Moxley v. Neven

• Decision Date: 20 September 2011
• Docket Number: 2:07-cv-01123-RLH-GWF
• Parties: JOHN TOLE MOXLEY, Petitioner, v. DWIGHT NEVEN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

JOHN TOLE MOXLEY, Petitioner,

v.DWIGHT NEVEN, et al., Respondents.

2:07-cv-01123-RLH-GWF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DATED: September 20, 2011

ORDER

This represented habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 comes before the Court for a final decision on the claims remaining. Petitioner John Tole Moxley seeks to set aside his 2004 Nevada state conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of possession of a stolen vehicle and his adjudication as a habitual criminal. All grounds other than Grounds 1(A), 2 and 5 have been dismissed.

Standard of Review on the Merits

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a "highly deferential" standard for evaluating state-court rulings that is "difficult to meet" and "which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Under this highly deferential standard of review, a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely because it might conclude that the state court decision was incorrect. 131 S.Ct. at 1411. Instead, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court may grant relief only if the state court decision: (1) was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court based on the record presented to the state courts; or (2) was based on an unreasonabledetermination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 131 S.Ct. at 1398-1401.

A state court decision is "contrary to" law clearly established by the Supreme Court only if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court case law or if the decision confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different result. E.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 10, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003). A state court decision is not contrary to established federal law merely because it does not cite the Supreme Court's opinions. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state court need not even be aware of its precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of its decision contradicts them. Id. Moreover, "[a] federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." 540 U.S. at 16, 124 S.Ct. at 11. For, at bottom, a decision that does not conflict with the reasoning or holdings of Supreme Court precedent is not contrary to clearly established federal law.

A state court decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if it is demonstrated that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case was not only incorrect but "objectively unreasonable." E.g., Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18, 124 S.Ct. at 12; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).

To the extent that the state court's factual findings are challenged, the "unreasonable determination of fact" clause of Section 2254(d)(2) controls on federal habeas review. E.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). This clause requires that the federal courts "must be particularly deferential" to state court factual determinations. Id. The governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that the state court finding was "clearly erroneous." 393 F.3d at 973. Rather, AEDPA requires substantially more deference:

. . . . [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appealfrom a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.

Discussion

Ground 1(A)

In Ground 1(A), petitioner alleges that he was denied due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew or had reason to know that the vehicle was stolen.

The Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the claim presented on direct appeal on the following grounds, in which it summarized the trial evidence against petitioner:

Determining the weight and credibility of testimony is a question for the jury. The jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal when substantial evidence supports the verdict. "The question for the reviewing court is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" "This court is not a fact-finding tribunal; that function is best performed by the district court. We also note that circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction. "[A]lthough mere presence cannot support an inference that one is a party to an offense, presence together with other circumstances may do so."

Our review of the record on appeal reveals sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact. In particular, we note that on November 12, 2002, a neighbor, Melissa Bifulco, witnessed a man driving a white compact vehicle into the backyard of 1693 Eddingham, Las Vegas, Nevada. Bifulco testified that she was familiar with appellant and recognized him. Appellant stipulated to the witness's identification in court. As Bifulco watched through her upstairs window, appellant took the license plate off the vehicle, unloaded items from the vehicle, and transferred the items inside the house. Later, items recovered from inside the house included the passport and identification of the individualwho owned the car.[FN8] Ms. Bifulco called 911, reporting the suspicious activities and expressing concern because she had not seen the owner of the house, Steven Such, for several days.

[FN8] On November 10, 2002, two days before appellant was arrested for the present conviction, Amir Lagstein was robbed at gunpoint in his home by a man wearing a black ski mask. In addition to other personal items, the gunman stole Lagstein's white 1991 Mitsubishi Eclipse. Lagstein could not identify the gunman.

Officer Thomas Stoll responded to the call, and looking through the open gate, could see a white, compact car missing license plates. Officer Stoll entered the backyard, checked the VIN number of the car and discovered that the car had been reported stolen. Officer Stoll testified that it appeared that someone had left in a hurry. The water hose was left running, music was left playing, and the sliding glass door to the house was left open. Officer Stoll approached the sliding glass door of the house to check on the welfare of Such. Such, was found sleeping inside and consented to a search. During the search of the property, officers found appellant hiding behind boxes in the rafters of the garage. Based on the above, we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that appellant knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle was stolen.

#35, Ex. 40, at 2-4 (emphasis in original)(citation footnotes omitted).

Petitioner has not disputed the state supreme court's summary of the trial evidence in its decision on direct appeal with a showing of clear and convincing evidence in the state court record to the contrary. The state high court's summary thus is presumed to be correct. See,e.g., Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 563 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

The state supreme court's rejection of petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the foregoing facts was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the habeas petitioner faces a "considerable hurdle." Davis v. Woodford, 333 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the jury's verdict must stand if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Davis, 333 F.3d at 992. Accordingly, the reviewingcourt, when faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences, must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution, even if the resolution by the state court trier of fact of specific conflicts does not affirmatively appear in the record. Id. The Jackson standard is applied with reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. E.g., Davis, 333 F.3d at 992. When the deferential standards of the AEDPA and Jackson are applied together, the question for decision on federal habeas review thus becomes one of whether the state supreme court's decision unreasonably applied the Jackson standard to the evidence at trial. See,e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005).

The evidence reflected that Moxley removed the license plates from the car, removed personal identification papers - including the vehicle title¹ - with another person's name from the vehicle, apparently left hurriedly when an officer arrived while he was cleaning the car, and then was found hiding later only after other officers arrived at the scene and conducted a search. The state high court's conclusion that a jury...