Moweaqua Coal Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 17 April 1935
• Docket Number: No. 22395.,22395.
• Citation: 360 Ill. 194,195 N.E. 607
• Parties: MOWEAQUA COAL CORPORATION v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

360 Ill. 194

195 N.E. 607

MOWEAQUA COAL CORPORATION

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 22395.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 17, 1935.

Error to Circuit Court, Shelby County; F. R. Dove, Judge.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary Ondes for the death of her husband, George Ondes, claimant, opposed by the Moweaqua Coal Corporation, employer. Judgment setting aside award made by the Industrial Commission and making new award on different basis, and claimant brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

HERRICK, J., dissenting.George W. Dowell, of Du Quoin, Leal W. Reese, of Taylorville, Oral P. Tuttle, of Harrisburg, D. W. Johnston, of Taylorville, C. C. Dreman, of Belleville, and Nobel Y. Dowell, of East Peoria, for plaintiff in error.

Thomas P. Sinnett, of Rock Island, and W. C. Ropiequet, of East St. Louis, for defendant in error.

Will R. Kee, of West Frankfort, and Lan Haney, of Marion (Daniel D. Carmell, of Chicago, of counsel), amici curiae.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is here on writ of error to review the judgment of the circuit court of Sheiby county setting aside an award of the Industrial Commission and entering an award upon the record. The facts are not disputed. The only question presented is as to the proper amount to be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

George Ondes on December 24, 1932, while in the course of his employment in defendant in error's coal mine, was killed by an explosion. He left him surviving a widow and children, two of whom were under the age of sixteen years at the time of his death. On the application of his widow for compensation the arbitrator awarded as such compensation $4,800, payable at the rate of $12 per week for 400 weeks. This award was confirmed by the Industrial Commission. On certiorari the circuit court set aside the award and awarded the sum of $4,040, payable at $12 per week for 336 2/3 weeks. The earnings of Ondes during the year next preceding his death were $1,010. Plaintiff in error contends that under subparagraph (h) 3 of section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act [Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 48, § 144, subd. (h) 3] she is entitled to $4,800.

Section 7 of the act, so far as necessary to be considered here, is as follows:

Ԥ 7. The amount of compensation which shall be paid for an injury to the employee resulting in death shall be:

‘(a) If the employee leaves any widow, child or children whom he was under legal obligation to support at the time of his injury, a sum equal to four times the average annual earnings of the employee, but not less in any event than two thousand five hundred dollars and not more in any event than four thousand dollars. * * *

‘(h) 1. Whenever in paragraph (a) of this section a minimum of two thousand five hundred dollars is provided, such minimum shall be increased in the following cases to the following amounts:

‘Three thousand dollars in case of one child under the age of 16 years at the time of the death of the employee.

‘There thousand one hundred dollars in case of two children under the age of 16 years at the time of the death of the employee.

‘Three thousand two hundred dollars in case of three or more children under the age of 16 years at the time of the death of the employee.

‘2. Whenever four times the average annual earnings of the deceased employee as provided in paragraph (a) of this section amounts to more than two thousand five hundred dollars and to less than four thousand dollars, the amount so payable under said paragraph shall be increased as follows:

‘In case such employee left surviving him one child under the age of sixteen years the amount so payable shall be increased three hundred fifty dollars.

‘In case such employee left surviving him two children under the age of sixteen years the amount so payable shall be increased four hundred fifty dollars.

‘In case such employee left surviving him three or more children under the age of sixteen years the amount so payable shall be increased six hundred dollars.

‘3. Whenever in paragraph (a) of this section a maximum of four thousand dollars is provided, such maximum shall be increased in the following cases to the following amounts:

‘Four thousand four hundred fifty dollars in case of one child under the age of sixteen years at the time of the death of the employee.

‘Four thousand eight hundred dollars in case of two children under the age of sixteen years at the time of the death of the employee.

‘Five thousand five hundred dollars in case of three or more children under the age of sixteen years at the time of the death of the employee.’ Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 48, § 144, subds. (a), (h), Cahill's Rev. St. 1931, c. 48, par. 207, subds. (a) and (h), pp. 1406, 1407.

Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of paragraph (h) of section 7 were added to the act by an amendment of May 31, 1917, as (h) 1 and (h) 2. Laws 1917, p. 494. Subparagraph 2 of paragraph (h) was added to the act by amendment of July 2, 1927. Laws 1927, p. 502. By this amendment original subparagraphs (h) 1 and (h) 2 were re-enacted except as to maximum and minimum amounts, and (h) 2 became (h) 3. In 1931, subparagraphs (h) 1 and (h) 3 were again amended by increasing the maximum and minimum, but without further change. Laws 1931, pp. 580, 581. It is conceded by counsel on both sides that paragraph (a) of section 7 is modified by subparagraphs (h) 1, (h) 2, and (h) 3 of that section.

Prior to the amendment of 1917 the Workmen's Compensation Act made no provision for increase in awards in death cases because of children under the age of sixteen years. Subparagraphs (h) 1 and (h) 3, as enacted in 1917, and as re-enacted since, provide only for increasing the minimum and maximum, respectively, of awards, over the minimum and maximum fixed by paragraph (a) of section 7. Subparagraph (h) 2, as enacted in 1927 and as amended since, provides a specific amount of compensation in the cases therein fixed in addition to ‘the amount so payable’ derived from computing four times the average annual income. Subparagraphs (h) 1 and (h) 3 have at no time contained a provision for the addition of any specific amount to the award provided in paragraph (a), but have, and have had, to do only with an increase of ‘such minimum’ and ‘such maximum.’ Before the addition of subparagraph (h) 2 in 1927, there was nowhere in section 7 a provision for the addition of any specified sum to the award as determined under paragraph (a) of section 7. While subparagraph (h) 2 was amended in 1929 (Laws 1929, p. 446), by increasing the amount to be added to the award and by adding a clause, it in no way deals with or changes the maximum or minimum fixed in paragraph (a), but has at all times dealt only with specific amounts to be added to a sum four times the average annual earnings of the deceased employee where such sum falls between the minimum and maximum prescribed in paragraph (a). It is thus clear that the subject-matter of subparagraph (h) 2 is not the same as that dealt with in subparagraphs (h) 1 and (h) 3.

Plaintiff in error contends that whenever four times the average earnings of a deceased employee on account of whose injury and death a liability is incurred amounts to or exceeds the maximum of $4,000 stated in paragraph (a), the award provided by subparagraph (h) 3 is $4,800 if such employee left a widow and two children under the age of sixteen years. Defendant in error on the other hand contends that the award provided by subparagraph (h) 3 under such circumstances is four times the average annual earnings, but in no event more than $4,800. Its counsel argue that the word ‘maximum’ as used in subparagraph (h) 3 must be given its ordinary meaning, which, they say, is the ‘highest amount obtainable.’ Plaintiff in error's counsel argue that while the word ‘maximum’ means the highest amount obtainable, it is to be construed here as meaning the highest amount obtainable where there are no children under sixteen years of age.

It is a long recognized and frequently announced canon of construction that unambiguous words in a statute are to be construed in accordance with their ordinary use and meaning, or when they have a well-settled meaning through judicial interpretation such meaning is to be adopted when those words are used in a statute. Trustees of Schools v. Berryman, 325 Ill. 72, 155 N. E. 850;In re Manaca, 146 Mich. 697, 110 N. W. 75;Poolman v. Langdon, 94 Wash. 448, 162 P. 578. As was said by this court in Murrell v. Industrial Com., 291 Ill. 334, 126 N. E. 189, 190: ‘The words of a statute will be construed in their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them under such construction unless such construction will defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature. When the words have a well-settled meaning through judicial interpretation, they must be understood, when used in a statute, to have that meaning unless a different meaning is unmistakably indicated.’ So in People v. Patten, 338 Ill. 385, 170 N. E. 280, 282, it was said: ‘The intention of the Legislature is manifested by, and must be ascertained from, what it has said in the act construed, and not from somethingthe court might surmise the Legislature might have intended to say but which it for some reason failed to say.’ When the meaning of the language of a statute is plain, courts are not privileged to attribute to it a different construction though they may be of the opinion that the language was unwise or seriously impairs the act as a whole. People v. J. O. Beekman & Co., 347 Ill. 92, 179 N. E. 435;Downs v. Curry, 296 Ill. 277, 129 N. E. 761. It is likewise a rule of construction that when words appear more than once in a statute it will be presumed that the General Assembly intended to attribute to them the same meaning throughout, unless there is something to show that a different meaning was intended. Board of Education v. Morgan, 316 Ill. 143, 147 N. E. 34. It is also the rule that a primary purpose in construing a statute...