Moy v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 04 October 1923
• Docket Number: No. 15285.,15285.
• Citation: 140 N.E. 845,309 Ill. 242
• Parties: MOY et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

309 Ill. 242

140 N.E. 845

MOY et al.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

No. 15285.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1923.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1923.

Suit by George Moy and others against the City of Chicago and others. Decree of dismissal, and complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles M. Foell, judge.

Jacob Levy, of Chicago, for appellants.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Albert S. O'Sullivan, of Mound City, of counsel), for appellees.

THOMPSON, J.

The city of Chicago passed an ordinance regulating the establishment and operation of laundries and making it unlawful for any person to operate a laundry without a license. Among other things, the ordinance provides that no laundry shall be established or conducted in any building which is not equipped to provide sufficient natural light on clear days to ‘show a minimum illumination of five-foot candles' in all parts of each room; that no person shall be permitted to sleep in any laundry or in any room in direct connection with such laundry; that all rooms used as a laundry or for the storage of laundered or unlaundered fabrics shall be kept in good repair and in a clean and sanitary condition; that no person who has a communicable or contagious disease shall be employed in any laundry; that all rooms used for laundry purposes shall be ventilated so that a complete change of air in all parts of such rooms may be made at least four times each hour; that there shall be at least 1,000 cubic feet of air space provided for each person employed therein; that the floors of all such rooms shall be substantial, tight floors, constructed of impervious material, and shall be properly drained to a public sewer; that every laundry shall be equipped with adequate sanitary plumbing, drainage, and lavatory facilities; and provides a penalty for the violation of any of the provisions. On behalf of themselves and all other persons interested, appellants filed a bill to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that it is void. A general demurrer was filed, a hearing was had before the chancellor, and the bill was dismissed for want of equity. The chancellor granted an appeal to this court.

Appellants argue that the ordinance is passed pursuant to the eighty-second paragraph of section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Laws of 1919, p. 285). This paragraph was declared void in People v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 134 N. E. 740. If the ordinance depended upon this paragraph for its validity, it could not stand. The ordinance is clearly a health regulation, and the city had authority, under paragraph 78 of the same section, to pass the ordinance. That paragraph provides that the city shall have power ‘to do all acts, make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease.’ This clause gives the city the power to compel any owner or occupant of a building to keep it in a sanitary condition and to conduct his business so that it will not endanger the health of the employees or of the public. City of Chicago v. Pettibone & Co., 267 Ill. 573, 108 N. E. 698. We have held that the city has authority, under this provision, to regulate the conduct of bakeries (City of Chicago v. Drogasawacz, 256 Ill. 34, 99 N. E. 869) and the distribution of milk (Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 Ill. 122, 104 N. E. 1104, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 67). Under paragraph 66, which gives cities the power to ‘pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances,’ the city council is given authority to pass this ordinance to carry out the purposes of paragraph 78. Paragraph 66 is not a delegation to the municipalities of all the police powers of the state, but it gives municipalities the power to pass and enforce all police ordinances which may be necessary in reference to the subjects and occupations which by other specific paragraphs such municipalities are given express authority to regulate and control. City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753. Before an ordinance can be sustained as an exercise of the police power, it must tend in some degree toward the accomplishment of the object sought to be attained. If it clearly had no reasonable relation to any of the subjects over which municipalities are given authority of regulation and control, the ordinance would be invalid as an unauthorized invasion of private rights. It is manifest that the laundry business is of that character which without proper regulation may create unsanitary and unhealthful conditions, and that by the employment therein of persons suffering from communicable or contagious diseases, or by the improper mixing and laundering of the soiled linens of different people, the health of the public is seriously endangered. There seems to be no doubt that the city had authority, under paragraphs 66 and 78, to regulate the establishment and operation of laundries and to provide a license fee to care for the additional expense incurred by the city in properly enforcing such regulation.

It is next contended that the ordinance is void for the reason that it delegates to the health commissioner legislativepowers. Section 3 provides that he shall recommend the issuance of a license to a laundry if he ...