Mowery v. Berryhill, Civil No. 4:17-CV-02149
| Decision Date | 03 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 4:17-CV-02149 |
| Parties | SUSAN MOWERY, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
In this case we are called upon to determine whether substantial evidence supported the findings of an Administrative Law Judge, (ALJ) that the plaintiff, Susan Mowery, who was employed part-time during the period of her claimed disability, could work full-time at the type of work she was performing on a part-time basis.
For Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), evaluating cases like Mowery's, Social Security disability determinations frequently entail an informed assessment of competing medical opinions coupled with an evaluation of a claimant's subjective complaints. Once the ALJ completes this task, on appeal it is the duty and responsibility of the district court to review these ALJ findings, judging the findings against a deferential standard of review which simply asks whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012), a quantum of proof which "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
In the instant case, an ALJ denied Susan Mowery's application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits, based on her determination that Mowery was not disabled and could perform light work, including her past work. Mindful of the fact that substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings in this case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we will recommend that this court affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying this claim.
Susan Mowery was 59 years old at the time of her alleged amended onset date of October 16, 2014. (Doc. 11, at 2). She has a high school education and has worked as a manager at a fast food restaurant, a sales clerk, a laborer and a cashier. (Id.) In fact, through the date of the administrative hearing, Mowery was actually working 20 hours per week at Burger King as a shift supervisor. (Tr. 46, 52). Mowery applied for disability benefits on September 2, 2014, alleging that she was disabled due to her shoulder pain, high blood pressure, and depression. (Tr. 96).
In September 2014, Mowery was seen for an orthopedic evaluation by Dr. Baublitz, D.O., which revealed that she had a retracted rotator cuff tear with early rotator cuff arthropathy. (Tr. 427). Subsequently, in October, she underwent surgery to repair her right shoulder, and started physical therapy thereafter. (Tr. 432,482). Mowery's shoulder pain continued, however, as she complained of shoulder pain when she was seen for a consultative examination by Dr. Yang, M.D., in January 2015. (Tr. 447). Dr. Yang found mildly decreased range of motion in the right shoulder and surmised that Mowery could lift and carry 10 pounds frequently, and up to 20 pounds occasionally. (Tr. 449, 451). In April 2016, Mowery went to Ephrata Community Hospital for clavicle and shoulder pain, as well as fatigue. (Tr. 682).
Mowery also complained of knee pain when she saw Dr. Folk, D.O., in October 2014. (Tr. 429). Dr. Folk observed that Mowery spent all day on her feet as a cook at Burger King, and that she was walking with crutches. (Id.) He noted a large round mass on her knee, and that she could not put full weight on it. (Id.) Dr. Folk set up an appointment for Mowery with an orthopedist. (Id.) An MRI in December showed extensive osteoarthritic changes of the patellofemoral articulation, medial compartment osteoarthritic changes, a tear involving the posterior meniscus, and a medial popliteal fossa cyst. (Tr. 490).
Mowery also complained of knee pain to Dr. Yang in his internal medicine evaluation on January 7, 2016. (Tr. 447). Dr. Yang opined that Mowery could sit, stand and walk each for 8 hours total in an 8-hour workday, that she could frequently climb stairs and ramps, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, and that she could perform activities such as shopping, travelling, walking a block, and walking up steps. (Tr. 452-56). Mowery had surgery to repair her knee on January 8. (Tr. 509-10). In February, Mowery saw Dr. Baublitz, who noted that she had anterior knee pain, and that they were going to continue and at-home exercise routine. (Tr. 547). He also noted that her shoulder continued to progress. (Id.)
In addition to her physical ailments, Mowery had a history of depression that was controlled with medication, and in April 2016, was diagnosed with moderate depression. (Tr. 549, 699).
It is against this factual backdrop that the ALJ conducted a hearing on November 15, 2016. (Tr. 28-92). Both the plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. (Id.) In a decision dated March 6, 2017, the ALJ denied Mowery's claim for benefits. (Tr. 12). The ALJ first found that Mowery met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2020. (Tr. 17). The ALJ found that there was at least a one-year period in which Mowery did not engage in substantial gainful activity since the alleged amended onset date of October 16, 2014. (Id.) At Step 2 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Mowery had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the right shoulder status-post right rotator cuff repair, degenerative joint disease of the right knee status-post excision of Baker's cyst, degenerative joint disease of the left knee, and obesity. (Tr. 18).
The ALJ also determined that the plaintiff's depression was a nonsevere impairment. (Id.) The ALJ found that the plaintiff had no more than a mild limitation in the following areas: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. (Id.) Further, the ALJ noted that Mowery's primary care treatment records consistently showed that her depression was controlled with medication. (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ found that none of theplaintiff's impairments met or medically equaled the severity of the listed impairments. (Id.)
Before proceeding to Step 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functioning capacity ("RFC"). The ALJ determined that Mowery could perform light work as follows:
[T]he claimant can lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can sit, stand, or walk for a total of eight hours each in an eight-hour workday; is limited to frequent reaching in all directions with the right (dominant) upper extremity; can frequently crouch, kneel, stoop, climb ramps/stairs, or crawl; and can tolerate frequent exposure to moving mechanical parts or unprotected heights.
(Tr. 19).
In making this determination, the ALJ relied on the claimant's reported symptoms to the extent they were consistent with the objective medical evidence of record. (Id.) The ALJ considered the claimant's medical records as a whole and gave substantial weight to the opinion of Dr. Yang, an internal medicine specialist. (Tr. 20-21). The ALJ noted that Dr. Yang's opinion was generally consistent with the whole record and was based on his own documented objective clinical observations. (Tr. 21). Further, the ALJ concluded that Mowery's statements of her symptoms, concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms, were not entirely consistent with the objective medical evidence. (Tr. 19).
On this score, the ALJ concluded at Step 4 that Mowery was capable of performing her past work as a cashier, sales clerk, and fast food manager. (Tr. 21). The ALJ based this determination on the evidence of record, as well as the testimony of the VE and the plaintiff's work history report and earnings record. (Id.) It was determined that the plaintiff's past work as a fast food manager, sales clerk, and cashier required only a light exertional level, and that the plaintiff could perform the cashier job as generally performed in the national economy and as actually performed by the plaintiff, and the manager and sales clerk jobs as generally performed. (Tr. 22). Thus, the ALJ ultimately concluded that Mowery was not disabled and was not entitled to benefits. (Id.) This appeal followed. (Doc. 1).
On appeal, Mowery contends that the ALJ's determination that she could perform light work is not supported by substantial evidence. She argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the plaintiff's obesity and did not account for the plaintiff's depression. Moreover, she avers that the ALJ erred when she failed to ask the VE specific questions regarding the consistency of the expert's testimony with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). Mowery also asserts that the ALJ erred in her RFC determination. Lastly, Mowery claims that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints.
For the reasons set forth below, under the deferential standard which applies to review of ALJ disability determinations, we find that substantial evidence in the record supported each of the adverse rulings made by the ALJ which Mowery now challenges on appeal. We further find that the ALJ's decision sufficiently articulates the factual underpinnings of these determinations in a way which permits meaningful judicial review of this decision. Therefore, we will recommend that the court affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
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