court.’ It then made a specific statement of the facts relied on ‘for the suspension of said Jasper I. Moutray and Mark O. Moutray from the practice of law in this court,’ and concluded as follows: ‘By means whereof your relator represents unto you that a fraud and a forgery has been practiced upon the clerk of this court by the said firm of Moutray & Moutray, attorneys at law, being the said Jasper I. Moutray and Mark O. Moutray, and they, and each of them, have thereby been guilty of malconduct in their office as such attorneys, and should be suspended from the practice of law in this court; and your relator asks upon the consideration of this information your honor will suspend the said Jasper I. Moutray and Mark O. Moutray from the practice of law in this court, and render such judgment in the premises in addition thereto as the gravity of the case may require, and to this honorable court shall seem meet.’ A motion was made by the respondents to quash the information for the reason it did not state it was prosecuted in the name and by the authority of the people of the state of Illinois, and did not charge that the malconduct charged was against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of Illinois. The motion was overruled, and an exception taken. Thereafter a plea or answer was filed in response to a rule, and the cause was tried before the court upon the issues formed. The judgment and order of the court was that the defendants ‘be, and they are hereby, suspended as attorneys and counsellors at law, from the practice of their professions in this the Second judicial circuit of the state of Illinois from and after the 30th day of November, 1895, to the 16th day of June, 1897,’ and that they pay costs. The record was then brought to this court by appeal, and various assignments of error made.

We think there was no error in overruling the motion to quash. The statute (chapter 13, § 6) provides that the justices of this court shall have power, at their discretion, to strike the name of any attorney or counsellor at law from the roll for malconduct in his office, and that any judge of a circuit court or of the superior court of Cook county shall, for like cause, have power to suspend any attorney or counsellor at law from practice in the court over which he presides, during such time as he may deem proper, subject to the right to have such order set aside by this court upon appeal. The statute does not prescribe the mode in which either of these powers shall be enforced. Rule 50 of this court (41 N. E. x.) provides that, in case an application shall be made to strike the name of an attorney from the rolls, there shall be filed an information signed by the attorney general or some state's attorney, and when the information shall be deemed sufficient the court will enter a rule to show cause. It does not appear that any similar or other rule of court having reference to a proceeding for the suspension of an attorney from practice is in force in either the Richland circuit court of in the Second judicial circuit. It is the manifest intent of the statute that the proceeding to suspend from practice shall be summary, and it would seem any appropriate procedure may be adopted, provided the charges are stated with sufficient particularity, and reasonable notice is given, and opportunity afforded the respondent to produce his testimony and make his defense. Even in the absence of a statute, the courts have an inherent and summary jurisdiction over the attorneys practicing at their bars, and may strike them from the rolls, or suspend them from practice, for professional misconduct. 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 944, and authorities there cited. And the usual English and American practice is that, upon the filing of specific charges, properly verified by affidavit, the court will issue a rule upon the attorney, requiring him to show cause why he should not be stricken from the roll, or suspended from practice, as the case may be. Weeks, Attys, § 83. In Winkelman v. People, 50 Ill. 449, the circuit court, on information by a member of the bar, entered a rule against the appellant to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice as an attorney of that court. In People v. Harvey, 41 Ill. 277, the proceeding was commenced by filing an affidavit, and on the...