Moxley v. Vaughn
| Decision Date | 15 July 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 11065,11065 |
| Citation | 416 P.2d 536,148 Mont. 30 |
| Parties | William E. MOXLEY, Jr., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Monida S. VAUGHN, Individually, and as Executrix of the Estate of Charles E. Pew, deceased, First National Bank and Trust Co., a corporation, Commerce Bank and Trust Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Leif Erickson (argued), Helena, Jerrold R. Richards, (argued), Helena, Higgs, Fletcher & Mock, San Diego, cal., for appellant.
Galusha & Meloy, Helena, John R. Kline, (argued), Helena, for respondents.
The appellant, William E. Moxley, Jr., brought this action requesting that he be declared the owner of certain property in the City of Helena. The District Court of the First Judicial District rendered judgment, and this appeal is from a portion of that judgment.
Prior to her death on November 22, 1961, Cora Read Pew was the sole owner of certain real estate in the City of Helena commonly known as No. 312 Fuller Avenue. She entered into a contract with the 312 Fuller Avenue, Inc., for the sale of that property. Charles E. Pew, her husband, joined in the execution of the contract. This contract, after setting forth the terms of payment, specified that all payments were to be made to the First National Bank and Trust Company of Helena, Montana, for the credit of Cora Read and Charles E. Pew. It further provided that such payments be deposited by said bank in an account subject to draft by Cora Read and Charles E. Pew or either of them or their survivor.
This contract was still in effect when Cora Read Pew died. Her will provided that all her property be distributed as follows:
'1. To Charles E. Pew, my husband, for his lifetime, with the right in him to use the same as he shall see fit, and the right to sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise handle and dispose of the same, and to use the income and the principal thereof for his subsistence, comfort and enjoyment, but without the right to dispose of any thereof by will.
Charles E. Pew was appointed executor of this will and the estate of Cora Read Pew was probated. The decree approving the final report and distributing the estate was entered by the court. It provided in part that the residue consisting of the No 312 Fuller Avenue property subject to Contract of Sale, and all sums paid upon said Contract of Sale and other property, is hereby distributed to Charles E. Pew, for his lifetime. It also provided, as did the will of Cora Read Pew, that he could use the property as he saw fit, sell it, or otherwise dispose of it, and use the principal and income thereof for his subsistence and enjoyment, 'but without the right to dispose of any thereof by will.'
Thereafter, Charles E. Pew died and respondent, Monida S. Vaughn, was named executrix of his estate. She was also the sole beneficiary under his will. In probate of the estate of Charles E. Pew the respondent claimed the Fuller Avenue property as her property and listed it in the inventory filed by her. Thereafter, this lawsuit was filed in which the appellant claimed to be the owner of the vendor's interest in the contract for sale of the Fuller Avenue Property and of all payments on that contract since the death of Charles E. Pew. It was appellant's belief that under the will of Cora Read Pew, Charles E. Pew had only a life interest in these properties, and that upon the death of Charles E. Pew, he, the appellant, succeeded to her interests.
The respondent claims to be the owner of these properties as beneficiary and executrix of the estate of Charles E. Pew. It is her contention that the contract of sale of the Fuller Avenue property created a joint tenancy in the vendor's interest therein and that Charles E. Pew became the sole owner of said vendor's interest as the survivor of the alleged joint tenancy.
The district court found that the contract of sale of the Fuller Avenue property was a joint tenancy contract, and pursuant to its terms Charles E. Pew, upon surviving Cora Read Pew, became the sole owner of said contract; that upon the death of Charles E. Pew, the respondent became entitled to the contract and all payments made thereon and to be made thereon; and that the probate court in the estate of Cora Read Pew had no jurisdiction over the contract except to terminate the joint tenancy therein.
The appellant specifies the district court to be in error in all the above findings except that the respondent is entitled to all payments made to the First National Bank and Trust Company prior to the death of Charles E. Pew.
The central issue raised by this appeal is whether the contract for the sale of the Furller Avenue property and the joint bank account was joint tenancy property which became the sole property of Charles E. Pew upon the death of Cora Read Pew, or whether this property was residue of the estate of Cora Read Pew and passed to the appellant upon the death of Charles E. Pew. The appellant contends the property was residue of the estate of Cora Read Pew as provided in the decree of distribution of her estate, and that under section 91- 3902, R.C.M.1947, this decree cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding.
The rule governing the collateral attack of a decree of distribution has been set forth in Bell's Estate v. State, 134 Mont. 345, 331 P.2d 517. It is as follows:
The respondent contends that the court in the Estate of Cora Read Pew committed such an act. The respondent states that the property in question was joint tenancy...
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Hughes v. Hughes
...interest, the deceased's interest therein must be held to be a tenancy in common. 'In light of our decision in Moxley (v. Vaughn (1966), 148 Mont. 30, 416 P.2d 536) we find no merit in Birkeland's contention that the sellers are either joint tenants or tenants in common as to the proceeds o......
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Higgins v. Montana Hotel Corp.
...the judgment role (sic) that the court did not have jurisdiction or committed an act in excess of jurisdiction." Moxley v. Vaughn (1966), 148 Mont. 30, 34, 416 P.2d 536, 538. No such showing has been made herein. The fact that this foreclosure was decreed by default is of little consequence......
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Rickner's Estate, In re
...property interest, the deceased's interest therein must be held to be a tenancy in common. We refer to the case of Moxley v. Vaughn, 148 Mont. 30, 35, 416 P.2d 536, wherein Cora Read Pew was the sole owner of real property. She entered into a contract for the sale of the property. Charles E......